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DEMOCEAOY 

A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT 



DEMOCRACY 



A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT 



BY 

JAMES HrHYSLOP, Ph.D. 

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND ETHICS IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER^S SONS 
1899 



^H-\^ 



0) \<Z\L 



2 






COPTRIGHT, 1899, BT 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

• -■ -^r^ES REG. ^,4^Q. 




TROW DIRECTORY 

PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING COMPANY 

NEW YORK 



THIS BOOK 

IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED 

TO ALL THOSE WHO DESPISE POLITICS 



PEEFACE 

Carljle, after showing Emerson the House of 
Commons, thought he would annihilate his friend's 
optimism in politics by abruptly asking him, 
^' Don't you believe in the Devil now?" The 
memory of this incident, and the condition of 
things in this country, suggested that the title for 
the present essay should be " The Devil's Harness." 
But publishers might fear a hon mot for a title, 
and the advocates of popular government might 
resent the imputations which it would seem to 
carry against their idol. Yet tragedy and comedy 
are sufficiently mingled in politics to justify a lit- 
tle jeu d^esprit in the proposition to restrain some 
of the tendencies of the age. Besides, it is hard 
to resist the temptation to indulge in a little irony 
at the expense of Mr. Lecky for his pessimism 
respecting democracy, even if the sequel should 
reveal more sympathy with his criticisms than 
usually lurks in satire. I have considered Mr. 
Lecky half right and half wrong: right in his 
animadversions, but wrong in his implied demand 
for a return to eighteenth century methods. Such a 
verdict, however, while it allows a writer the privi- 

ix 



X PREFACE 

leges of a critic, also imposes duties tliat command 
the consideration of remedies for the political evils 
which it was not a part of Mr. Lecky's task to sug- 
gest. Of mere criticism, by both classes of political 
students, we have had enough, and more than 
enough. It is high time that something positive 
and constructive should be proposed. Barking at 
the Devil is not sufficient. Wearied, therefore, 
with the perpetual grumbling which is either un- 
able to see a way out of the confusion, or too cynical 
and hopeless to try an escape, I have thrown all 
diffidence aside, and ventured, with an audacity 
that may surprise others as much as it does myself, 
to offer for debate a complete system of govern- 
ment, which is neither a reaction toward monarchy 
nor an acceptance of the status quo. If that con- 
fession frightens the reader, I beg of him to re- 
member two things: (1) That the complexity of 
modern civilisation is so great that a single mod- 
ification of political machinery will not suffice to 
solve the whole problem. (2) That the two main 
principles upon which the theory of government 
should be based are the adequate and immediate 
responsibility of the executive and legislative 
branches, and the integration and differentiation 
of functions which have operated so successfully 
in the organic and industrial worlds. If these two 
things are properly considered, there will be reason 
to think charitably of so large an undertaking, 



PREFACE ai 

especially that the author does not profess to regard 
it as an object of immediate practical politics, but 
only a conception of government which it is neces- 
sary to have in mind when proposing measures of 
reform. 

It may interest some students of political ques- 
tions to know that the reflections which instigated 
this attempt to construct a system of government 
were the result of my study of the poverty prob- 
lem on the one hand, and of the exacting and 
impossible demands of civic duty on the other. 
N^ot that the outcome offers any cure for destitu- 
tion, but that the study of it in connection with 
universal suffrage and the growing tendencies to 
Socialism convinced me that the solution of the 
political problem was the key to much else besides. 
What the poverty problem suggested was. the ne- 
cessity of methods that would both diminish the 
influence of a class which can neither govern itself 
nor others, and secure more responsibility for pub- 
lic oflicials, and with it more intelligence and hon- 
esty in the execution of their duties. What our 
exorbitant civic duties suggested was the necessity 
of simplifying the functions of the citizen. A man 
cannot be expected to spend every night at some 
campaign committee meeting. On the one hand, 
the people care very little for abstract politics, and 
object to despotic powers only when they feel its 
abuses personally. On the other hand, the citizens 



xii PREFACE 

shirk their duties, partly because they feel powerless 
to effect any reforms, partly because they cannot 
understand the many problems that they are called 
to solve, and partly because life has other pleasures 
and obligations than talking politics and running 
to the polls when the choice of rulers is between 
knaves. This situation led to a study of modern 
democracy and of political institutions whose de- 
velopment has not kept pace with the general 
growth of complexity in civilisation. I found no 
way out of the labyrinth, therefore, but to search 
for the principle upon which the regulation of com- 
plex social conditions should be based, and then to 
work it out in practical proposals which might at 
least illustrate the theory of government, if they did 
not offer a simple remedy for our troubles. We 
may shake our heads at the magnitude of the 
scheme which has been proposed, but the excuse for 
it is the real magnitude of the problem itself and the 
necessity for some general theory of government 
which shall be different from the method of " checks 
and balances," now obsolete, and which will offer an 
intelligible goal to such reforms as the condition of 
the age may make practicable and imperative. To 
those, however, who may be tempted to look for 
something simpler than the present proposals as a 
whole, I may say that there is no demand for a 
sudden revolution, or the casting of a whole new 
constitution, in order to move toward the end here 



PREFACE 



suggested. The last few pages of tlie work will 
show how great reforms may be initiated by small 
changes which may be left to grow. But I have 
provided in the larger view of the problem an 
articulated system of means for satisfying the com- 
plex demands of government as a whole, and a 
prin<!iple that may help to guide the development 
which a few practical measures may initiate. This 
is the apology for so large a speculation. The rest 
may be left to a critical public, while I am willing 
to see the work a scapegoat, if only it may set my 
countrymen to thinking. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I. 

PAGE 

Introduction 1 



CHAPTER 11. 

The Nature of the Problem .... 38 

CHAPTER III. 
Practical Remedies 121 



DEMOCRACY 

CHAPTEE I 

INTEODUCTION 

Mr. Lecky's recent work on " Democracy and 
Liberty " is more than a personal and isolated 
opinion on the tendencies of democratic institu- 
tions. It represents a wide-spread interest in the 
developments of modern politics. This is evinced 
by its reception among both friends and critics, 
who are conscious of the grave problems before us, 
but are undecided in regard to the remedy and 
divide only when the question is raised whether 
we should retrace our steps toward the political 
methods of the past or continue in the general di- 
rection in which we have started. I^or is Mr. 
Lecky's work a mere pessimistic outburst of one 
who does not like to witness political change, like 
the immortal polemic of Burke against the French 
Revolution, but it is a serious and grave accusa- 
tion, supported by a large array of facts which are 
well calculated to arouse the defenders of democ- 
racy from their lethargic optimism. Few could 

1 



2 DEMOCEACT 

have imagined that such an immense and accumu- 
lative mass of facts was accessible to gratify the 
critic and to annoy the devotees of popular gov- 
ernment. Thirty years ago such a work would not 
have been possible, or if possible would hardly have 
received more than a passing notice. Democracy 
was then enjoying the full exuberance of youth, at 
least in its modern form and in so far as the popular 
enthusiasm was concerned, and only the few who 
knew history and the theory of politics could have 
restrained their allegiance to its ideals or appreci- 
ated the need of caution. The ISTew World had 
cut itself loose from the Old and attempted to work 
out its own destiny without any conscious regard 
to the past. The past had an influence on its in- 
stitutions, but only a few master men in this early 
history were either aware of it or could direct po- 
litical tendencies in any conservative channels. 
The majority of the people in the new continent 
knew too little of the past to be consciously influ- 
enced by its political ideals. This is even true of 
nearly every feature of its life, but especially in 
matters of religion and politics, and it has required 
the acute analysis of nien like Sir Henry Maine to 
discover any connection between our forms of 
government and those of the mother country. 
Even these seem to have been adopted without any 
profound knowledge of their nature, and it has 
required a century of experience and advancing 



INTRODUCTION 3 

enlightenment to enable us to discover the tenden- 
cies of our policy. Hence there are many observa- 
tions in Mr. Lecky's volumes which could not have 
been made a generation or more ago. Their gen- 
eral distrust of democratic government is a char- 
acteristic as old as political speculation, in fact a 
maxim with Aristotle, and would not have dis- 
turbed the easy contentment of the last generation, 
for the reason that the alarming symptoms of the 
present had not appeared, though Macaulay's warn- 
ing that our institutions would be more severely 
tested when we had our Manchesters and Liver- 
pools, was given in time to make us think and even 
pause. The times, however, have changed. Un- 
foreseen events have altered the situation, popu- 
lation has increased so as to heighten the struggle 
for existence, industrial development has compli- 
cated all social arrangements, customs, and morality, 
the pauper and semi-pauper classes hold the balance 
of power in politics with its blighting influences, 
and assaults on popular government can no longer 
be received with good-natured contempt and indif- 
ference. Above all, the doctrine of evolution has 
completely modified our ethical point of view from 
that of equality and mercy to the right of the strong 
and its aristocratic implications. Even the friends 
of democracy have been forced either to call 
for reforms or to acquiesce in their establish- 
ment in order to arrest the rapid progress toward 



4 DEMOCRACY 

destruction, and this very confession of solicitude 
involved in such concessions affords some invigora- 
tion for the forces of reaction. When the idolaters 
of democracy begin to falter or to retreat it is time 
for the philosophers to take courage. That the 
status of political conditions is what it is here rep- 
resented to be can best be shown by comparing 
the work of Mr. Lecky with that of De Tocqueville, 
and both with the political circumstances in which 
they arose. 

De Tocqueville's volumes on '^ Democracy in 
America " are interesting on more than one ac- 
count, and on none more than for their relation to 
the personality of the man and to the age in which 
he lived. He was an aristocrat by birth and educa- 
tion, and in spite of the natural influence of such 
antecedents upon his ideas he transcended his in- 
herited prejudices in his estimation of democratic 
institutions, not only so far as to treat them in a 
tolerant spirit, beyond mere submission to the in- 
evitable, but even to favour and to encourage their 
hopes, while he sought to moderate expectation and 
to warn the more adventurous among the sup- 
porters of democracy against the rocks and shoals 
that lay concealed in the path of its progress. It 
was his moral sympathies with man as man, with 
the plebs as well as with the nobility, that enabled 
him to be just toward democracy, while his knowl- 
edge of the vices and weakness of the classes that 



TNTIWDUOTION' 5 

possess more rights than duties inclined him to 
favour the aristocratic classes as the proper recipients 
of political power if they could, even from motives 
of self-interest, be induced to pay some homage to 
justice. The predominant characteristic of his 
mind was his sympathy with the rights of man and 
his consciousness that only the few are qualified to 
dispense impartially the justice which civilisation 
demands. Hence he divided his allegiance between 
the aims of democracy and the instruments of 
aristocracy. But he could hardly foresee the exact 
conditions which modern political students have to 
consider when they are called upon to discuss the 
problems of government. He was fresh from that 
fiery ordeal which had destroyed the tyranny of 
feudal institutions, and the most conservative, when 
they remembered the terrible injustice of the pre- 
revolutionary policy in France, and whatever their 
fears about democracy, could hardly have wished 
to see any return to the policies of Louis XIV. and 
Louis XY. He saw that social, political, and relig- 
ious conditions had changed and that traditional 
methods could not meet the present exigencies of 
government; hence he accepted democracy with 
a tolerant though critical spirit, and indirectly, if 
not directly, allayed among intelligent men some 
of the suspicions naturally entertained against the 
new regime and the spirit of revolt which it em- 
bodied against the past — a spirit that seemed to 



6 DEMOCRACY 

discriminate very little between the good and the 
bad in traditional institutions and that, conse- 
quently, was dominated by a desire to reconstruct 
civil government upon entirely new and opposite 
lines. He saw that the new tendency contained, 
for the time at least, a cure for the evils which only 
a hater of justice would defend or ignore, and 
hence bespoke for it that favour and toleration 
which human rights can claim as their legitimate 
protection. He was neither an optimist nor a 
pessimist in regard to democracy. The future of 
it was too little known to make him the former, 
and the conditions from which society had escaped 
by the French Revolution prevented him from 
being the latter. He recognised the evils of ar- 
bitrary government and its want of regard for in- 
dividual rights, and rather than encourage the 
reaction which interested monarchists preferred, he 
chose to admit at least the relative merits of insti- 
tutions which offered the only immediate escape 
from intolerable despotism. He therefore mediated 
between the advocates and opponents of democracy 
by refusing to indulge either in abstract speculation 
or in adulation for feudal imperialism, and by ac- 
cepting the claims of popular government to satisfy 
the demands for better justice against the abuses 
that were inseparably associated w^ith traditional 
policy. It was evident that the first problem of 
democratic government at that time was defensive 



INTR OD UGTION 7 

of riglits wliose security could not be assured in 
the hands of absolutists ; and whatever its weakness 
in constructive policy, the necessity for securing 
justice and liberty of any kind was so urgent that 
apology for some natural defects was easy, if not 
imperative, and the progress of civilisation ap- 
peared possible only by preventing a return to 
those political methods which would have been 
doubly cruel and oppressive, because they would 
not only have represented the principles of the past, 
but they would have embodied a reactionary tri- 
umph against the growth of liberty. De Tocque- 
ville could therefore consistently uphold the spirit 
of democracy while cautioning its advocates against 
irrational enthusiasm for unfulfilled hopes and 
against equally irrational antagonism to the past. 

It was in a letter to a friend that he himself sum- 
marised his own political convictions and sympa- 
thies more satisfactorily than any one else could 
do it for him. I therefore quote his own language. 
" People/' he said, " want to make me a party man, 
which I am not. They ascribe to me passions when 
I have only opinions — or rather but one passion, 
the love of freedom and human dignity. All forms 
of government are in my eyes but means to satisfy 
this sacred and lawful passion of man. Democratic 
and aristocratic prejudices are alternately ascribed 
to me. I should perhaps have had these or those 
had I been born in another century or in another 



8 DEMOCRACY 

country; but the accident of my birth has easily 
enabled me to defend myself against either ten- 
dency. I came into the world at the end of a long 
revolution, which, after having destroyed the for- 
mer state of things, had created nothing lasting in 
its place. Aristocracy was already dead when I 
began to live, and democracy was not yet in ex- 
istence. No instinct, therefore, impelled me blindly 
toward one or the other. I was an inhabitant of 
a country which had been for forty years trying 
everything and stopping definitely at nothing. I 
was not easily addicted to political illusions. Be- 
longing myself to the old aristocracy of my coun- 
try, I had no natural hatred or jealousy of aristoc- 
racy; nor had I any natural love of it, for people 
only attach themselves to what is in existence. I 
was near enough to judge it with knowledge, far 
enough to judge it without passion. The same may 
be said of the democratic element. I^o interest 
gave me a natural or necessary propensity to democ- 
racy; nor had democracy inflicted on me any 
personal injury. I had no particular motive to love 
it or to hate it, independently of my own reason. 
In a word, I was so well balanced between the past 
and the future that I did not feel myself naturally 
and instinctively drawn toward one or the other, 
and it was no great effort to me to take a tranquil 
survey of both sides.'' 

It was natural that an age of transition should 



INTJi OD UCTION 9 

bring, even from an aristocrat wlio had the sense 
of justice, some favourable expectations for democ- 
racy. More than this also, the influence of habit 
and tradition on mankind, which are the great con- 
servative forces of social, religious, and political 
life, would guarantee, as they did, that democracy 
would not at once exhibit its inherent tendencies, 
and that the momentum of what was best in pre- 
vious civilisation would continue into the new age, 
and carry its freight of blessing into the institutions 
that claim no direct lineage with aristocracy and 
would hardly acknowledge any inheritance from it. 
But Mr. Lecky lives in another generation. The 
destructive work of democracy has largely been 
accomplished, and it has had to reconstruct the 
order of society after the momentum of the tradi- 
tions which half sustained it at first had exhausted 
itself. The obstinacy and pride of aristocratic 
ideas have either been destroyed or reduced to the 
necessity of making favourable terms with the en- 
emy, sometimes even wearing the mask of popular 
institutions. Democracy has become triumphant, 
in theory at least, if not in practice, and where its 
fruits are not threatened by the ugly spectre of 
anarchy and socialism. From being a militant 
force against tyranny it has become the vehicle of 
that power for which it was supposed to be a safe 
substitute, and against which it was equally a pro- 
test and a competitor. It has had a comparatively 



10 DEMOCRACY 

free field for developing its policy and for fulfilling 
the hopes and promises of its votaries. It has 
undertaken its Herculean task in a sanguine mood 
and applied its machinery with unswerving devo- 
tion and confidence in its destiny. A century has 
passed and it still keeps on with the zeal of a mis- 
sionary. It has lost none of the momentum which 
it received from the original impulse, and cherishes, 
if anything, an increased fear and animosity against 
monarchical power, though usurping and exercis- 
ing functions quite as capricious, as irresponsible, 
and as dangerous to human welfare and the best re- 
sults of civilisation as the despotism for which it pro- 
fessed to be a cure. Consequently the political 
millennium seems to be as far off as ever, and democ- 
racy has still to learn the lessons of its weakness 
and failure in the constitutions of Greece and 
Rome. Not that we are to consider Greece and 
Rome as pure illustrations of either its beneficent 
or its maleficent power, for they were in reality 
aristocracies founded upon slavery and a limited 
suffrage. But they conceded enough to popular 
sovereignty to exhibit its tendency when the strug- 
gle arose between free and slave labor on the one 
hand, and the large and small landholders on the 
other; so that their inevitable result was imperial- 
ism, after avenging their wrongs upon aristocracy. 
Ignorance and slavery were the weakness of ancient 
democracy, as the former is of the present, while 



INTRODUCTION- 11 

tliey were the nemesis against aristocratic pride 
and distinction ; and though modern democracy has 
not been handicapped to the same extent by either 
of these forces, it has not been wholly exempt from 
class envy and the vanities of social distinction, and 
has at the same time managed to combine enough 
of anarchic tendencies to disappoint the expecta- 
tions of its friends and to confirm the accusations 
of its enemies. There are many facts that indicate 
this general feeling. The disgust with French 
Republicanism, which is honeycombed with worse 
corruption than most of the monarchies, and which 
could not survive for a day except for the want 
of a respectable aspirant to the throne; the union 
of all parties in the world to suppress socialism and 
anarchism; the attitude of Castelar toward the 
Spanish monarchy after a life spent in the advocacy 
of republicanism; the recent English elections 
which revealed so much fear of radicalism; the 
ominous tendencies of American politics as exhib- 
ited in the recent presidential campaign — all these 
are symptoms of a condition' that is far from the 
Utopia which enthusiasts for democracy have 
promised us. It is not that the monarchies of the 
time represent any saintly virtues in their ambi- 
tions and exercise of power, but that the social and 
moral forces which democracy lets loose show no 
conservative respect for justice, law, and order. 
The government of our cities is the best evidence 



12 DEMOCRACY 

of tliis tendency. But the features that concern 
us more immediately are unjust taxation, costly 
government, " machine politics," the organisation 
of monopolies under state protective policy, de- 
generacy in the type of public officials, socialistic 
legislation, demagogic appeals to ignorance and 
private greed and betrayal of the hopes thus en- 
couraged, defiance of intelligent public opinion, 
blackmailing of corporations, conferment of special 
favours either openly or by indirection upon various 
business agencies, and perpetual meddling with the 
laws of trade and the rights of individuals. All 
these, which it would require many pages or a vol- 
ume to illustrate and prove, are the tendencies for 
which monarchy would have very quickly paid the 
penalty, and which are all the more dangerous in 
that democracy can offer no resistance to them ex- 
cept by changing its own character and moderating 
its own power. Monarchy may be forced to reform 
or abdicate by the sheer influence of numbers 
against its aggressions, but democracy has no en- 
emy but itself, and has to be reformed from within 
and never from without. Democracy is made up 
of the individuals to be governed, and if they are 
the governors there will be no abdication and no 
external agencies to reform it in its derelictions. 

Mr. Lecky canvasses the development of demo- 
cratic influences in all modern countries affected 
by it in any form, as well as the laws, customs, and 



INTRODUCTION 13 

institutions adopted or attacked by it. Its relation 
to excessive taxation, to the corruption of the fran- 
chise, to the decHne in legislative morality, to the 
institution of private property which it was sup- 
posed to securely protect, to municipal corruption, 
to the exclusion of the best talent and character 
from its legislative and executive councils, and to 
laxity in public and private morals — all these sub- 
jects are discussed at a length which cannot even 
be summarised here to illustrate the nature of his 
accusations. But I shall quote one passage in il- 
lustration of the animadversions that are stored up 
in his two volumes, even to the extent of prolixity. 
" The government of cities," says Mr. Lecky, 
quoting Mr. Bryce, " is the one consj)icuous failure 
of the United States. The faults of the State 
governments are insignificant compared with the 
extravagance, corruption, and mismanagement 
which mark the administration of most of the great 
cities. For these evils are not confined to one or 
two cities. There is not a city with a population 
of 200,000 where the poison-germs have not sprung 
into vigorous life, and in some of the smaller ones, 
down to 70,000, it needs no microscope to note the 
results of their growth. Even in cities of the third 
rank similar phenomena may occasionally be dis- 
cerned; though there, as some one has said, the 
jet-black of ^ew York or San Francisco dies away 
into a harmless gTay. It should be added," con- 



14 DEMOCRACY 

tiniies Mr. Lecky, ^' that there is no country in the 
world in which this question is more important 
than in the United States^ for there is no country 
in which town life during the present century has 
increased so enormously and so rapidly. The pro- 
portion of the population who live in towns of over 
8,000 inhabitants is said to have risen in that period 
from four to twenty-three per cent. 

^' Mr. Bryce has enumerated from good Ameri- 
can sources the chief forms which this municipal 
robbery assumes. There are sales of monopolies in 
the use of public thoroughfares; systematic jobbing 
of contracts; enormous abuses of patronage; enor- 
mous overcharges for necessary public works. 
Cities have been compelled to buy land for parks 
and places because the owners wished to sell them; 
to grade, pave, and sewer streets without inhab- 
itants in order to award corrupt contracts for the 
works; to purchase worthless properties at ex- 
travagant prices; to abolish one office and create 
another with the same duties, or to vary the func- 
tions of offices for the sole purpose of redistributing 
official emoluments; to make or keep the salary of 
an office unduly high in order that its tenant may 
pay largely to the party funds; to lengthen the term 
of office in order to secure the tenure of corrupt 
or incompetent men. When increasing taxation 
begins to arouse resistance, loans are launched un- 
der false pretences, and often with the assistance 



INTRODUCTION 15 

of falsified accoiTnts. In all the cliief towns munici- 
pal debts have risen to colossal dimensions and in- 
creased with portentous rapidity. ^ Within the 
twenty years from 1860 to 1880/ says an Ameri- 
can writer, ' the debts of the cities of the Union 
rose from about $100,000,000 to $682,000,000. 
From 1860 to 1875 the increase of debt in eleven 
cities was 270.9 per cent., increase of taxation 
362.2 per cent.; whereas the increase in taxable 
valuation was but 156.9 per cent, and increase in 
population but 70 per cent.' The ^N^ew York Com- 
missioners of 1876 probably understated the case 
when they declared that more than one-half of all 
the present city debts in the United States are the 
direct results of intentional and corrupt misrule." 

This is one concrete example of Mr. Lecky's 
facts to prove his case, and I dare say that almost 
any citizen can verify such allegations from his 
own observations. In truth, volumes of them could 
be produced in support of Mr. Lecky, if his asser- 
tions are questioned. The history of the New York 
and Erie Canal is one of the best instances of no- 
torious corruption which democracy has not been 
able to prevent, and it is only one of the thousands 
of cases that prevent any mitigation of the sus- 
picions against democracy. The instances are not 
sporadic enough to relieve it of the distrust directed 
against it. 

It is against all such defects and fatal tendencies 



16 DEMOCRACY 

as these facts betray that Mr. Lecky's work is an 
impeachment without a remedy, and herein lies 
both the strength and the weakness of his position. 
Its strength appears in the circumstance that his 
opponents must refute his facts instead of picking 
flaws in a theory of government. On the other 
hand, the weakness of his method lies in the fact 
that it offers no cure for an evil which he implies 
is menacing, if he does not pronounce it intolerable. 
If Mr. Lecky had proposed a remedy involving 
any revolutionary tendencies backward his com- 
plaints would have gotten a very ready hearing and 
received hostile criticism enough. But mankind 
are indulgent even of evil when they see no way 
out of it. Change of any kind that does not clearly 
promise redemption from intolerable conditions is 
often feared as a worse evil than the status quo. 
We become adjusted to our environment and are 
content to remain in the worst of circumstances, 
in spite of complaint, if there is no hope of im- 
provement. Men will bear the burdens they have 
rather than rush into evils they know not of. 
Hence they demand the promise of some paradise 
as an incentive to action for the improvement of 
the present in any respect. Mr. Lecky must, there- 
fore, suffer from this instinct and inertia, which 
will not move to change even conscious evil, unless 
under the stimulus of hope and positive proposals. 
This conservatism which attaches itself as readily 



INTR OB TICTION 17 

to democracies as to other forms of society will set 
about criticising any proposition to change, espe- 
cially if it be reactionary, instead of reforming the 
abuses laid to the charge of democracy. 

But it is no refutation of Mr. Lecky to decry the 
perils of monarchy. He has only assailed the op- 
timism and rosy promises of those who have offered 
society salvation from the injustice of the past by 
popular sovereignty, but who now seem to have given 
us a stone^ for bread. They are making the bitter 
discovery that civilisation depends upon something 
more than political machinery. It may be tantalis- 
ing to be placed where the argument must be di- 
rected against facts instead of against a theory, but 
if the advocates of democracy are given the chance 
to use a iu quoque reply as the only escape from 
confusion, they are certain to evade the issue and 
to run off into matters that will only throw dust 
into our eyes. Mr. Lecky is therefore wise in his 
policy of limiting the discussion to the facts that 
impeach the value of democratic institutions, 
though he seems to favor a return to the despised 
politics of the last century. He can thereby en- 
force attention to the first and most important issue, 
which is the actual cause of present evils, whatever 
the remedy, rather than to a political theory which 
opponents of reform or change can easily assault. 

It would require much space merely to sum- 
marise Mr. Lecky's indictments against democracy. 



18 DEMOCRAOY 

But it is neither desirable nor necessary to do so, 
as the scope and object of this volume does not 
demand a review of his criticisms. It suffices to 
remark the nature and extent of his animadversions, 
which turn upon every important function of gov- 
ernment and social morality, and which reflect a 
growing distrust of democratic machinery, espe- 
cially in regard to the most fundamental principles 
of civilisation, namely, the rights of private prop- 
erty and of private contract, in order to see what 
strength the attacks upon democratic institutions 
have. Mr. Lecky's observations and convictions 
are not advanced to prove the alleged defects, but 
to show what the tendency is among thoughtful 
men, and that it has to be met whether it is right 
or not. Sir Henry Maine's reflections on the same 
subject are equally suggestive. He also reminds 
optimists in very trenchant language of the ob- 
stacles that they have to overcome in sustaining the 
alleged perfections of popular government, and 
events themselves are forcing attention to the fact. 
But if the critics of democracy, whether by asser- 
tion or innuendo, think that we must return to 
mediaeval policy as the only escape from anarchy, 
they are hugging a delusion of a most inexcusable 
kind and betray complete ignorance of the prin- 
ciples from which reform can be expected. Not 
that the writers above-mentioned are uncompromis- 
ing sticklers for the virtues of the past, for they 



INTRODUCTION' 19 

are mainly critics, but that they are exposed to the 
suspicion of at least covertly harbouring motives 
of this sort, because reaction is the natural resource 
of thought when it finds its hopes regarding an 
institution disappointed. History never goes back- 
ward, even when it is supposed to repeat itself, and 
though decline may seem to mark certain periods 
of the process. Each step of change involves the 
destruction of something that cannot be restored, 
but, at the same time, the institution of some new 
result that cannot be otherwise obtained. There 
may be retrograde motion in some particulars, but 
not in the whole mass of the social organism, unless 
all progress is to be denied. IsTor is it that we are 
to expect political redemption by continuing as we 
are; for democratic government requires radical v,.^ 
modifications, if it is to fulfil the pretensions of its // 
admirers and to escape the present tendencies toward 
anarchy. But it is just as true that the monarchical 
institutions of the Middle Ages are as obsolete as the 
Holy Roman Empire, and for the same reasons. 
The development of individualism in state, church, 
and industry; the complexity of our civilisation, 
due to the solidarity of economic interests; the 
diversity of sentiments, racial, social, and religious, 
extending over large areas of territory, and the 
deeply imbued jealousy against arbitrary power 
which possesses the majority of mankind, have 
made very doubtful, if not impossible, any return 



30 DEMOCRACY 

to the past forms of government that are not ac- 
companied by adequate limitations and security for 
the intelligent and moral exercise of power. But 
even if the social forces of to-day are not inclined 
to accept reactionary measures of reform, this fact 
proves neither the wisdom of developing unmodi- 
fied our present tendencies nor the fitness of the 
multitude to work out its own salvation without 
a change of political machinery. Although the 
masses have emancipated themselves from the po- 
litical tyranny of the Middle Ages, at least as they 
imagined it to be, they have not emancipated them- 
selves from the tyranny of their own improvidence, 
vices, and ignorance, which are not only quite as 
hard masters as unscrupulous despots, but are cer- 
tain to produce political powers of that type. Those 
who cannot govern themselves cannot successfully 
govern others. They may have removed certain 
external restraints upon their freedom, which they 
interpret without any regard to the rights of others, 
but have not yet learned to exercise that liberty 
either in behalf of their own interests or consis- 
tently with the equal rights of their neighbors. 
They have obtained liberty without the correspond- 
ing intelligence and morality necessary to insure 
happiness, and so have gained power without re- 
sponsibility, an immunity that should belong only 
to saints and gods. I do not mean to imply, how- 
ever, that men should not have any liberty unless 



INTRODUCTION 31 

they can avoid all mistakes and abuses of it. I 
mean to draw a distinction between the liberty to 
pursue one's own affairs and the liberty to exercise 
the functions of government. Liberty and power 
to govern others has far more limitations than the 
liberty or right to compete freely with others in 
the struggle for existence. In the latter case free- 
dom may be the ciu-e for its own abuses, but power 
to govern others or to determine social policy re- 
quires a grade of intelligence and morality not 
always commensurate with the right to personal 
liberty in private matters. But these qualities do 
not distinguish the multitude. They are short- 
sighted and capricious in their political action, 
moved by passion and selfish interest, inferior in 
their ideals, intellectual and moral, to those who 
are capable of keeping up the standard of civilisa- 
tion, and while claiming the immunities and rights 
of political power blindly follow the unscrupulous 
leadership of demagogues and scoundrels. And it 
neither refutes this accusation nor provides a solu- 
tion for our political problem to say that their more 
successful rivals for power often exhibit similar 
defects of character: for too frequently the pos- 
sessors of this poAver are merely their own bene- 
ficiaries, and as far below the standard of high 
civilisation as their constituency can make them. 
Moreover, this multitude is moved more by per- 
sonality than by principles, when the latter are 



22 DEMOCRACY 

the condition of successful democracy if executive 
functions are to be minimised. Furtherj the masses 
refuse to share the economic risks of modern in- 
dustrial life, as shown in the fact that labor com- 
binations reject co-operation as a basis of social 
reform; they are improvident in marriage and the 
use of their incomes, this delinquency producing 
the competitive conditions against which they com- 
plain so bitterly; they are fully confident of their 
ability to govern society, while they fail in self- 
government, and though demanding the fruits of 
knowledge are as fatally jealous of intelligence as 
they are of political power. Add to this the fact 
.that the franchise confers upon them a sovereignty 
as absolute and irresponsible as any enjoyed by a 
mediaeval monarch, while their ignorance makes 
them as subservient to the arts of the demagogue 
as the besotted Greeks who followed Alcibiades 
and produced the Thirty Tyrants. This is a condi- 
tion of things which requires to be escaped as well 
as the much dreaded evils of monarchy, and it 
avails nothing to escape Scylla by rushing into 
Charybdis. 

The problem is much more than one of political 
machinery. It is also one of the ideas that furnish 
the motive power behind the machinery. The 
problem of constitutions is an important one, but it 
is subordinate to the intelligence and morality of 
the agencies that apply them. A constitution is an 



INTRODUCTION 23 

agreed rule of procedure and assumes that the citi- 
zen will treat it with respect and obey it. It is noth- 
ing but a basis for calculating the future and in- 
spiring confidence in those events that depend on 
the conjoint action of citizens. Consequently it is 
only an instrument for securing association in 
action w^here individual initiative would only re- 
veal many cross purposes without it. But its whole 
efiiciency is conditioned upon the willingness of 
citizens to abide by its requirements and upon the 
character of their action in applying it. Intel- 
lectual, moral, and economic conditions primarily 
determine the forces which we have to take into 
account in constructing the forms of government 
and in interpreting their usefulness. These forces 
express what the citizen will carry into effect. The 
constitution must represent the power of the best 
elements in the community, or it becomes merely 
a formal instrument for the sport of those who 
know how to evade it. It is an old maxim, too 
often forgotten by political students, that, impor- 
tant as machinery may be in the economy of gov- 
ernment, its usefulness depends upon its concrete 
embodiment of men and social forces in the lives 
of its citizens. It is ideas, whether consciously or 
unconsciously held, that rule human life, both 
social and individual, and they constitute the real 
forces that determine the efficiency of constitutions 
and political machinery. To make any political 



24 DEMOCRACY 

system successful for the object for which it is sup- 
posed to exist, there must be a common social idea 
to impel and govern it; otherwise, whether mo- 
narchic or democratic, it becomes an instrument 
either of anarchy or of despotism. This is to say 
that the primary point of view is the moral one, 
representing the forces behind the machine to make 
it go, and summarised they involve the 'proper 
adjustment of intelligence and character to power 
and responsibility. This is, of course, a truism, 
but we have to be reminded of it from time to time, 
partly as a starting-point for political reflection and 
partly because, simple as the maxim is, it is too 
often ignored or forgotten. What, then, are the 
ideas that govern modern life, and that make 
reactionary policies as unwise as they make reform 
imperative ? 

The answer to this question requires a brief sur- 
vey of history in regard to the great principles or 
general ideas that have dominated different periods. 
The great and fundamental difference between the 
past and the present is the difference between the 
economic and the ethical ideals'. The antithesis 
between the two may be denied, and both may be 
called ethical, if we like, but though they may be 
ethical in the broadest sense of the term, they are 
nevertheless of different types, the moral being 
more inclusive, and it will be convenient here to 
characterise them by the current antithesis between 



INTR OD UCTION 25 

economics and ethics, because the objects of the 
two kinds of volition are often different. But 
whether we choose to express the radical distinction 
between the past and the present by the prevailing 
antithesis between the ethical and the economical, 
there is certainly an important difference between 
the types of life characterised by modern economic 
impulses and mediaeval religious conceptions. The 
Middle Ages were dominated by the religious, and 
the present by the economic ideal. But what is 
meant by them? 

Eome bequeathed to mankind the idea of uni- 
versal empire, and Christianity the idea of immor- 
tality. One is a political and the other is a religious 
ideal, either giving zest to the ethical ideal or ter- 
minating in it. Their various characteristics will 
come up in another connection. But both of them 
in common represented two facts of great impor- 
tance. The first was the necessity of some sacrifice 
for the attainment of an end. The other was a 
common social object which insured co-operative 
action and which is possible only when men are 
united in interest and ideas. The political ideal 
involved the subjection or sacrifice of the individual 
to the state, and the religious ideal involved the 
sacrifice of the present to the future, a carnal to a 
spiritual life. The realisation of the political ideal 
required a central and imperial form of constitution 
with a military organisation and its correlate of 



26 DEMOCRACY 

absolute obedience. Hence tbe type of govern- 
ment, whatever called, was monarchic. The real- 
isation of the religions ideal demanded none of the 
functions of government at all. Its end was the 
perfection and the happiness of the individual, and 
though it was associated with the sovereignty of 
God and the affiliated idea of his government con- 
ceived after the political type of the time, no sub- 
jection to arbitrary human power was required to 
attain its object, until church and state were united. 
The kingdom of Gcd was in the individual; the 
kingdom of this world was outside of him. But 
born and bred in a condition of social chaos, when 
the only hope of happiness lay in aiming at a tran- 
scendental state of existence and in suppressing the 
carnal or materialistic life, the religious ideal cul- 
tivated spiritual aspirations and sacrifices that in- 
volved a disregard of worldly pleasures and emol- 
uments, of wealth and its enjoyments, and of all 
the material glory, pomp, and power that were 
embodied in the political conceptions of the age. 
Ancient politics represented the materialistic con- 
ception of life, though accompanied by institutions, 
themselves supported by religion and morality, such 
as the family, art, and science, which were destined 
to modify its pretensions and authority. But in 
spite of elements that were better than its im- 
perialism, antiquity confined its main object to the 
satisfaction of material and secular wants, and cul- 



mTR OB UCTION 27 

tivated national glory in the interest of pure ma- 
terialism, even if it was tinged with idealism, which 
is as compatible with sensuous as it is with spiritual 
ideals. The church, with its ideal of a paradisaic 
existence hereafter, kept alive the sacrifice of pres- 
ent enjoyment to immortality with its rewards, and 
thus encouraged an ascetic life with spiritualism as 
its philosophy. In its union with the state it com- 
bined both tendencies, adopting the secular type of 
social and political power and sustaining the sacri- 
fice of the individual to the whole, while subordi- 
nating the present to the future. 

But the final triumph of scepticism changed this 
situation. It both impaired the reverence for 
authority on which imperialism was founded and 
discredited the belief in immortality on which the 
religious ideal rested. The impairment of author- 
ity created the spirit of liberty, and the decline of 
the belief in immortality stimulated the economic 
ideal. Individualism became both political and 
industrial. Both influences established or encour- 
aged a spirit of jealousy against central and arbi- 
trary power, the one to protect personal liberty and 
the other to resist taxation. In this way began the 
reaction against the past. The economic ideal of 
the new age became the legatee of the materialism 
of imperial politics and of the individualism of 
religion, while democracy becomes the heir to the 
value of the individual associated with immortality. 



28 DEMOCRACY 

But in neither of these does the old spiritual ideal 
find a place. This is left as an unprotected dower 
to the church, which has itself become thoroughly 
infected with scepticism. The economic ideal has 
seized every department of human activity wher- 
ever the slightest tinge of sceptical influence has 
appeared. Corroborative of all this it is interesting 
to remark that industrial development and the 
growth of political liberty, if they do not mark 
their birth, certainly received a strong impulse from 
the Protestant Reformation and grew wherever 
Protestantism gained the ascendancy. Both indus- 
trial development and scepticism characterise an 
ideal or ideals that antagonise every principle that 
dominated the Holy Roman Empire; one of them 
the ^^ divine right of kings," and with it the asso- 
ciated imperialistic form of government, and the 
other the spiritual life in the kingdom of God, in 
so far as it was represented by a transcendental 
world beyond the grave. Consequently, the eco- 
nomic ideal which represents a purely secular type 
of life sets in operation, free from the fear of the 
gods, a whole system of motives opposed to the 
ascetic civilisation of the Middle Ages and supports 
them by the philosophic and political conceptions 
of individualism. The satisfaction of material 
wants has become the dominant aspiration of men. 
Wealth, luxury, entertainment, sensuous enjoy- 
ment, social caste and eclat based on property, and 



IN TROD UCTION 29 

general devotion to material ideals liave been sub- 
stituted for the spiritual hopes that had treated the 
carnal life as a sin. The universe, regarded merely 
as a vast mine or shop from which to draw the 
means for purely physical satisfaction, wealth, and 
power, presents the struggle for existence in all its 
naked savagery, supplanting thereby the socialism 
of primitive Christianity on the one hand and the 
individualistic hope of a life to come on the other. 
The egoism that had sacrificed the present to gain 
a superior happiness hereafter, having emancipated 
itself from the obligations of human brotherhood 
by abandoning Christian socialism, simply changed 
its highest good to the pursuit of wealth and sacri- 
ficed the rewards of immortality to economic ma- 
terialism. The singular foil to all this is modem 
altruism which furnishes the moral force to social- 
ism, and which is the inheritance saved from the 
wreck of imperialism on the one hand and of the 
belief in immortality on the other. But the release 
of the natural appetites from the repressive influ- 
ence of the old religious asceticism, hopes, and fears 
has simply invested the economic ideal with an 
egoistic tendency that will no more allow restraint 
from imperial government than it will from theol- 
ogy, and hence it is futile to look for political 
salvation from a restoration of monarchical insti- 
tutions. The jealousy against arbitrary power is 
too intense, too deeply seated, and too widely ex- 



30 DEMOCRACY 

tended, and the absence of a general social ideal 
too apparent to encourage any hopes in that direc- 
tion. Imperial methods with their vast powers of 
taxation and patronage are too dangerous in a 
civilisation as consolidated as ours is by territorial 
unity over vast areas and by a similar unity of 
economic interests. Industrial and property ar- 
rangements, interconnected with large territories 
and masses of population, are too delicately poised 
to be put at the mercy of the arbitrary functions 
of government, unless they are exercised by more 
intelligence and morality than are visible at present. 
The present complex condition of civilisation, with 
its delicate relation between population and the 
means for subsistence, requires for the adjustment 
of human life the stability of natural laws and a 
profound sense of justice. Monarchy may give 
stability, but it pays too little respect to liberty and 
justice. Democracy, if it has the sense of justice, 
has no stability and no capacity for governing. 
But whatever shortcoming we assign to democratic 
polity, the economic ideal and individual liberty 
must forever oppose a return to the simplicity of 
monarchic methods. 

All this is true in spite of the counter tendencies 
to socialism, the nemesis of individualism, and 
sought as a redress against the tyranny of those who 
know how to direct democracy to their own uses, 
and though it disguises the imperialism from which 



INTRODUCTION 31 

egoism would escape. One of the strangest illusions 
of the age is the belief of the socialist that, in the 
present state of human development, liberty, equal- 
ity, and fraternity are compatible with his political 
scheme for curing poverty and attaining human 
happiness. It is the heir to the sentimental philan- 
thropy of the church and its conception of equality 
and fraternity, but vainly supposes that it can 
eliminate the struggle for existence by constitu- 
tional forms and legislation, while the imperialism 
lurking in the background of its method would easily 
and quickly play havoc with the liberty which it 
invokes for support. But liberty, equality, and 
fraternity are inconsistent with each other as long 
as man is not moralised and as long as he remains 
infatuated with the economic ideal. They can be 
harmonised only when men have resolved to rival 
each other in prudence and virtue. Until then the 
arts of peace and the importance of industrial and 
political individualism will make men as cautious 
about socialism as they are opposed to imperialism, 
and reactionaries will be received as advisers who 
do not understand their problem. Yet Socialism 
is the natural product of the forces at work in pres- 
ent political conditions. It is an unconscious ex- 
pression of the failure of democracy to fulfil its 
promises, while it rather inconsistently clings to the 
forms of popular government for the attainment of 
its ends. It is the revival of paternalism in the dis- 
guise of democracy and freedom. 



33 DEMOCRACY 

On one point, however, socialist and anti-socialist 
are agreed. Tliey agree that the drift of present 
tendencies is unendurable, and that it is not enough 
to quarrel with Mr. Lecky's inclination to praise 
the past. There are evils to be remedied which 
will undoubtedly restore imperialism as the only 
escape from anarchy, unless democracy can dis- 
cover some means to correct its tendencies. This is 
indicated by a variety of important facts. Among 
the first is what is known as ^\ machine politics." 
This is the most important symptom of danger, be- 
cause it is actually imperialism in disguise. This 
menacing agency does not require to be described 
in this work, as men are sufficiently acquainted 
with its methods to justify the omission of all de- 
tails, and only to mention its relation to democratic 
forms of government. As we shall ascertain later, 
it is partly due to the unwieldy and inefficient 
action of democracy and partly to the opportunities 
which our institutions offer for escape from political 
responsibility. Machine politics are completely 
subversive both of democracy and of the principle 
of responsibility for which democracy is supposed 
to stand. It constitutes nothing except a system 
of self-appointed rulers, and the principle of elective 
representation of which we boast becomes a farce. 
Public servants and officers can in some way, 
usually, be made responsible for the administration 
of government, but political bosses never, or at 



INTR OD UCTION 33 

least not until they have retired with plunder 
enough to live without politics. The despotism of 
Russia can lay some claim to legitimacy. The Czar 
obtains his throne and power by the forms of law 
and has a healthy fear of something, but not so 
with our bosses. They nominate our candidates 
for office and mortgage their support, so that we 
are ruled by men who are not elected to govern us 
at all, our nominal officers being the mere puppets 
of the machine. Public opinion is defied until its 
patience is exhausted, when it is gratified in some 
caprice, and it lapses back again into indifference 
and the old game goes on. Property of all kinds 
is blackmailed directly or indirectly, and business 
terrorised. Even vice and crime come in for tribute, 
as is well known. This is anarchy, not government, 
and yet we indulge the pleasing illusion that democ- 
racy is a paradise. 

Another fact of which much complaint is made 
that it presents a serious danger to our institutions 
is the concentration of capital and business either 
in the hands of monopolies or in those of large 
corporations, who can exercise an undue infiuence 
upon the lives and fortunes of the general popula- 
tion. I do not sympathise with the widespread 
opinion that great accumulations of wealth are an 
intrinsic evil, for they are not. But when they add 
to their natural advantages over others the pos- 
session of political power, acquired by the defiance 



34 DEMOCRACY 

of justice, they do certainly menace popular insti- 
tutions. Wealth is a blessing or a curse, according 
to the manner of its acquisition and its consump- 
tion. Obtained by superior skill and intelligence, 
under equal conditions, it offers no excusable temp- 
tations to envy and jealousy, for it then represents 
only what every man can claim as the natural and 
legitimate reward of his labour. But when it is the 
result of political influence upon the machinery of 
government, such as protection, blackmail, legis- 
lative favours, etc., which represent some surrepti- 
tious form of taxation and police force, we are 
threatened with the repetition of the old Roman 
struggle between the proletariat and the property- 
holders. This undue influence of wealth, however, 
is not wholly caused by the selfishness of capital- 
ists, but is quite as much the result of the necessity 
for defending property against the propensities of 
blackmailers elected to office by democracy. This 
necessity for self-defence relaxes the austerity of 
conscience even in those who would otherwise re- 
spect its commands. All the power and temptation 
are given those who have no regard for law under 
any circumstances. Consequently, under the pres- 
ent regime in democratic politics, with wealth com- 
pelled to employ political subreption for defence 
or enabled to use it for illegitimate advantages, it 
comes in for all the jealousy that men have been 
accustomed to entertain against imperialism, be- 



INTRODUCTION 35 

cause it does represent something like tlie irrespon- 
sibility of despotism in the exercise of its power 
in the community. The existence of such an in- 
fluence in society, especially when it contravenes 
the sentiment of equality and is a perpetual menace 
to justice, no matter what the form of government, 
will create a demand for political reforms. 

There are other facts of the same import and 
pointing to the same conclusion. Among them are 
the complexity of our civilisation and the inade- 
quacy of present government agencies to meet the 
responsibilities placed upon them. A small coun- 
try, with a scanty population, few resources and 
industries, and similar social sentiments, may go 
on without much difficulty under democratic insti- 
tutions. But a vast territory, with untold ma- 
terial wealth waiting for labor, a growing popula- 
tion, and with it an increase in the severity of the 
struggle for existence, and the great diversity of 
moral, economic, political, and social sentiments, 
must call for government that corresponds to this 
complexity. The increasing density of population, 
the growing intensity of the struggle between capi- 
tal and labor, partly the effect of population and 
partly of the struggle for social position by the 
aristocracy of w^ealth, and the infinite complexity 
of the economic machine created by railways, 
canals, marine commerce, the telegraph, telephone, 
etc. — all these supply problems which the simple 



86 DEMOCRACY 

institutions of tlie past cannot grapple with success- 
fully, and something must be done to meet the new 
conditions. Our constitution was made when the 
conditions of life, economic, moral, and political, 
were very simple as compared with the present, 
and representatives could at least approximate the 
requirements made upon them by their constituents. 
But our constitutional methods are less elastic than 
those of England, and adjustment to the immeas- 
urable changes of political and economic circum- 
stances is rendered almost impossible by the cum- 
bersome machinery of amendment. Moreover, the 
problems which confront our public agents require 
almost omniscience to solve them, while a glance 
at the beneficiaries of political honour and respon- 
sibility is sufiicient to show how little of that quality 
is present. Congress has duties which it is impos- 
sible for the ordinary man to perform, however 
conscientious he may be, and elected, as members 
are too frequently, by a corrupt machine and an 
ignorant proletariat, there are wanting in the condi- 
tions that can insure a just exercise of power, and 
such power as is possessed is usually employed to 
satisfy either party or personal interests. The 
consciousness of impossible tasks must appal any- 
one who has the character to feel his duties to the 
public and to withstand the influences for evil 
arrayed about him. But the intelligent and honest 
man's impotency is the scoundrel's opportunity, 



IN'TR OD VCTION 37 

and official responsibilities are assumed only to show 
that honesty cannot stand the competition with 
demagogy, while the public pays the penalty of all 
the vices which such a system must produce. To 
state the case in a word, the machinery of govern- 
ment is too simple for the problem which it is asked 
to solve, and we cannot neglect its modification, 
even if we dare not return to the monarchic methods 
of the past. 



CHAPTEK II 

THE NATUKE OF THE PKOBLEM 

We have said that we cannot return to mon- 
archy and that we cannot stop with our present 
democratic methods. The reason is the same in 
both cases. The machinery of government in both 
a monarchy and our present system is too simple 
to meet the responsibilities of a highly complex 
civilisation. We must therefore reconstruct our 
methods to suit the existing conditions and their 
demands. But such a task requires us to deal with 
the whole theory of government, and it is one of 
great magnitude, as the history of theoretical poli- 
tics abundantly proves. It will not be my purpose, 
however, to treat the subject with that detail which 
is the custom with political students, but to discuss 
the most general principles which determine gov- 
ernment of any kind and its forms. Politics have a 
philosophic basis, or are intimately connected with 
the general ideas that are the subject of philosophic 
reflection, and hence are amenable to courts of 
philosophic jurisdiction. As a consequence of this 
fact it will be important to survey the general ideas 

38 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 39 

and moral forces that predetermine tlie movement 
of both theoretical and practical politics. In this 
way we may discover some clue to the kind of po- 
litical reforms that the present situation demands. 
If we look at history and philosophy we shall 
find that the discussion of theoretical politics always 
turns about the problems and conceptions of mon- 
archy, oligarchy, and democracy, or the rule of the 
one, the few, and the many. This is the division 
adopted by Aristotle and perpetuated in philosophy 
ever since. Oligarchy was made convertible by 
him with aristocracy, though the literal interpreta- 
tion of the term might not suggest that conception. 
Associated conceptions, besides that of mere num- 
ber in the other two forms of polity, helped to 
produce this idea of oligarchy. But the principle 
of classification noticeable in his system is that of 
the mere number of rulers. I am going to con- 
tend, however, that this conception is either false 
or conceals from us the real problem involved in 
the theory of government. Political students yet 
need their Bacon to emancipate them from the 
authority of Aristotle in the settling of the problem 
which they attempt to solve. It is not a question 
of the number, but of the kind, of rulers, whatever 
the number may be, that society is to have if the 
best results are to be attained. Back of the ques- 
tion of the number of persons who shall participate 
in the functions of government are two more im- 



40 BEMOCIiACY 

portant questions: (1) The kind of rulers, and (2) 
tlie adjustment between power and responsibility 
in rulers. This latter principle has been at least 
partly but inadequately recognised in modern de- 
velopment of political theory and practice. But the. 
two are prior in importance to all other considera- 
tions in government^ while questions of how many 
shall take part in politics should be postponed until 
these are solved. 

We have said that Aristotle classifies govern- 
ments as monarchic, oligarchic, and democratic, 
with the recognition of a composite form to be no- 
ticed later. The first put power and the irrespon- 
sibility that attaches to it into the hands of one 
person, a despot ; the second, in the hands of a few, 
the aristocrats; and the third, in the hands of all 
the citizens^ the limitations of number in the last 
class being determined by what the word ^' citizen " 
should mean. In Aristotle's time the criterion of 
citizenship was (1) free birth and (2) Greek nation- 
ality. Slaves and barbarians were excluded. 
Democracy in modern times, after the adoption of 
the idea of universal brotherhood and equality, ex- 
tends citizenship to nearly all members of the 
community and correspondingly modifies the social 
area occupied by the conception of popular govern- 
ment. But in respect to the number of human 
beings who have political rights and powers in 
Aristotle's " democracy,'' it was in reality an oli- 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 41 

garclij. But, though we must understand by the 
term in his time a very different mode of govern- 
ment from that of the same name to-day, yet the 
classification of polities can remain the same. The 
principle of democracy remains as it was with 
Aristotle; namely, the distribution of political 
power over a larger area of numbers than in either 
a monarchy or an oligarchy. But in distinguishing 
governments by the number of rulers, Aristotle had 
in view, not that the agents and the beneficiaries 
of government should be the same persons, which 
constitutes the idea of 5e?/-government to-day, nor 
again that the right to political citizenship should 
coincide with manhood universally, but that irre- 
sponsible power could be divided in three ways, 
and legislation secured by three methods: namely, 
(1) By a single ruler; (2) By a select portion of 
the whole number of free native citizens; and (3) 
By the whole number of such citizens. He also 
recognises what we call a Republic, which he re- 
garded as a combination of the others. This is 
representative government, which even passes as 
convertible with democracy. But Aristotle's 
democracy was not representative at all. It was 
direct legislation by the people after the type of 
the referendum. It was at least partly represented 
in the Athenian assemblies. 

Political science, however, has not gone beyond 
the conception of the forms of government as classi- 



42 DEMOCRACY 

fied by Aristotle. His authority ruled the Middle 
Ages in its philosophy as despotically as ever the 
church has done, and political science seems still 
to be under his sway in the matter of the general 
conceptions which shall determine the forms of 
government to be considered. It may be very 
convenient for historical purposes, but it completely 
conceals the true principles of politics which should 
regulate the constructive efforts of philosophic stu- 
dents. It is the failure to analyse the problem and 
to break away from the authority of Aristotle that 
prevents us from discovering the fundamental 
principle that has moved political history. His 
principle of classification was not philosophical, but 
historical, and based the organisation of govern- 
ment upon the number of persons who shall par- 
ticipate in it. But I must contend that this is 
wholly false for any scientific or philosophic pur- 
poses. It is not the quantity of men, but the 
quality of them that determines whether we shall 
have good government or not, while the whole de- 
velopment of history, reinforced at least by the 
speculative principle of Aristotle, has been toward 
the idea that good government can be obtained only 
by extending the area of citizenship and political 
power, regardless of the character which shall de- 
termine political action. This tendency, however, 
I must regard as a mistake, if it be interpreted as 
the last word on the subject. I grant that the 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 43 

evolution of better political institutions may not 
have been able to take an easier course, and that the 
simple criterion of mere numbers may have been 
necessary to thoroughly purge the evils of ancient 
aristocracy, but this is no final reason why we should 
not seek for a new principle for government as did 
those who wished to correct the tendencies of 
aristocracy. The assumption of ancient polity was 
the same as the present. It drew no distinction 
between the agents and the beneficiaries of gov- 
ernment. Reform accepted this assumption and 
demanded democracy, or the extension of citizen- 
ship and the suffrage. Aristocracy distributed 
political power and rewards in favor of intelligence, 
but at the expense of justice : democracy distributes 
them at the expense of intelligence, while trying, 
perhaps unsuccessfully, to satisfy the claims of 
justice. But democracy stands for the universal 
benefits of government, and hence in respect of the 
beneficiaries of it the development of government 
from monarchy through oligarchy to democracy 
has been toward better things, at least in comparison 
with the past. But it has not seen the necessity 
for discriminating between the agents and the 
beneficiaries of government, and hence the parallel 
development of political institutions to secure the 
right quality of men for citizens and officials has 
not occurred. This is the more important prob- 
lem, and though political philosophers have recog- 



M DEMOCRACY 

nised the need for this desideratum they have been 
too much enslaved by the quantitative basis of 
pohtics to apply any ingenuity to discover a method 
for securing a qualitative basis. We require a 
system which will secure good rulers and universal 
benefits; that is, a system based upon the quality 
of men for citizens and quantity of them for the 
benefits of society. How this can be effected is the 
problem. At present, however, our democracy is 
merely nominal. We have a kakistocracy of plu- 
tocrat and proletariat for agents and beneficiaries, 
the plutocrats usually being the beneficiaries and 
I the proletariat being agents in their own deception, 
j instead of aristocracy for our rulers and democracy 
: for the beneficiaries. Whether the latter is possible 
is the question, but it is certainly the ideal polity, 
\ and if any machinery can be devised which will 
adjust the quality of citizens and rulers to the larger 
quantity of men to receive the benefits of govern- 
ment it should be accepted with open arms, and a 
new step in political evolution initiated. That, 
however, is still the desideratum. To attain this 
end we require to devise some means of fixing 
political responsibility. In order to make this clear 
I shall have to examine the development of political 
theory, and while doing so analyse the problem as 
I understand it. I cannot, however, go into the 
subject with any great minuteness, but must treat 
it in broad outlines. Moreover, I shall treat it from 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 45 

the standpoint of the development of ideas with- 
out much regard to chronological order. I wish to 
exhibit the social and political influence of ideas 
both as conscious and unconscious agencies in 
moulding institutions. 

Speculation on politics and forms of government 
began very early in the history of intellectual cult- 
ure, though not until physical philosophy and some 
of the arts had considerably advanced, especially 
those of poetry, painting, and sculpture. This 
speculation represented the reflective stage of prog- 
ress, when the mind turns back upon accomplished 
facts and endeavours to analyse them, to discover 
their law or raison d'etre, and to exercise some pre- 
visionary consideration for the regulation of future 
action. All conscious progress is dependent upon 
this discovery. Consciousness of the forces, phys- 
ical or intellectual, that make events is a great help 
to action, in fact indispensable for all rational ad- 
justment and development. But politics and gov- 
ernment had long proceeded in their course without 
the direction of theoretical knowledge in regard to 
their forces, and hence upon assumptions which it 
was the business of philosophy to discover or bring 
into consciousness and not to create. Government 
and its necessities antecede theories of it, and are not 
created by them, though speculative ideas are addi- 
tional aids to progress whenever they arise, in that 
they facilitate adjustment to all the conditions 



46 DEMOCRACY 

affecting development. It is important to remark 
this retrogressive origin of all theory, and perhaps 
even its subsidiary value compared with the actual 
forces which it discovers and directs, in order not 
to mistake the nature and functions of theoretical 
knowledge which often obtains the credit of an 
influence that it does not possess. It may modify 
the direction of moral and physical forces, but it 
cannot create them. Hence it is not the condition 
of all government, but only of those incidents which 
follow the conscious direction of forces to an end 
which might escape the merely casual agency of 
nature and unconscious action. Consequently, it 
is interesting to remark that the forms of govern- 
ment had gone through considerable development 
before Greek speculation had touched upon them. 
The worst forms of despotism had been thrown off 
and large concessions made to the idea of democ- 
racy before the theoretical and reflective operations 
of philosophy had been applied to them, and hence 
without its predetermining influence upon this de- 
velopment. Hence it was that Aristotle's classifica- 
tion of polities was historical and not philosophical. 
But when philosophy began to test everything in 
its alembic, politics could not escape its analysis. 
This became especially true when, after Greece had 
secured her independence or safety from foreign 
invasion, she had to grapple with the problems that 
were created by internal dissensions. Questions 



THE NATURE OP THE PROBLEM 47 

regarding tlie forms of government and domestic 
policy liave a minor interest and importance while 
the community is engaged in the defence of its 
existence against outside adversaries. But the case 
is very different when the state has to contend with 
domestic foes. Here the problem of governmental 
institutions becomes one of great importance, and 
only the consciousness that the military regime 
which is adapted to defence against external ene- 
mies is dangerous to domestic peace and industry 
can divert the momentum of the ideas developed 
by military life from their destructive tendencies. 
Hence after Greece had escaped Persian conquest 
and had developed some of the seeds of internal 
corruption, her philosophers began to discuss the 
best form of government to realise the ideals of the 
community. Plato's Republic is the first definite ex- 
pression of this interest, though Aristotle's Politics is 
the more scientific. But Plato has a more correct 
conception of the problem. He does not seek as Aris- 
totle did to explain, but to reconstruct a political 
constitution. In spite, however, of its Utopian 
character, as it is often called, and of his failure 
to devise practical machinery to attain its really 
fundamental object; namely, recognition and dis- 
tribution of justice among men, it was based upon 
the correct conception of the problem, and sought 
to place political power in the hands of intelligent 
and just men. His ideal was, therefore, correct, 



48 DEMOCRACY 

and lie failed to realise it only because lie did not 
rise above his age in tlie practical macliinery tliat 
he proposed and because he did not insist upon mak- 
ing the area of the beneficiaries of government 
larger than that of its agents. But Aristotle re- 
mained almost wholly within the limits of his- 
torical perspective in the treatment of political 
theory, and could not transcend the principle of 
mere number of citizens in the construction of po- 
litical constitutions. Consequently, he only helped 
to intensify and perpetuate the conceptions which 
he discovered and the social forces which he made 
self-conscious. 

To see what these ideas aid forces were we have 
only to return to the general character of Greek 
civilisation, and here it is interesting to remark that 
the same conceptions lay at the basis of both the 
ante-reflective and the reflective stage of this early 
period. This fact enables us to disregard philos- 
ophy as such, and to examine the concrete elements 
of Greek political life and consciousness as they are 
related to the problem of government. The ideas, 
then, which made Greek political institutions and 
which made and limited the theories of them were 
the same, and may be summarised in two proposi- 
tions: (1) The assumption of enormous powers in 
the hands of political authorities, and (2) The com- 
plete subordination of the individual and his rights 
to the state. The first of these ideas was at least 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 49 

almost what theoretical politics would call absolute 
sovereignty, or unlimited and irresponsible power. 
It was the failure to place any value upon the in- 
dividual that enabled the sovereignty of govern- 
ment to be so absolute, and hence it was only when 
civilisation began to recognise that value that any 
permanent limitations or restraints were placed 
upon what the idea of sovereignty represented. But 
what is sovereignty, and what does its absoluteness 
mean in the parlance of political science? 

A complete answer to this question would take 
us very far into speculative problems of politics, 
and would, perhaps, involve much abstract discus- 
sion. But I shall not indulge, nor do I require to 
indulge, in any profound exposition of political 
sovereignty. A very brief account of its import 
for the theory of politics is all that is necessary. 

In its strictest application ^^ sovereignty " is 
simply irresponsible power. This is power without 
restraint or limitation, and is usually conceived in 
the form of absolute despotism, which is repre- 
sented in the popular mind by the will of a single 
ruler. But the conception of absolute sovereignty 
is not limited to any particular number of rulers. 
It extends to any possible form of government 
within the threefold classification of Aristotle, and 
hence applies to democracy as well as to monarchy. 
Whatever the constitution, it is simply political 
power without legal restraints of any kind. Greek 



50 DEMOCRACY 

politics may not have represented this sovereignty 
in its pure form, but strong government and vast 
administrative powers were exercised with a free- 
dom from restraint that modem civilisation will 
not permit, except in extraordinary emergencies, 
and even then are subject to a jealous and vigilant 
scrutiny. That the range and intensity of political 
sovereignty in Greek civilisation was very great 
and merited the characterisation which I have given 
it is supported by the authority of Bluntschli. He 
says : " The Hellenic state, like the ancient state 
in general, because it was considered all-powerful, 
actually possessed too much power. It was all in 
all. The citizen was nothing, except as a member 
of the state. His whole existence depended on and 
was subject to the state. The Athenians indeed 
possessed and exercised intellectual freedom, but 
that was only because the Athenian state valued 
freedom generally, not because it recognised the 
rights of man. The independence of the family, 
home life, education, even conjugal fidelity, were 
in no way secure from state interference; still less 
of course the private property of the citizens. The 
state meddled in everything, and knew neither 
moral nor legal limits to its power.'' This was as 
true of the period of the Athenian assemblies as 
that of the earlier monarchies. It determined the 
conceptions under which the philosophers had to 
work, and with the philosophers' natural respect 



i 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 51 

for conservative habits, they remained in theory 
what they were in historical practice; namely, ap- 
parently the necessary assumptions for government 
of any kind. ISTo such thing as limiting the sover- 
eign power was thought of either in theory or 
practice. The question only regarded the persons 
who should possess it, or rather how many should 
possess it. 

There were reasons in the social and economic 
conditions of the time for the existence of such 
authority. In the economic world complete indi- 
vidualism prevailed, in so far as each man or com- 
munity was self-dependent. !N'o widely extended 
commercial relations existed in the early period, 
and when they arose the problem of government 
changed. But the economic independence of the 
community, in so far as the means of subsistence 
were concerned, because the standard of living was 
low, made it unnecessary to quarrel with political 
power, however absolute, as long as it did not in- 
vade personal interests and rights. This is of course 
true in any age and conditions. But in this period 
of which we are speaking the opportunities for 
economic injustice were fewer than in our highly 
developed civilisation. On the other hand, the 
social conditions were not less effective in promot- 
ing tolerance of absolutism. They represented the 
militant type of life, when union was necessary 
for defence against foreign enemies, or when mili- 



52 DEMOCRACY 

tary organisation was required to carry on aggres- 
sive conquest. Both defensive and aggressive 
military operations demand absolute power and 
authority in order to secure prompt and effective 
action, as is even still apparent in our own civilisa- 
tion. Hence tlie fact that early society began in 
militant and military conditions shows what type 
of government represented the model upon which 
the institutions of Greece and Rome were built. 
They borrowed their conception of sovereignty or 
political power from the conditions of war which 
required as much exemption as possible from 
restraint and responsibility. Social and political 
inertia, with a whole system of conservative in- 
fluences, enabled absolutism to continue the mo- 
mentum of its methods, both practically and 
theoretically, far into the ages when it required 
modification. In fact it determined the type and 
impulse of imperialism ever afterward, just as 
science, literature, and philosophy have been de- 
termined by the same civilisation. 

I have emphasized this characteristic of imperial- 
ism in Greco-Roman polity and its influence upon 
later ages wherever strong governnient was neces- 
sary, because too many attempts to remedy the 
evils connected with power of this kind have only 
sought to change the persons who shall be invested 
with imperial powers. Revolutions have directed 
their efforts to the transfer of sovereignty from 



THE HATUME OF THE PROBLEM 53 

monarchy to oligarchy, and from oligarchy to 
democracy, instead of imitating the division of 
labor observed in the economic and the organic 
worlds. In the course of time this principle influ- 
enced politics as well as other departments of 
human activity, but the usual course in politics 
was merely a change of one set of rulers for an- 
other with unchanged powers, while the cause of 
complaint remained the same. No adequate re- 
vision of either the practice or the theory of sover- 
eignty was undertaken, and hence in general the 
theory never got beyond being truistic, and the 
practice remained tyrannical when the sovereignty 
was in a monarchy and inefiicient when it was in 
a democracy. But the main trouble with both 
theory and practice was the complexity of func- 
tions that were associated together in the concep- 
tion of sovereignty. Both require that there shall 
be some ultimate court of appeal and authority 
which shall not be unduly hampered by restraints 
and limitations in the exercise of its power. But 
the simplicity of ancient constitutions which often 
combined legislative, judicial, and executive func- 
tions in the same person, and disregard of the dis- 
tinction between the abstract and concrete problems 
of politics, led to confusion between the ruler and 
the absoluteness of his power, between the sovereign 
and sovereignty, or, in later parlance, between the 
executive and its irresponsibility. Modern devel- 



54 DEMOCRACY 

opments have done mucli to recognise or imply a 
distinction between power and irresponsibility, 
but they have not yet exhausted its fertility, and 
it remains to receive the special attention of politi- 
cal students in the future. But we are still, directly 
or indirectly, under the influence of the idea that 
power to govern must be irresponsible, or if not this, 
that neither of them shall exist at all. Democracy 
is not a contradiction of this assertion. It shows 
a very marked tendency to make its ofiicials at least 
nominally responsible, while it theoretically re- 
tains, in flat contradiction with its jealousy of the 
power of one man over another, the irresponsibility 
which everywhere else is considered so dangerous, 
and then in its own inability to use its powers in- 
telligently and honestly results practically in the 
irresponsibility of its representatives. Thus the 
reaction against ancient policy fails to discover the 
source of the difficulties in government. It is sim- 
ply the attempt to make the sovereign and sover- 
eignty, or the representative and irresponsible 
power coincide. The one point to establish in the 
theory of government is the responsibility of power. 
This is sufficiently recognised in the modern theory 
of politics, where the representative is said to be 
responsible to the electorate, and perhaps also in 
other constitutional arrangements. But it is not 
carried out in detail as it may still be done. The 
most important distinction to be made, both in 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 55 

theory and practice, is that between the responsi- 
bility of executives and representatives and the 
limitation of their powers. The facts Avhich con- 
cealed this distinction in the concrete operations of 
government and which led to the establishment of 
official responsibility by the limitations of powers 
were the contradiction between the abstract ideas 
of sovereignty and responsibility and the embodi- 
ment of this sovereignty or imperial and irrespon- 
sible power in the executive. But I am going to 
insist upon the important distinction between the 
limitation and the responsibility of power. It was 
Hobbes and those who have followed and who have 
not improved his position that gave the setting to 
the theory which still conceals the method of real- 
ising the object consciously and unconsciously in- 
tended by the limitation of powers in the organisa- 
tion of government. Hobbes defined sovereignty 
as irresponsible power. He said sovereignty is 
power, power is liberty, and liberty is irresponsibil- 
ity. But Hobbes was not concerned with a merely 
abstract problem. He was employed at a practical 
scheme of politics, and because he feared the an- 
archical tendencies of democracy he simply invested 
the sovereign with irresponsibility instead of con- 
ceding it to the Puritan's commonwealth. He saw, 
as all political students must do, that irresponsibility 
must devolve somewhere in the functions of gov- 
ernment, and for the sake of the efficiency, de- 



56 DEMOCRACY 

spatcli, and intelligent action in ruling society 
preferred to locate sovereignty in tlie executive. 
In his doctrine, therefore, sovereignty or irrespon- 
sibility and the execntive were closely associated. 
But if we divest ourselves of the abstract theories 
of politics and think only of the concrete problems 
of government, Avith human nature the determinate 
factor in them, it will be possible to conceive, as 
the elective tenure of the executive implies, that 
the executive and other representatives can be 
made responsible in a more effective way than at 
present. To show how this can be done would be 
to anticipate. But it has been necessary to indicate 
that Hobbes was in reality giving theoretical ex- 
pression to Greco-Boman imperialism, and that he 
did it at a time which marked the crisis between 
monarchy and democracy. But in the attempt to 
establish the responsibility of the crown or the ex- 
ecutive the reaction retained Hobbes's doctrine in 
the sovereignty of the people, and sought to make 
the executive and representatives responsible partly 
by the limitation of their powers and partly by 
elective tenure. In England it was sought only by 
curtailing the powers of the crown : in America and 
republics generally both elective tenure and limita- 
tion of authority were applied. But in spite of the 
large curtailment of their powers the executive and 
legislative functionaries have their privileges and 
duties very much affected by an irresponsible 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 57 

electorate, on the one hand, and by their leadership 
of the electorate, on the other. Taken in connec- 
tion with '" machine politics " they are practically 
irresponsible, except as occasional deference to 
public opinion may be construed as responsibility. 
But in reality neither this nor elective tenure are 
responsibility at all when the rulers can manipulate 
the electorate fo suit themselves. But whatever 
the actual consequences, the resistance to imperial- 
ism sought relief from its dangers and abuses by 
limiting its powers and by adopting a system of 
" checks and balances " which assumed a conflict 
of interests as the only security against the pre- 
dominance and tyranny of any one of them. Hence 
w^e find the political movement from monarchy 
through oligarchy to democracy, but with the lim- 
itation of powers for responsibility and less differ- 
entiation of structure and function than has oc- 
curred spontaneously in the economic world. The 
consequences of this will be examined again. 

There were two principal reasons for the Greco- 
Roman imperialism and for the length of time that 
it prevailed. The first is that ancient civilisation 
placed no value upon the individual, and the second 
is that the problem of the legitimacy, or moral 
equity, of political action had not been suggested. 
The first of these reasons has already been men- 
tioned, and requires no proof, since it is a common- 
place of history. But the second is not so clear. 



58 DEMOCRACY 

It is, however, a most important influence in de- 
termining both tlie nature and the incidents of 
ancient political institutions, in that the absence of 
modern ethical ideas, which are founded upon the 
value of the individual, left no other criterion for 
political conduct than the maxim that might makes 
right, embodied in national glory. This is clearly 
proved by the moral doctrines of the Sophists as 
well as by the actual practice of politics. Morality 
had no reference to the personal worth of the in- 
dividual which it was the business of the state to 
protect, but was constituted by a purely social 
content, what was called the welfare of the state, 
and the only way to secure this was to command the 
absolute obedience of the citizen. Any authority 
that could effect this end was the object of neces- 
sary allegiance. ISTo such thing as a divine law 
above kings was recognised, except by the poets 
and common people. The state had superior power 
to determine ideals and obligations for it. As the 
individual was to be sacrificed to it, no law existed 
above the safety and glory of the state. Such a 
thing as testing the legitimacy of political action 
by the standards of individual worth and morality 
was inconceivable. Of course, questions of justice 
and right with individual reference, especially in 
the development of Roman law, entered into the 
political constitution as a subsidiary end, just as 
they are a conscious element and the principal end 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 59 

of modern life, but tliey were not the chief end of 
man in ancient political action as they are intended 
to be to-day. The exigencies of a military civilisa- 
tion and a mnch less highly organised state of 
society gave rather free scope to arbitrary political 
power, governed by the expediency of the ruler 
and his party, who knew as well as their successors 
to-day how to combine personal interest with the 
national glory, and consequently ancient civilisa- 
tion had no other example for morality than the 
rights of a commander and the virtues of a soldier. 
The social and altruistic point of view, on the one 
hand, and the subordination of everything, nature 
and the state equally, to the rights of the individual 
had not yet asserted themselves as the basis of all 
action. 

Christianity created a revolution in this respect. 
It was a direct assault upon ancient morality and 
an indirect assault upon its politics. This was 
effected by changing the content and the direction, 
but not the point of view of the individualism that 
regulated ancient private life. I have said that 
ancient morality was confined to civic ends. But 
private conduct was under the dominion of per- 
sonal interest, and this was materialistic, being 
sensuous satisfaction and wealth based upon slavery. 
Christian civilisation was spiritualistic and its in- 
dividualism was not only concentrated upon im- 
material ideals, but also required the sacrifice of 



60 DEMOCRACY 

the present to the future and the subordination of 
self to the welfare of others. This change in con- 
tent and direction of conduct was accomplished by 
its doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Usually 
this belief is assumed to represent a purely religious 
conception with no political importance whatever. 
But it was in fact the profoundest political force 
in history, and with its associated social and moral 
conceptions was both a revolutionising and a re- 
generating influence for higher civilisation. The 
more we examine into the nature of this doctrine, 
the motives to which it appealed, the moral equality 
which it proclaimed even between master and slave, 
the promises and hopes which it held out to the 
poor, its contempt for riches and abandonment of 
ancient political ideals and ends, the more we must 
recognise the natural antagonism which it aroused 
in pagan Rome with the prevailing devotion to 
the secular and military ideal. Patriotism and the 
virtues of soldiers and citizens directed only toward 
material happiness and national glory were not 
likely to characterise men whose aspirations were 
occupied with a spiritual world beyond the grave. 
Hence antiquity showed a perfectly natural and 
logical instinct when it endeavored by all the means 
in its power to crush the new society; for its con- 
ception of the brotherhood of man, of human rights, 
its indifference to politics, and the firmness and 
austerity of its conscience were moral forces that 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 61 

sounded the deatli-knell of a civilisation which was 
based upon mere power. But I shall not dwell 
upon this feature of the new force, as I wish merely 
to summarise the conceptions which ultimately 
revolutionised political institutions, and since I 
have traced their lineage to the belief in the im- 
mortality of the soul and associated ideas it remains 
only to indicate how this doctrine effected such a 
result. 

The revolutionary influence which was exerted 
by the doctrine of immortality was caused by the 
value ivliich it put upon the individual. In Greek 
thought all moral values were placed in abstract 
institutions. The only approach to spiritual ideals 
that Greco-Koman civilisation produced was found 
in welfare of the state and the sacrifice of individual 
life and conduct to it. But Christianity put this 
value in the concrete individual for whom insti- 
tutions existed, and not he for institutions. The 
new movement withdrew from politics at the out- 
set, seeking the '^ kingdom of God '' partly in the 
voluntary association of its votaries and partly in 
the purification and hopes of the soul. The mental 
and .moral attitude of ancient thought, which had 
subordinated the individual to the whole was here 
completely reversed, and man was conceived as a 
being to whose interests and perfection both nature 
and government were to be contributory. In this 
conception of the world and man all rights and 



62 DEMOCRACY 

values belonged to the individual, and not to po- 
litical and physical powers above him. Thus a new 
centre of interest, social and moral, arose, making 
the subject and not the sovereign the ultimate 
reference of conduct. Hence it is no wonder that 
Christianity was so violently attacked by Pagan- 
ism. This inversion of the ancient political ideal, 
the substitution of the spiritual kingdom of God 
for the material splendour of civic grandeur, and the 
installation of the rights of the individual against 
the absolute rights of the sovereign were revolu- 
tionary forces of incomparable magnitude, and 
made modern democracy inevitable. Imperialism 
and its military ideals were impossible where citi- 
zens sought peace on earth, good-will toward men, 
and supernal bliss in a transcendental world after 
death. Political absolutism can thrive only in an 
atmosphere of blind, passive obedience and belief 
in the divine right of kings when the civic ideal 
of Greco-Roman polity has vanished, and such a 
condition arises only when the individual despairs 
of salvation by personal faith and effort and de- 
volves the task upon the state. 

Paganism, however, did not die easily, and even 
when the religious system over which Christianity 
triumphed gave up the ghost, its political assump- 
tions remained partly to antagonise and partly to 
assist the aims of the Church. The Phoenix rose 
from its own ashes. Ideas die only to live again 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 63 

in some other form. The antagonism between the 
secular and the religions order, between the ma- 
terialistic and the spiritualistic view of individual 
and political life, was not destroyed by the decline 
of Paganism, but remained to torment the Church 
throughout the Middle Ages, and sufficed often to 
so corrupt society that during much of the time 
no moral force whatever was left to protect social 
order itself except the beneficiaries of political 
power, who were still influenced by the glory of 
the Greco-Roman civic ideals and the lights and 
shadows which they reflected. The great struggle 
was between the Church and the State to determine 
which should be supreme. The fortunes of the 
Church were varying until it finally triumphed, 
swallowing up the political power in itself. But 
the Church had no genius for government, for the 
exercise of imperial functions. Both its constitu- 
tion and its ideal were democratic. Its great object 
being individual salvation, it had always to act 
with this end in view, and hence its weapon had to 
be persuasion instead of force. It had to convince 
the subject as well as to govern him. Otherwise it 
could get no farther than Paganism. Faith as well 
as obedience was a condition of the salvation it 
offered, and this faith had to be supplied by the 
subject and not by the king. The Church often 
degenerated from this ideal, and when it did the 
imperial conception of Rome reappeared with a 



64 DEMOCRACY 

theological dress in the doctrine of salvation by 
worksj priestly confession, penance, indulgences, 
and passive obedience to an external power, and 
the true genius of Christianity had to recover its 
original significance in the Reformation. In the 
meantime, church and state were involved in po- 
litical contests, each striving to obtain supremacy 
over the other, the state to subordinate the ecclesi- 
astical to the civil power and the church trying to 
subject the civil to the ecclesiastical. But it is no 
part of this discussion to dwell upon the details of 
this struggle, especially as it disguises the real in- 
tellectual and moral conceptions at the basis of it, 
and which were the determining influences upon 
the tendencies of both theoretical and practical pol- 
itics. The church had inherited the obligations of 
the Roman Empire and became responsible for the 
social order which the decay of the civil power 
threatened with dissolution, but her constitution, 
her aims, and the class upon whose support she re- 
lied were counter-forces to the imperialism which 
she envied. Personal salvation and the inculcation 
of dogma are not ends which readily commend 
themselves to the methods of politics and remain to 
work their way into human conviction by other 
means than force. Hence as the profession of the 
church did not suffer her to compete with imperial- 
ism in her method, she had to gain her point by 
scholastic philosophy and promises of salvation, and 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 65 

instead of overpowering lier enemies by tlie sword 
she set about converting them by logic and the 
hopes of paradise. Her Founder had counselled 
peace and good-will toward men, so that consistency 
and tradition forbade the employment of her rival's 
means for the extension of her territory, and con- 
sequently enjoined, at least by indirection, the use 
of some form of persuasion. In the kingdom of 
God warfare was to be a lost art, and though the 
contests in which reason has been engaged have not 
always been either as respectable as they might 
have been or fruitful in philosophic achievement 
they have consciously or unconsciously cultivated 
higher moral ideals than the animal struggles and 
human warfare, even though this result was gained 
by the decline of physical courage. The first step 
in this movement was the intellectual controversy 
between Greek philosophy and Christian dogma. It 
was the struggle between faith and reason. Faith, 
associated with the sense of an ultimate court of ap- 
peal both for knowledge and conduct, stood for 
authority and became the heir to the ideas that were 
embodied in imperialism: reason stood for the in- 
dividual rights of the subject as against foreign in- 
trusion and infringement. In the end reason con- 
quered, but only by substituting individual assent 
for authority. Hence in spite of the dogmatism 
that allied itself with the authority of faith, when 
she used the court of reason, the church employed 



66 DEMOCRACY 

a method which was destined to overthrow the spirit 
that she had inherited from Rome. It was not the 
nature of either reason or faith that determined the 
difference between their alliances: for both are 
compatible with either individualism or imperial- 
ism. In its original impulse faith was an activity 
that could be supplied only by the subject, and rea- 
son in Greek thought was equally an individual 
function of the man instead of an eternal influ- 
ence. But the controversy with Greek philosophy 
caused them to diverge in their implications. The 
confessedly anomalous nature of Christian doctrine, 
the theory of grace which, including the funda- 
mental necessitv of faith for salvation, involved an 
agency foreign to the subject for his redemption, 
and the church's responsibility for social order, 
which requires obedience to power if government 
be necessary at all — these allied faith with the idea 
of authority, and left reason with the duty to sus- 
tain the rights of the individual. In respect to the 
state the church's point of attack was the supremacy 
of political power, and her claim lay in maintain- 
ing the superior allegiance of man to God and the 
church, and hence that the state was subordinate to 
the object of the ecclesiastic power. As this object 
was individual salvation, which the church could 
offer as a reward for obedience, she was reasonably 
sure of the victory and set the example of making 
the political ideals pay tribute to the spiritual. In 



THE XATURE OF THE PROBLEM 67 

this way she forced subserviency to conceptions 
which, being democratic both in their logical ten- 
dencies and in the hopes they inspired, nndennined 
her covetous political ambition to wield the sceptre 
of imperialism. But there were inherent contra- 
dictions in the policy of the church. Her strict ad- 
hesion to the principle of authority contradicted her 
democratic constitution, and the intellectual habits 
which her philosophy inculcated and encouraged 
undermined faith and authority, on the one hand, 
and stimulated individual liberty, on the other. 
But the contradiction was at least to some extent ex- 
cusable in the conditions of the age, which required 
concessions to imperialism for the sake of social 
order, until intelligence was more widely distrib- 
uted, as it became after the invention of printing, 
and until economic development availed to imify 
interests that had previously enjoyed larger inde- 
pendence. The railway, telegraph, and other in- 
struments of commercial and economic solidarity 
have consolidated social and political interests to 
such an extent that the anarchic tendencies of 
democracy are not so great to-day as they were when 
intelligence was not widely distributed and individ- 
ual communities were more self-sufficient than they 
are to-day. Until this condition of greater solidar- 
ity was created imperial methods had much to ex- 
cuse them. But throughout this politico-economic 
struggle the most important influence against im- 



68 DEMOCRACY 

perialism was the demand that all institutions, 
claims, and powers should justify themselves at the 
conrt of reason. The very controversy between 
faith and reason awakened an interest in mental hab- 
its which faith did not represent and which sought a 
de jure basis for conduct instead of the de facto 
status of mere power. An appeal to reason to jus- 
tify a policy is an abandonment of imperialism and 
its use of force. It implies an internal resource for 
persuasion instead of an external method of com- 
pulsion. Force requires obedience; reason, assent, 
and assent can be determined only by the subject. 
Consequently, wherever rationalism sought to jus- 
tify an institution or a law, it was forced to find its 
principle in the individual whose assent it sought, 
and not in external authority. Legitimacy was 
thus a conception which subordinated might to right 
and forced political power to get its sanction in the 
individual claims of man to respect. Greco-Roman 
civilisation was not exercised by any problems of 
abstract legitimacy above the welfare of the state 
as an organisation : Christian ages, even when they 
simply reinstated in the hands of God the power 
which they had refused to the civil ruler invested it 
with the idea of righteousness, and substituted uni- 
versal justice for the caprice of imperialism. After 
idealising and spiritualising the Divine, the imperial 
conception lost much that was repulsive in its 
Greco-Roman embodiment, and formed a peaceful 



THE WATURE OF THE PROBLEM 69 

alliance with reason to subordinate kings and their 
power to the rights of man. Sovereign and subjects 
became equals in the higher kingdom, reason being 
the arbiter between men, whatever the authority 
between man and his maker. The appeal to the 
right and to reason w^as therefore to discard the 
criterion of mere power, and though the church had 
many delinquencies to account for, she initiated an 
intellectual and moral influence that completely 
substituted the idea of legitimacy for that of power 
in the guidance of conduct. 

It does not alter the position here taken to say 
that the church was governed by as unscrupulous 
men and aims as the state, and that it was anxious 
for power, benefices, and pelf of all kinds as kings 
and princes. For this accusation of corruption can 
be conceded as true. But while the motive and con- 
duct of the ecclesiastical organisation were as offen- 
sive as those of the state, the priests and rulers of 
the church, even when they were hypocrites in dis- 
guise, and many were not this, used language that 
fostered an ideal in the minds of their simple fol- 
lowers which represented conceptions that were 
radically opposed to the unchristian methods of 
both political and ecclesiastical imperialism, and in 
the growth of this moral ideal is found the force 
that reformed both church and state. We do not 
always find history on the surface. This is especially 
true of ideas. They work below the surface, often 



TO DEMOCRACY 

counteracting the influences wliich we suppose are 
the only ones in play. Men of the world often un- 
dermine their own systems of policy by cultivating 
conceptions that appear afterward to be the real but 
silent forces of history, though theirs is only a dem- 
agogic intention to protect themselves in power. 
They sow ideas broadcast with the expectation of 
controlling their influence when they themselves 
have secured power, and they may sometimes fool 
their own generation, but in the end they are hoist 
by their own petard. What Bastiat said of eco- 
nomic forces is also true in political and ecclesias- 
tical matters. It is what we do not see that often 
means and effects more than what we do see. The 
history of the struggle between the church and the 
state shows the combatants on both sides often 
equally unscrupulous in their motives and deeds. 
But seldom did the state stand for anything more 
than the traditional ideas of imperialism culminat- 
ing in Machiavelli, while the church, however cor- 
rupt the clergy and its rulers, which they often 
were not, always claimed the power and authority 
of God in its favour. Though its representatives 
too often embodied little of the divine in their life 
and conduct, the very opposition which it kept up 
between imperialism in politics and the divine 
rights of religion availed to give one term of the 
antithesis all the colouring of the ideal. To the com- 
mon people God was idealised and contrasted with 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 71 

the character of earthly sovereigns, and this all the 
more for the reason that he was never seen or felt 
in material form. The dnalistic conceptions of the 
age enabled the mind to throw all responsibility for 
evil upon material agents and man. God, besides 
being idealised and spiritualised, also took on the 
Christian attribute of benevolence and appeared as 
interested in man's welfare or salvation. Hence, no 
matter what its motives in playing upon the hopes 
and fears of the common people, the church was cre- 
ating a moral force of great power and significance 
for revolutionising the traditions of imperialism 
both in the state and within its own domain. The 
development of this idea did not need the sincerity 
of those who appealed to it. It was sufficient that 
the ideal was invoked in language and defined in 
contrast with the secular power, and so left to grow 
in the minds of the common people, until kings 
learned to invoke the idea of justice instead of 
power in their efforts to curb the influence of the 
church. It was in this way that the church con- 
quered by its ideas and not by its political policy. 
But it conquered in precisely the same way in which 
Rome conquered the northern nations of Europe. 
The barbarians overthrew the empire, but only to be 
silently conquered by Roman civilisation. Sim- 
ilarly Rome vanquished Greece, but could not with- 
stand the influence of her ideas. The church had 
attacked the arbitrary imperialism of the state by 



72 DEMOCRACY 

representing that political institutions were de- 
pendent upon divine authority and subordinated to 
the object which Christianity had placed under its 
auspices; namely, the salvation of the individual. 
Her first weapon was persuasion, but as she grew 
stronger she imitated the policy of her adversary. 
She failed, however, to conquer the political power 
by usurping the methods of imperialism. Still she 
might have succeeded even in this endeavour had 
not the moral ideas in which she was not always 
sincere conquered the state, or been employed by it, 
in its own victory over the church. The state simply 
won over the citizen by offering to be his servant, 
and ever since political power has not the audacity 
to claim any privileges except to defend its subjects. 
The only diiference between the formula that repre- 
sents the object of the state and that which defines 
the aim of the church is that in one we speak of the 
salvation and in the other of the welfare of man. 
The secular and the religious ideas still differ, the 
one aiming at the future and the other at the present 
happiness of men, but they agree in their subordina- 
tion of all institutions to the rights of the individual. 
The church and the state divided the territory be- 
tween them and imperialism became the prey of 
democracy. 

The tendency of all this is most clearly seen in 
the political philosophy of Hobbes, in whose theory 
of the state the final struggle between imperialism 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 73 

and individualism is waged. The cliurcli liad not 
been conscious of the anarchic tendencies inherent 
in the idea of individual rights, the liberty of reason 
and conscience, and the reformation which matured 
the antagonism to imperialism within the church had 
only unchained a set of forces that threatened to 
shake the thrones of Europe to their foundations, 
the political issue being incipient in the execution of 
Charles the First, and ripening in the French Revo- 
lution. In the meantime and before its consequen- 
ces were fully realised, the policy of the Puritans in 
England had frightened the philosophers of politi- 
cal order, while it offended and united the interests 
of both state and church against it. Hobbes thought 
he saw his ^^ original state of war " coming again, 
and fearing the consequences of the system in which 
the rights of individual conscience were supreme, he 
propounded his doctrine of sovereignty, which, 
though not theoretically new, was simply a philo- 
sophic expression for the '^ divine right of kings " in 
the practical politics of his time, and exempted the 
supreme civil authority from political responsibility. 
The legal maxim or fiction that " the king can do no 
wrong " is a practical formula for this conception of 
absolutism. But the theory of Hobbes was the last 
effort to revive despotism and to counteract the 
tendencies toward democracy. Freedom had been 
unchained and could not again be allured into am- 
bush. 



74 DEMOCRACY 

The view liere taken of Hobbes may easily mis- 
represent him. It may cbaracterise him as the ad- 
vocate of bad government, for which absohitism 
appears to stand in the eyes of democracy. But it 
was not the intention of Hobbes to defend despot- 
ism at the expense of justice. Nor was there any 
indirection in his methods. His work was not sur- 
rounded with any of the suspicions that haunt the 
name of Machiavelli. Hobbes had a perfectly in- 
telligible problem. Theoretical politics had come to 
grapple with the questions that had for so many 
centuries baffled the resources of practical states- 
men. Political science demanded a theoretical 
basis of authority which did not confuse might with 
right, on the one hand, and did not associate right 
with anarchy, on the other. The struggle between 
imperialism and individualism, both as a theoret- 
ical and a practical problem, still remained unsolved. 
There was no disposition to compromise their claims, 
or to divide up the functions of social and political 
action between them. Each asserted its right to 
solve the problem alone. But in this method no 
progress was made. History only reported the alter- 
nate failures of despotism and democracy, and 
Hobbes saw that the whole work of both theoretical 
and practical government had still to be done. The 
theoretical problem was the principle of legitimacy : 
the practical problem was the method of securing 
efficiency in the preservation of order. Hobbes un- 



THE NATVTtE OF THE PROBLEM 75 

dertook to solve both problems at one stroke. He 
endeavoured to correct the aberrations of democratic 
individualism by showing the importance of a 
supreme central authority, and to insure its freedom 
and efficiency of action he endowed it with what is 
known as '^ sovereignty " in political philosophy. 

It will be necessary at this stage of the problem 
to examine more fully what is meant by this doctrine 
of ^^ sovereignty." It was not wholly new in polit- 
ical science. Hobbes had been anticipated in the 
main principle by Bodin a century before. This 
author gave expression to the theoretical importance 
of absolute power. '^ He is entitled/' says Sir Fred- 
erick Pollock, '^ to share with Hobbes the renown of 
having founded the modern theory of the state; 
and it may be said of him that he seized on the vital 
point of it at the earliest time when it was possible. 
The doctrine referred to is that of political sover- 
eignty. In every independent community gov- 
erned by law there must be some authority, whether 
residing in one person or several, whereby the laws 
themselves are established, and from which they 
proceed. And this power, being the source of law, 
must itself be above the law: not above duty and 
moral responsibility, as Bodin carefully explains; 
but above the municipal ordinances of the particu- 
lar state — the positive laws, in modern phrase — 
which it creates and enforces. Find the person or 
persons whom the constitution of the state perma- 



76 DEMOCB.ACY 

nently invests with sucli authority, under whatever 
name, and you have found the sovereign. ^ Sover- 
eignty is a power supreme over citizens and subjects, 
itself not bound by the laws.' This power some- 
where is necessary to an independent State, and its 
presence is the test of national independence. Such 
is in outline the principle of sovereignty as stated by 
Bodin, taken up a century later by Hobbes, and 
adopted by all modern publicists with only more or 
less variation in the manner of statement.'' The 
most significant phrase in this passage is Sir Fred- 
erick Pollock's qualification of this sovereignty by 
^^ duty and moral responsibility." Such a qualifi- 
cation was possible only after the establishment of 
Christianity, which put a certain morality above the 
law. Ancient sovereignty, practical not theoretical, 
did not distinguish between political and moral re- 
sponsibility or irresponsibility. It did not confer 
political irresponsibility and at the same time urge 
the idea of moral responsibility. Both functions 
were endowed with the same attribute. It was not 
that an '' irresponsible " ruler had no duties, but 
that, in the absence of democratic methods, there 
was no theoretical or practical restraint upon his 
authority which might be called ^' responsibility." 
The whole tendency of the mediaeval period, with its 
conflict between the principles of might and right, 
between authority and legitimacy, was to insist upon 
moral responsibility even when political irresponsi- 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 77 

bility was conceded, and in the development of 
theory it was merely a device to escape a logical con- 
cession to despotism. This development, however, 
forced Hobbes into a curious combination of the 
ideas of sovereignty and social contract, with a lim- 
itation upon the right of revising the contract that 
committed him to sympathy with absolutism, and 
so aligned him against democracy. His idea of sov- 
ereignty is mediaeval imperialism pure and simple: 
his idea of social contract is democracy pure and 
simple, as we see in Rousseau. But he robbed it of 
its sting by refusing it the right of changing its con- 
stitution. This limitation upon the rights of the 
social contract indicates very clearly that his de- 
mocracy was only abstract. He would not permit 
the concrete application of contract at the pleasure 
of the citizens. Hence he virtually distinguished 
between abstract and concrete democracy. But he 
was not so scrupulous with his doctrine of sover- 
eignty. Modern theory distinguishes between ab- 
stract sovereignty, as absolute power somewhere, 
and its practical application in a particular person 
or place. ISTot so with Hobbes. His is as much a 
practical as it is a theoretical problem, and he places 
his sovereignty in a monarchical agent, though 
deriving it ultimately from the social contract. 
Summarising his doctrine Sir Frederick Pollock 
says: ^^ The sovereign's authority is derived from 
the consent of the subjects, and he is their agent for 



78 DEMOCRACY 

the purj)ose of directing their united strength for 
the common benefit ; but he is an agent with an nn- 
Hmited discretion, and with an authority which 
cannot be revoked. The subjects cannot change 
the form of government, for that would be a breach 
of the original covenant both toward the sover- 
eign and toward one another. The sovereign can- 
not forfeit his power, for he made no covenant, and 
there is none therefore which he can break. Any 
subject who dissents from the institution of the 
sovereign thereby ceases to be a member of the com- 
munity and remits himself to the original state of 
war, in which anyone who can may destroy him 
without violating any right. For similar reasons 
the sovereign is irresponsible and unpunishable. 
'^o man can complain of what his agent does within 
the authority given him, and in the case of a politi- 
cal sovereign all acts of sovereignty have been au- 
thorised beforehand by all the subjects. Holders of 
sovereignty may commit iniquity but not injustice. 
The sovereign, again, is the sole judge of what is 
necessary for the defense and security of the com- 
monwealth, and, in particular, of the question what 
doctrines are fit to be taught in it. There are like- 
wise annexed to sovereignty the powers of legislat- 
ure and judicature, of making war and peace, of 
choosing counsellors and ofiicers, of rewarding and 
punishing, and of regulating titles and precedence. 
All these rights are indivisible and incommunicable; 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 79 

the sovereign may delegate tliem, but cannot aban- 
don them." 

This language could be used to describe the ul- 
timate authority in any form of governmentj pro- 
vided that the terms '' sovereign " and ^^ sover- 
eignty '' are taken in their abstract sense. But 
Hobbes was anxious to hold that the '^ sovereign " 
in England was the King, and this interest in the 
concrete embodiment of absolute power gave his 
theory an imperialistic import. Hence the practi- 
cal politician and statesman seized the opportunity 
to convert this theoretical position into the support 
of tyrannical government. Hobbes's primary in- 
tention was to qualify the anarchy of individualism 
by the unlimited sovereignty of the central govern- 
ment, and it was only an accident of practical poli- 
tics that turned his doctrine into an apology for 
despotism. But he himself encouraged this ten- 
dency by the failure to distinguish between the ab- 
stract theory of political power and the concrete 
embodiment of it. He did not suspect the principle 
which has gradually, though imperfectly, worked 
its way into modem politics ; namely, the division of 
functions, but assumed too readily that the problem 
had to be solved on the lines of the opposition be- 
tween monarchy and democracy. " It does not oc- 
cur to him," says Sir Frederick Pollock, ^' as possi- 
ble that sovereignty should be vested in a compound 
as well as in a simple body." In his fear of anarchy, 



80 DEMOCRACY 

Oil tlie one hand, therefore, and in the failure to 
differentiate political functions, on the other, he 
gained his point by denying the responsibility of the 
crown, and this was done simply by making power 
and liberty convertible conceptions. He defined the 
complete antithesis between monarchy and democ- 
racy by this simple identification of power and lib- 
erty, and chose absolute monarchy as the only safe 
type of government. Liberty meant to him irre- 
sponsibility, and feeling that there could be no com- 
promise between the liberty of the people and that 
of the king, he thought that its possession by the 
people could only result in anarchy. This is true in 
the unlimited sense in which liberty is conceivable. 
He therefore defended the irresponsibility of the 
crown, partly as a necessity for his theory and partly 
as a measure of practical politics in the interest of 
efficient government, though as a concession to Eng- 
lish history he did not oppose a limitation of the 
crown's functions. Such powers as he left it, and 
they were the most important, were absolute and 
irresponsible. But his general theory both specula- 
tively and practically was the last fruit of scholas- 
ticism and imperialism in government, inasmuch 
as he. endeavoured to unite the ideas and functions 
of authority and legitimacy, might and right, in the 
\ same power without the attribute of responsibility. 
He was endeavouring to check the disintegrating ac- 
cidents of the Reformation by asserting a function 
for imperial powers. 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 81 

But the tendencies of history would not tolerate 
either the conception or the application of so much 
arbitrary power. The English people had found it 
necessary to place important restraints upon the au- 
thority of the crown and would not submit to 
a policy that represented a reaction against the 
hardly won conquests of individual liberty. Instead 
of leaving the functions of the crown intact, so far as 
their scope is concerned, and introducing some ma- 
chinery to make it responsible, they took away 
nearly all power from the king, following Hobbes 
and leaving him irresponsible in what he still pos- 
sessed, and made the ministry responsible partly to 
the crown and partly to Parliament, and both the 
ministry and Parliament to the people. This re- 
sulted in a natural movement toward democracy and 
the transfer of irresponsibility from the king to the 
people, depriving the crown of executive power, 
until Parliament has become omnipotent and the 
crown absolutel}^ impotent except as a distributor 
of patronage. Parliament is even more powerful 
than our own Congress, and can make and unmake 
the constitution at will, while Congress is circum- 
scribed both by the written constitution and the 
Supreme Court. The omnipotence of Parliament 
would have been the black beast of Hobbes, a Levia- 
than of a more dangerous sort than the one he con- 
templated. But it was only the logical outcome of 
his theory of absolutism. The public had been 



82 DEMOCRACY 

taught that the '' sovereign " was irresponsible, and 
not being able to get justice from the crown it sim- 
ply transferred the king's powers to itself. The 
crown retained its irresponsibility at the expense of 
its power, at least its executive power. The people 
obtained both, at least in a theoretical sense. But 
Parliament occupied a peculiar position. Besides 
being responsible to the people, as an elective body, 
it was also responsible to the crown which could dis- 
solve it, and the ministry, appointed by the crown, 
was responsible both to the crown and Parliament. 
The ministry in fact inherited the executive func- 
tions of the crown, so that this double responsibil- 
ity of that power becomes a matter of extreme in- 
terest. All this is a decided reaction against the 
whole doctrine of Hobbes. Outside of England the 
democratic tendency, which the reaction represents, 
has been more toward the principle of " checks and 
balances " than in the country which was its home. 
The two Houses of Parliament serve somewhat at 
least as checks upon each other. But the chief in- 
terest to the political student lies in the peculiar 
function of the crown to apply responsibility to 
agencies which in this country are practically irre- 
sponsible. We have tried to obtain responsibility 
for the executive powers partly by constitutional 
limitations and partly by elective tenure. These 
restraints, however, are not effective, as they too 
often prohibit instead of encourage action on the 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 83 

part of those best qualified to administer govern- 
ment. Hobbes and his school have so thoroughly 
inoculated us with the assimiption that power and / 
irresponsibility stand or fall together that we re- 
strict the power to act and govern in order to secure , 
responsibility. The true conception of government | 
is power and responsibility, and not power and 
irresponsihility , as Hohhes conceives it. It is along 
the line of this assumption that I wish later to sug- 
gest some reforms. In the meantime, however, I 
wish to emphasise the sharpness of the distinction 
between the two schools of political theory, and to 
show that the reaction against the theory and prac- 
tice of Ilobbes's time has not taken adequate ac- 
count of the complexity of the problem. Both con- 
ceive or represent it as a question of the locus of the 
whole power of government. Hobbes aims at unity 
and efiiciency of action as against the anarchy of 
individualism, and his opponents prefer the irre- 
sponsibility of the citizens to the imperialism of the 
king. The struggle has been between absolute 
monarchy and absolute democracy, with the latter 
coming off victorious, some compromises having 
been adopted to tide over immediate dangers. But 
assuming that power meant liberty and irresponsi- 
bility, the reaction against Hobbes sought to counter- 
act tyranny by imposing prohibitions and restric- 
tions upon central government agencies and by 
making both executive and legislative bodies elec- 



84 DEMOCRACY 

tive, a mere paper responsibility in hotli cases. The 
whole tendency has been more and more to restrict 
executive functions. We are as jealous of power as 
mankind have ever been, and rather than allow our 
rulers to possess any large amount of it, we make 
mere figure-heads of them and leave the functions 
of government to irresponsible deliberative assem- 
blies. Consequently, with the loss of the efficiency 
involved in Hobbes's idea, with the demand for it, 
and with the inability of the masses to effect unity 
and con^stancy of action necessary in our complex 
civilisation, the emergency gives us Hobbes's doc- 
trine in the very practical form of the irresponsible 
" political boss." The dangers of his rule, the 
anarchy of our legislatures, and the jealousy which 
we entertain against large executive powers drive us 
logically toward the referendum and initiative, 
which will make intermediate legislative functions 
and agencies merely vestigial in their nature, and 
which is the last development of the idea that power 
and irresponsibility go together. Theory and 
practice fluctuate between the two extremes of im- 
perialism and pure democracy. 

The development of government away from 
Hobbes's conception of sovereignty has taken two 
directions. The first is an attempt to establish the 
responsihility of executive and legislative officers. 
It was quickly seen that irresponsible power could 
not be tolerated in a social and industrial civilisa- 



TH£: NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 85 

tion, but only in a military system, and tliat some 
way had to be obtained to bring political agents to 
account. A variety of influences contributed to this 
result. But the main institution for the purpose 
was elective tenure. This was probably as much 
suggested by the policy of the church as it certainly 
was by the idea for which the church stood ; namely, 
the salvation and the welfare of the individual. 
The church, as we have seen, had always been dem- 
ocratic. It elected its officers and exacted of them 
a life of service for others. When then it came to 
making kings responsible elective tenure offered 
the method and public service the object of political 
institutions. But the development of politics soon 
lost sight of the principle of responsibility which 
had started its opposition to despotism and concen- 
trated its attention upon the democratic object of 
elective methods. Elective tenure, however, though 
it may increase the power of the citizen, does not, 
in the complicated action of modern society, effect 
all that the principle of responsibility calls for, and 
has also too often failed to secure an intelligent and 
conscientious governing class. Something in addi- 
tion to elective tenure is required to establish that 
condition. What this shall be must be presented 
again when we have discovered the principle that 
is to direct the organisation of political machinery. 
For the present we have only to remark the method 
that has been employed to correct Hobbes's theory 



86 DEMOGRAGY 

of sovereignty and the evils of mediseval imperi- 
alism. 

Tlie second tendency in the reaction against 
Hobbes and his school was the limitation of the 
sovereign which was accomplished partly by con- 
stitutional restraints and partly by institutional 
bodies endowed with the powers forbidden to the 
sovereign. Written and unwritten constitutions il- 
lustrate the first of these limitations. Legislative, 
judicial, and ministerial agencies illustrate the sec- 
ond, and suggest also the principle which we wish 
to carry out here more fully, as the correct one to 
govern the political student of the future. Though 
such bodies were in a measure substitutes for im- 
perialism and conceived as the incumbents of the 
powder refused the sovereign, yet they were a recog- 
nition, conscious or otherwise, of the division of 
labor which, though needing still further develop- 
ment, yet needs still more the supplementary and 
correlative organisation of an agency to attain effi- 
ciency and concentration of power not possible in our 
legislative assemblies. This correlative need is the 
integration of function in government to supple- 
ment the differentiation which has been begun and 
requires still further development. The manner in 
which this was accomplished, however, did not fully 
realise the end of which it is capable. The reason 
for this was partly that the object of the transfer of 
functions was not for the division of labor; that is 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 87 

the development Avas not conscious of its own ten- 
dency and meaning: partly that its application was 
effected by the method of '' checks and balances," 
which prevented the proper responsibility of the 
agencies so constituted and consequently the organi- 
sation of a central power which could make them 
responsible. Monarchy, if it was irresponsible it- 
self, made all the other agencies of government re- 
sponsible; but in curbing its power society simply 
transferred the irresponsibility of the monarch to 
the several agencies substituted for it. Consequently 
with its system of '^ checks and balances " it lost 
both the principle of responsibility and the full de- 
velopment of the division of labor, as it appears in 
the industrial and economic field. ^Nevertheless, 
the course of political theory and practice has pre- 
sented us with at least a latent tendency to suggest 
the principles which may serve to correct the evils 
of democracy. They are the idea of responsibility 
and the division of labor in government. Both may 
be comprehended in the one formula of the inte- 
gration and differentiation of function in the oper- 
ations of government, though the suggestions to be 
carried out here will make it convenient to keep the 
idea of responsibility separate from the arrange- 
ments adopted for securing the proper division of 
political functions. The trouble with the past was 
that it did not realise the complexity of the problem 
before it, and assumed that a mere transfer of power 



88 DEMOCRACY 

was sufficient to attain the object of government. 
Our present tendency, influenced by the conceptions 
of tbis past, is to limit sovereign powers in every 
form except in the people themselves, as the only 
escape from corruption and tyranny, with the conse- 
quence that we sacrifice political efficiency in the 
functions of government to the extension of de- 
mocracy, while the old evils return in the " bosses," 
who are simply the necessary result of the demand 
for organisation and efficiency, and consequently 
are the irresponsible and unconstitutional substi- 
tutes for the legitimacy of the past. We have made 
onr legitimate governors mere figure-heads because 
of our jealousy of a strong executive and because 
we have seen no way to connect responsibility with 
power. Hobbes's conception still influences us even 
when we abandon monarchy. We have deified 
" checks and balances " for security and relied sole- 
ly upon the electorate for our court of responsibility, 
when the real want is a better organised subordina- 
tion of government function and responsibility to 
some agency additional to the electorate. I would 
summarise, therefore, the principles of political 
theory which will mediate between monarchy and 
democracy in the following manner. They repre- 
sent the philosophic basis of government in every 
form that can prove permanently successful. They 
are: (1) The adequate responsibility of the execu- 
tive, legislative, and administrative powers, and (2) 



TEE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 89 

The integration and differentiation of function in 
the operations of government. 

I have stated the problem in a form that implies 
a connection between philosophic ideas and practi- 
cal politics. There is always a relation between 
them, whether it be one of cause and effect or mere 
association. Actual institutions give rise to philo- 
sophical systems about them, and philosophy reacts 
upon them to modify or improve them. Hence it 
will be interesting to remark this relation between 
philosophical conceptions and the development of 
social and political institutions. This is especially 
true in regard to the two principles that have been 
enunciated, and which represent, one of them at 
least, the fundamental law of evolution or progress. 
It is not, however, that philosophy always directly, 
or even indirectly, determines our practical politics, 
at least in its details, nor that politics will necessarily 
determine any particular theory of philosophy; but 
that the conditions that produce the one will also 
often produce the other, though the changes and re- 
actions in each of them are not always synchronous 
with those of the other. There is always a complete 
reciprocity between our ideas and our volitions, 
both individually and socially. The only difficulty 
is to determine what the prevailing social ideas are. 
The opinions of individuals differ so much that we 
cannot reason from any given philosophy to the con- 
duct and institutions of society. In fact, among 



90 -^ DEMOCRACY 

philosophers certam conceptions may prevail without 
reflecting themselves upon social conduct, and the 
community may act Avithout regard to any given 
philosophy prevalent in the schools. But the mo- 
ment that any system of ideas becomes general it 
Droduces an influence upon political conduct, and 
institutions reflect themselves in the philosophic 
systems of the day. This reciprocity between ideas 
and institutions, individual and social, enables us to 
study the principles which rule our progress in the 
types of philosophic thought, where we find man be- 
coming conscious of the forces and ideas that de- 
termine his destiny. It is only when man becomes 
conscious of these forces that he can expect to 
rationally aid the process of his development. 
Otherwise it must be left wholly to the contingency 
of natural selection. Hence if we can discover the 
law of progress, which is only the means to the end, 
we may be able to apply it in a way to improve or 
hasten the course of development. This is the rea- 
son why a philosophic principle may help us to see 
our way through the difiiculties of our political 
problem. Being the founder of those conceptions 
which establish or represent the unity of nature, 
philosophy reflects its connection with, and influence 
upon, every department of human activity, and re- 
sults in similarly unifying human volitions, whether 
individual or social, and where it does not determine 
them directly, it serves as a good index of the essen- 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 91 

tial principles that do determine them. More es- 
pecially that philosophy represents man's con- 
sciousness of the influences and ideas about him, and 
which he can turn to practical account, it may de- 
termine for us the principle which should govern us 
in the construction of political institutions, where 
wisdom is so much demanded. For this reason it 
may prove profitable to study briefly the connection 
between philosophic ideas and both political theory 
and practice. 

Animism is perhaps the first as it is the simplest 
stage of reflection in which the human mind at- 
tempts to explain the world. It sees life everywhere, 
but the conception of a cosmos, a unified whole, is 
not clear, or perhaps does not exist in this stage. 
Corresponding to it the social organisation is, at 
least usually, as anarchic as the philosophic ideas 
represent nature. But animism is an indefinite con- 
dition out of which two wholly different types of 
philosophy proceed, the direction of development 
depending upon the question whether the mind 
comes to the study of the forces of nature with a 
disposition to unify them by a pantheistic or by an 
atomistic hylozoism. That is to say, it depends upon 
whether it conceives the world as a cosmos or a chaos. 
If the life that animates nature is conceived to be a 
single universal force, no importance will be at- 
tached to the individual unit or phenomenon in it, 
and we have variously monism, pantheism, and 



93 DEMOCRACY 

monotlieism as the inevitable direction of philo- 
sophic thought. On the other hand, if this life is 
placed in the individual and no stress is laid upon the 
unity of the cosmos, the direction of ideas is toward 
polytheism in religion and atomism in philosophy. 
Philosophically speaking, monism and atomism are 
the two extreme opposite tyj)es of thought, and the 
others are more or less only different applications of 
one or the others. The order of development in 
each case is not important for our purpose, but only 
the logical tendency of the movement. The pre- 
dominance of one or the other prevails according to 
circumstances. At the same time both distinct 
forms of thought may co-exist and develop side by 
side in different persons, so that the general tendency 
may either be indeterminate or a compromise of the 
two movements. 

The social equivalent of animism has no special 
importance for us in the present work: but it is 
interesting to observe that what is known as imperi- 
alism; namely, the possession of large political 
powers over extensive areas of territory and a di- 
versity of tribes, seems everywhere to have followed 
the decline of polytheism and the adoption of mo- 
nistic or monotheistic conceptions. The reason for 
this may not appear on the surface, but it is evident 
to those who know what pantheism and monotheism 
stand for in their conception of power and the sub- 
ordination of the individual, with the social ten- 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 93 

dencies that affiliate themselves with such ideas. 
They favour, if they do not produce, central govern- 
ment and the restriction of individual liberty 
commensurate with its imperialism. But poly- 
theism was in the ancient religious world what the 
atomic conception was in the philosophic. It rep- 
resented an individualistic idea of things, a system 
of local and independent deities as the atoms were 
independent forces. It marked the absence of all 
such conceptions of the imity of nature as we find 
in pantheism and monotheism, and hence of the 
causal agency at the basis of it. Its social equivalent 
was a vast system of warring tribes and families 
without a highly organised central government. 
The powers of the chief or ruler were absolute 
enough, but their connection with military condi- 
tions of life and small areas of population suggested 
very little of the notion of empire, which requires 
for its realisation a larger unity of sentiment and in- 
terest than the existence of warring tribes would per- 
mit. This unity is fostered, if not created, by those 
conceptions of the world that transcend the limits 
of polytheistic thought. Many gods meant as many 
independent tribes and provinces, perhaps not nec- 
essarily but as an associated fact, and hence ideas 
which represented so little general unity physically 
and socially as the polytheistic system could only 
favour political institutions of a limited sort. How- 
ever absolute power may have been within the tribe 



94 DEMOCRACY 

or the jurisdiction of the local deity, its exercise 
was limited partly by territorial considerations and 
partly by the rival dangers of independent tribes. 
But the departure from polytheism to monotheism 
in religion and the substitution of monism for atom- 
ism in philosophy illustrated, if it did not produce, a 
tendency to bring independent forces, communities, 
individuals into subordination to a higher and more 
central authority, so that the social equivalent of 
these ideas is a more imperial form of civilisation. 
Polytheism in religion and atomism in philosophy 
represented a system of independent individuals, 
and society had little organisation. Monotheism 
in religion and monism in philosophy represented 
the subordination of these individuals to a universal 
pov^er. Hence they indicate a conception of the 
cosmos that confers great pov^er upon the supreme 
cause v^hile establishing the unity of the world, and 
so prepare the way for conceiving a common rela- 
tion of all men to this agency, just as the individuals 
of the family or tribe in the polytheistic stage were 
subject to its tutelar deity. But the larger concep- 
tion of monotheism and monism simply widened 
the range of this subordination and equality, though 
it lacked democratic significance because the em- 
phasis was placed upon the relation of the individ- 
uals to the whole instead of their relation to each 
other. This subordination of the individual to the 
supreme power created the whole content of virtue 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 95 

and social obligation. It is therefore hardly an ac- 
cident that we find that the idea of justice, so prom- 
inent in the monistic philosophies of Plato and 
Aristotle, was that of social^ not individual wel- 
fare, and that the brotherhood of man sprang from 
Stoic pantheism. This latter philosophy, however, 
with its subordination of the individual to the ab- 
solute, though it suggested the universal brother- 
hood of man as one of its corollaries, could not give 
it moral value and efficiency, simply because it 
placed so little value upon the individual and em- 
phasised his subordination to the supreme power in- 
stead of his independent relation to his fellow. In 
the golden age of Greek philosophy and politics the 
universal or social and individual were conceived 
in antagonism to each other, but when the atomic 
philosophy took the place of the monistic systems 
of the earlier period it democratised the relation be- 
tween the social and the individual and justice 
changed its content so that social and individual wel- 
fare coincided. But in the transition from the in- 
dividualism of the polytheistic stage to the monistic 
period the social value of the latter's conception of 
the unity of the cosmos was very great, in that it 
determined a higher ideal than the atomic anarchy, 
physical or political, of the earlier period. Polythe- 
ism, of course, often remained among the common 
strata of society, and even as a conception of de- 
pendent and subordinate beings among other classes 



96 DEMOCRACY 

who ]iad accepted monistic ideas, long after tlie 
triumph of a monotheistic or pantheistic type of 
thought. But as soon as the latter gains the ascen- 
dency it begins to revolutionise social conditions, 
and either institutes, or accompanies the institution 
of, extensively centralised power, and polytheism 
or atomic influences remain only as a limitation 
upon the extent of its authority, or become an atro- 
phied civilisation. 

This movement of thought and conduct and the 
various degrees of complexity and conflict among 
the conceptions of philosophy and the forces of po- 
litical life are apparent in the histories of India, 
China, Greece, and Rome. They cannot be trav- 
ersed here for lack of time and space to make the 
proof adequate. But I may summarise results. In 
them we should find that imperialism, with its ex- 
tensive political power, was a concomitant of the 
conceptions that represented the unity of the cos- 
mos. It was the monism of religion and philosophy 
that was the precursor of both the conception and 
the reality of universal empire. The philosophic 
principle of the unity of nature and of the suprem- 
acy of a single force or deity over all others was 
either the index or the concomitant effect of the 
psychological and social conditions which supported 
or created extensive political dominion. I do not 
pretend that philosophic ideas are the only indices 
or causes of the political institutions contemporane- 



THE NATURE OF TEE PROBLEM 97 

ous with them: for there are other influences equal 
or greater in importance in producing the same ef- 
fect. Thus there can be no doubt that the substitu- 
tion of slavery for the killing of captives was a 
powerful influence tow^ard the creation of large em- 
pires. It modified the functions of the ruler, in- 
creased population to be provided for, and brought 
into play the economic and social forces incident to 
slavery and a denser population; namely, agricult- 
ure and aristocracy, and was thus more immediately 
the efficient cause of imperial tendencies. Other 
ideas were also contributory to the same effect. But 
the larger view of the world, which monistic ideas 
initiated and instilled, tempered and encouraged 
the spirit of conquest, though that spirit may have 
arisen in economic necessities. Without it we might 
never have seen the ambitious projects of Persia 
under Xerxes, of Greece under Alexander, of Rome 
under Caesar, of the Franks under Charlemagne, 
of France under I^apoleon. These men and move- 
ments were representatives of an idea which had its 
inception in philosophy before it appeared to af- 
fect the destiny of political life, and the part which 
this idea played, whether successful or not, in all 
the main purposes of the movement was that of 
creating a common sentiment, enlarging the func- 
tions of government and centralising the power that 
had to rule over the conflicting forces of a diversified 
society. In this way the idea of monarchy and its 



98 DEMOCRACY 

concentrated power over large areas of territory be- 
came the resource of social order, the means of keep- 
ing the world with its denser population out of 
anarchy, and as long as each group of social units, 
the family, the tribe, the province, etc., was 
economically sufficient for itself, and both po- 
litical and industrial conditions were simple, this 
form of government, with its absolute powers, 
though somewhat limited by this very self-suffi- 
ciency of the groups over which its power was ex- 
ercised, was the best adapted to the situation: es- 
pecially that the ignorance and superstition of the 
masses disqualified them for dealing with common 
interests independent of their own local affairs. 
The centralisation of political power and its impe- 
rial efficiency became a necessity for the mainte- 
nance of any order at all. 

But the conditions that necessitated and justified 
ancient monarchy with its irresponsible sovereignty 
and undifferentiated political functions no longer 
exist. Individualistic modes of thought, modified 
by the philanthropic impulses of Christianity, have 
supplanted the socialism of ancient monistic concep- 
tion, which offered no personal immortality to en- 
hance the value of the individual, while the eco- 
nomic interests of men have become so socialised or 
reciprocally dependent upon each other that their 
protection can be safely left to voluntary effort, at 
least more safely than in conditions where interests 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 99 

were conflicting. The self-sufficiency and individ- 
ualism of ancient life were counteracted bj tlie so- 
cialism of political ideas and power, while the social- 
ism of modern economic life, with its automatic reg- 
ulation of private interests exhibiting the solidarity 
of parts in an organism, corrects the tendencies of 
individualism, and imperialism becomes either dan- 
gerous or useless, except as it may be made to sub- 
serve a legitimate individualism against the tyranny 
of socialism. Manufacture and commerce, railwaj^s 
and telegraphs, science and literature, art and re- 
ligion, have so revolutionised human knowledge and 
sentiments, both extending the range of common 
ideas and multiplying their differences, creating 
great solidarity in some directions and equal diver- 
sity in others, that the concentrated and arbitrary 
power of ancient monarchy is either unequal to 
the task of government, or would be in danger of 
enslaving the individual in a worse manner than 
antiquity. Moreover, military glory has succumbed 
to the economic ideal ; the masses are educated and 
the distribution of knowledge more nearly approxi- 
mates the condition of equality, and the humblest 
classes actually possess the franchise; the disposi- 
tion to passive obedience which was once more com- 
patible with the enjoyment of individual rights and 
happiness has given place to self-assertion, freedom, 
and independence which are now more necessary for 
protection against arbitrary power because of the 



100 DEMOCRACY 

present greater solidarity of economic interests; 
freedom of conscience, of tliouglit, and of action has 
been at least partly secured, and witli it tlie individ- 
ualisation of almost every form of human energy 
as the foil against imperialism, and all of them ac- 
companied by that persistent jealousy of political 
power which is not subject to the restraint of the 
governed that makes any other than electoral insti- 
tutions all but impossible. Just as the atomic phi- 
losophy of Democritus and Epicurus was the anti- 
dote to Eleatic monism and Stoic pantheism, so the 
individualism of modern life, itself the outcome of 
atomic physics and the value which the idea of im- 
mortality has conferred upon the individual, is a 
fatal obstacle to anything like the monarchical in- 
stitutions of the past. Government must be divided 
into a number of agencies in order to make it pos- 
sible, on the one hand, and to escape the dangers of 
omnipotent powers in a monarch, on the other, with 
anything but omniscience to guide him. On the 
other hand, the anarchy of individualism and its 
multitude of irresponsible agents, limitations, and 
restraints upon prompt action require a strong cen- 
tral authority to maintain order and to save civili- 
sation. As monistic conceptions are necessary to 
correct the tendencies of atomic doctrines toward 
chaos, so imperial functions in government are nec- 
essary to co-ordinate the conflicting interests of 
society and to secure prompt and efficient action in 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 101 

important emergencies. The complexity of social 
and economic interests, embodying as tliey do a 
strange mixture of common and conflicting objects, 
tlie one requiring liberty and the other regulation, 
makes large central and executive powers indispen- 
sable, if they can be made responsible at the same 
time. Equally important will be the distribution of 
government functions among a number of agents 
or bodies, partly as a limitation to arbitrary author- 
ity and partly as a release from impossible tasks and 
responsibilities. A monarchy is too simple and a 
democracy is too anarchic to properly accomplish 
the object of government under such conditions. A 
wholly different principle than either of them, 
though combining the functions of both, is the key 
to the situation. The policy of modern industrial 
organisation, which has free development in this 
respect far beyond the progress of legitimate poli- 
tics, and itself only one illustration of the universal 
law regulating both organic and social life, is the 
type of institution which suggests the best remedy 
for social ills. It is the concentration of power and 
the division of labor, the integration and indifferen- 
tiation of function, as Mr. Spencer calls it, charac- 
terising the development of all complex organisms, 
that offers a guide for the reconstruction of political 
institutions, with an additional agency in govern- 
ment to supply the place of competition in the 
economic world. Briefly the thing wanted is large 



102 DEMOCRACY 

executive powers without monarchy and made ade- 
quately responsible, and the differentiation of func- 
tions without democracy, wdiich, in its pure form, 
is simply polyglot government without head or 
brains. 

I^ow just as a monistic philosophy conditioned or 
supplied the clue to the political organisation that 
put an end to anarchy, and as the atomic philosophy 
exaggerated the importance of the individual, with 
its tendency to disintegrate society while it corrects 
the evils of monarchical despotism, so we may look 
to modern philosophic thought, which endeavours 
to harmonise monistic and atomic conceptions, for 
the principle upon which to base the necessary in- 
stitutional reforms of political life. It is not that 
we can take philosophy as an infallible guide in the 
pursuit of any object or end we please, much less as 
an '^ open sesame " to the perplexities of political 
problems without due regard to experience and prac- 
tical insight. For of all persons who are most likely 
to fail in such matters it is the abstract philosopher, 
the man who is for ever grubbing in mere ideas of his 
own making, ^o abstract principle will take us very 
far into the problems of politics. They are too com- 
plex for a simple solution. They demand for their 
satisfaction the delicate adjustment and combina- 
tion of a variety of principles which are forever 
shifting their action and incidents. Only Utopias 
grow out of supreme confidence in an abstract prin- 



THE NATURE OF THE PR OB LE IT 103 

ciple which makes no account of otlier facts quite as 
important as the one that so often catches the ec- 
static glance of the philosopher. ^Nevertheless the 
Avide general principles of philosophy can no more 
be ignored with safety by the practical man than 
the concrete facts of experience by the speculative 
mind. Both should be combined for complete suc- 
cess in anything. Ignorance of either will be fatal 
to any project. Consequently , though general phil- 
osophic ideas cannot alone determine for us the solu- 
tion of the whole problem, they do serve as an indis- 
pensable guide to the general policy necessary to 
any institutions whatsoever. Modern philosophy 
should do as much as the ancient to suggest a way 
out of political difficulties. It is not that the gen- 
eral conception of philosophy has changed, though 
there is a natural tendency for the human mind, 
like a pendulum, to fluctuate between two equally 
absurd extremes of opinion: for the idea of uni- 
versal unity of some kind remains as a permanent 
assumption or conquest of knowledge, and equally 
urgent or fixed is the conception of the multiplicity 
and individuality of the forces constituting the 
whole. These ideas are the commonplaces of all 
philosophic doctrine. But there is one idea, associ- 
ated with the theory of evolution, which has 
smoothed the conflict between two intellectual ex- 
tremes of thought, while it has added to reflective 
knowledge a fact that possesses an importance be- 



104 DEMOCRACY 

yond all measure for political students. This fact is 
the law of that evolution. This law has already been 
formulated several times, and represents that all 
progress is due to the proper adjustment of the 
integration and differentiation of structure and 
function to the end and complexity of the life which 
has to he preserved and developed. So abstract a 
statement of the law, however, may not be clear 
enough to the general reader, and much less its ap- 
plicability to the forms and agencies of government. 
It will be wise therefore to illustrate and explain its 
operation in the phenomena of nature and history. 
We observe in the growth of organisms two com- 
plementary processes going on. As the individual 
increases in complexity of nature and function there 
occurs an increasing specialisation of organs, a di- 
vision of labor among the agencies contributing to 
the life and purpose of the whole. Simultaneously 
there goes on a concentration, or integration, of gen- 
eral functions in some one organ delegated with 
increased power of co-ordination and control over 
dependent members, adjusting their action to a 
common end. In simple organisms this process is 
not apparent, if it exist at all. The amoeba, for in- 
stance, is almost a homogeneous substance without 
individual organs either for locomotion or for di- 
gestion, and without traces of a neural system. 
There is so little differentiation of structure and 
function in it that any part of the body can be ex- 



THE NAT TIB E OF THE PROBLEM ^ 105 

temporised for hands, legs, moiitli, or stomach. But 
as we advance higher in the scale of existence spe- 
cial organs are developed for each of these purposes 
and others assume general control of the special 
members, adjusting them and the whole to a com- 
mon end. This concentration of regulative power 
is well illustrated by the nervous system in the 
higher orders and the differentiation of structure 
and function of a dependent kind by the limbs, 
muscles, stomach, lungs, glands, etc. To compare 
man with lower animals, we find this integration 
and differentiation illustrated in a very interesting 
manner. Man cannot use his hands for walking, 
but has to limit their employment to the technical 
arts connected with the supply of his Avants, his de- 
fence against enemies, and his general culture. 
These require increased knowledge and skill for 
their use and to regulate and co-ordinate their ac- 
tion while supplying adequate resources for intel- 
lectual activity a corresponding increase of neural 
matter is required and developed. On the other 
hand, the apes use the hands or forelimbs equally 
for walking and manual effort, though in such cases 
these limbs make neither good hands nor good feet. 
In the nervous system also this differentiation and 
integration is very noticeable. The primitive ner- 
vous organism was a simple ganglion or mass of cells 
and this gradually altered into a spinal column. This 
linear mass of cells in the simpler forms of life had 



106 DEMOCRACY 

to perform all tlie neural functions incident to the 
organism. But gradually a differentiation between 
the reflex or unconscious and the deliberative or con- 
scious activities arose and this was marked physi- 
cally by the enlargement of one end of the spinal 
column into a brain, the spinal cord remaining pre- 
dominantly an organ for reflex actions connected 
with the vital and reproductive functions, while the 
brain became the medium for the intellectual and 
voluntary activities. Then again the brain further 
differentiates into a system of partly distinct centres 
and organs for as distinct functions, as is illustrated 
by the localisation of brain processes. At the same 
time its unity and integration are kept up by a sys- 
tem of commissural fl.bres connecting the various 
centres so that co-ordination is effected partly by 
the inhibitory influence of one centre upon another 
and partly by the functional action of the organ as 
a whole, acting as the central agency for regulating 
all bodily functions. The nature and extent of this 
process is illustrated in an interesting manner by the 
effects of surgical and experimental operations on 
the brain. In animals excision of the hemispheres 
disturbs the exercise of important function often 
only for a short period. The vicarious restitution of 
such functions in other centres will often take place 
with comparative readiness. But this is not so easy 
in man. In him the differentiation has gone so far 
that restitution of function after excision is not so 



THE XATURE OF THE PROBLEM 107 

prompt, if it occur at all. The increase of integra- 
tion makes the brain as a whole in man a much more 
vital organ and it will not bear as much disturbance 
as it does in the animal. The predominance of 
man's intellectual life is a factor in the case as well 
as the amount of integration. But it suffices for our 
present purposes to remark the increase of inte- 
gration and differentiation as the complexity of the 
organism increases. So much for the physiological. 
But it is not in organic life alone that we find this 
process manifesting itself. The same law is appar- 
ent in social and political institutions, though the 
integration has hardly developed pari passu with 
differentiation. With the growth in complexity of 
the social system, which has been caused partly by 
the density of population, partly by the complexity 
and solidarity of economic interests and general rec- 
iprocity between individuals and communities, and 
partly by the territorial extension of government, 
there has gone a constant multiplication of the 
agencies necessary to perform functions which 
would either overtax the central power or threaten 
the individual with its mischievous influence. Il- 
lustrations of this process are the tribe with 
its single absolute ruler, then the larger com- 
munity with administrative appointees under 
the king, and lastly the modern state with 
its executive, legislative, and judicial heads, and 
various commissions and administrative subordi- 



108 DEMOCRACY 

nates. In this country, for instance, we have first 
federal and state governments, and each with their 
executive, legislative, and judicial departments. 
Then subordinate to the state are the county and 
township political agencies. On the other hand, the 
integration has not been so great. The various 
agencies mentioned do not exhibit that relation of 
subordination of one to another that is necessary to 
central efficiency and control. They are all more or 
less independent of each other, with no responsibil- 
ity except to the people who have long pockets and 
short memories. They have been organised mostly 
on the idea of ^^ checks and balances," and so do not 
represent much integration. But that this integra- 
tion has to some extent occurred, though only in a 
different interpretation of the constitution, is appar- 
ent in the development of federal centralisation and 
authority since the foundation of the government. 
The Civil War put a practical end to the extreme 
States' Rights doctrine, which represented a logical 
tendency to pure democracy and the referendum, 
and the Interstate Commerce Commission and fed- 
eral interference in the Chicago riots indicate which 
way the development tends. But this tendency does 
not express itself in anything institutional, and be- 
sides it is largely counteracted by the usurpations of 
Congress and the democratic jealousy of executive 
power, which is made formidable by its want of re- 
sponsibility. The main difficulty, however, is the 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 109 

fact that there is no provision for an automatic and 
elastic supply of agencies to meet the situation 
created by the increasing complexity of the social 
system. Political institutions have not kept pacej 
with the integration and differentiation manifested / 
in the economic world. We have been forced to 
apply the principle to some extent, but have been 
governed too much by the conception of ^^ checks 
and balances " to see the way out of our perplexities. 
These instances of integration and differentiation 
in structure and function, taken from both the or- 
ganic and the social world, suffice to indicate the 
law of progress as I have stated it. Students of poli- 
tics are perhaps familiar enough with it as a fact, 
and I have not called attention to it as a new or un- 
known circumstance, but as a law wdiich requires to 
become the conscious principle upon which to base, 
or by which to regulate, political reforms. But this 
proposition to adopt as a regulative principle of po- 
litical institutions the law of evolutionary progress 
must be accepted with some caution. The explana- 
tion and illustration of the law may appear to be 
arguing from the physical to the moral, from the 
organic to the political world. It is objected that 
such a procedure assumes that society is an organ- 
ism, when as a matter of fact the identity between 
an animal organism and society is merely metaphor- 
ical. I agree that we cannot argue from the organic 
to the social world in this way. I should even go 



110 DEMOCRACY 

farther and maintain that no greater illusion can be 
entertained than the belief that we can construct a 
political theory solely upon the phenomena of or- 
ganic life. The difference between animal organ- 
isms and social communities is almost immeasurable. 
There are very striking and important resemblances, 
but there are also essential differences which make 
it impossible to reason from one to the other. On 
this account it is best not to apply the term ^^ organ- 
ism " to the two sets of phenomena at the same time. 
It has a different meaning in each case. It would 
be better to call the animal an " organism " and so- 
ciety an " organisation," though the latter term is 
also equivocal in that it applies so frequently to vol- 
untary and artificial combinations of men that it 
might be taken to imply that society is only Thomas 
Jefferson's social contract, which had to be renewed 
every generation in order to make government le- 
gitimate. But whether we can use this or any other 
term without misunderstanding or not, it ought to 
be evident that organic life and social bodies are so 
different that it is dangerous to apply the principles 
of one to the other without independent proof that 
they are common laws of both realms. Society is 
a collective whole : an animal is what I shall call an 
organic whole. J^ow a collective whole is a group 
of homogeneous units, individuals of the same kind: 
an organic whole is a group of heterogeneous units, 
individuals of a different kind, if we are entitled to 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 111 

call it a group at all. It is constituted by parts which 
we call membersj and we also call the individuals 
constituting a community members of it. But the 
units in a community can be classed as alike, essen- 
tially alike each other, while the members of an 
organism are distinctly unlike each other. Besides 
making one to consist of homogeneous, and the other 
of heterogeneous parts, the essential difference can 
also be indicated in the fact that an organic whole 
is spatially continuous, a collective whole not 
spatially continuous. The members of the former 
have no individual existence apart from the whole, 
those of the latter can have an existence independent 
of the collective group. The difference can also be 
expressed by saying that an organic whole is an in- 
dividual unit acting as an indivisible body, the parts 
being merely spatial divisions : society is a collective 
group of organic wholes, the parts being individual 
units with an independent existence of their own. 
This distinction, therefore, between organic and col- 
lective wholes explains why it is not possible to rea- 
son from one to the other. Neither have I done this 
nor do I intend that it shall be done. I have been 
careful to show that the law of integration and dif- 
ferentiation actually occurs in both realms instead 
of finding it in one and then trying to prove from 
its existence in the organic that we ought to act on 
its assumption in the social and political world. On 
the contrary, it has been found to exist as a univer- 



112 DEMOCRACY 

sal law of progress, and consequently the argument 
is not from one class of phenomena to another quite 
different in nature, but is for a more distinct and 
conscious recognition of a method which has been 
too much ignored for that of " checks and balances.'' 
Such division of labor as has taken place in the past 
has been little conscious of the principle on which 
it has proceeded, while the idea determining con- 
scious effort at reform has been that of Hobbes 
minus the king. This led merely to a transfer of 
power from one authority to another without any 
regard to differentiation of functions, on the one 
hand, or to responsibility of an efficient form, on 
the other. That is to say, we have complained of 
arbitrary power in the hands of a king and turned it 
over to the mob of the legislature, with the elector- 
ate a prey to every demagogue who wishes to play 
upon its passions and ignorance. The distribution of 
powers and duties incidental to the evolution of the 
system has hardly been aware at all of the founda- 
tion upon which it rested and no attention has been 
paid to their subordination to some adequate court 
of responsibility. Usually institutional changes or 
modifications have been suggested by some specific 
problem, witness the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion, where the existing agency was overburdened, 
and no regard was made to the general principle in- 
volved, or to the complementary changes necessary 
to obtain the desired results. That is to say, the 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 113 

differentiation of function is adopted without the 
required integration, and progress is too slow. 

But whether this last statement be true or not, it 
is certain that the law of integration and differentia- 
tion as exhibited in both the organic and the politi- 
cal world, incompletely in the latter, is the general 
principle of progress, and that political students 
must adopt it as the conscious and regulative idea 
upon which proposed reforms are to be based. If this 
assumption can be made, we have the major prem- 
ise upon which to proceed in our practical efforts. 
We have onlv to see that our concrete measures con- 
form "rightly to our general principle. But that po- 
litical development has not kept pace with the re- 
quirements of this law is very clearly evinced by 
a variety of facts. In the first place, the contrast 
between political conditions and those of our eco- 
nomic institutions, which have been free to adjust 
themselves to natural law, is very marked. Organi- 
sation has reached a high degree of perfection in the 
industrial world. The combination of capital and 
the division of labor have proceeded upon an enor- 
mous scale, and have even excited strong jealousy 
and opposition on the part of interests less organised. 
This concentration of economic forces, on the one 
hand, and the division of labor, on the other, have 
shown themselves in all large organisations of busi- 
ness, which are simply governments in parvo. 
Large railway corporations, monopolies and trusts. 



114 DEMOCRACY 

our vast department stores, immense manufacto- 
ries, and similar bodies of industrial and commercial 
importance are instances of the kind in view. They 
are integrations or combinations of capital under a 
central authority with large and untrammelled 
powers, and differentiated into divisions or depart- 
ments with complete responsibility to a chief. They 
are perfect little kingdoms, and their success is due 
partly to their economic value and partly, perhaps 
mostly, to the large powers and intelligence of the 
central management which has been left free to de- 
velop according to the necessities of the case. The 
evils that are incident to them are not due to their 
nature and method of organisation, but to the sys- 
tem of politics which enables certain classes of them 
to obtain legislative favour and protection. The in- 
stitutions of government have not kept pace with 
I these organisations. As independent evidence of 
Vthis view I may quote Mr. Godkin's Problems of 
Democracy. Speaking of the practical working of 
our political machinery, he says: ^^ In all these 
things we are trying to meet the burden and re- 
sponsibilities of much older societies with the ma- 
chinery of a much earlier and simpler state of things. 
It is high time to halt in this progress until our ad- 
ministrative system has been brought up to the 
level of our present requirements." If only politi- 
cal methods could be made as elastic as the industrial 
and economic conditions our problems could be more 



THE NATURE OF THE rROBLEAT 115 

easily solved. This is to some extent the case in 
England. There we find no written constitution to 
hamper adjustment to new conditions. Parliament 
and the Ministry, subject to their responsibility to 
the crown, have the matter of adjustment entirely 
in their own hands. Political conditions are as elas- 
tic as the industrial. Political machinery need be 
no more antiquated than public opinion. But the 
political inertia in this country preventing the 
prompt integration and differentiation of function 
is due partly to the necessity of conforming to 
a written constitution and partly to the jealousy 
against sovereign powers in the hands of the ex- 
ecutive. This jealousy succeeds in limiting the 
exercise of executive authority just where it is 
needed, instead of trying to leave it free to 
act with responsibility. Its action is limited or 
prohibited rather than made responsible. Re- 
sponsibility is consistent with the freedom to act 
while it limits only such actions as the properly con- 
stituted authorities may regard as incompatible 
with public welfare. Furthermore, this jealousy of 
the executive, following the policy and precedents 
of the reaction against Hobbes, only succeeds in in- 
vesting either the legislature or the electorate with / 
the powers denied to the executive and which their \ 
nature as deliberative assemblies makes unwieldy, i 
and in the absence of constitutional machinery for 
adjusting government to new conditions, no ade-j 



116 DEMOCRACY 

quate differentiation of functions can be instituted 
without resistance from the legislature which tends 
to usurp the powers of both the executive and the 
electorate. Nothing is more evident than the tyr- 
anny of our democratic legislatures, and there is 
no way to restrict their power: for constitutional 
amendments and changes must first pass through the 
hands of the legislature itself. Consequently, when 
they assume or possess the omnipotent powers of 
government, which either they, or the constitution, 
or public opinion refuses to the executive, there is 
no method by which they can be made adequately 
responsible. What is wanted, therefore, is a more 
thorough application of the law of evolution to poli- 

1 tics, both theoretical and practical. This law, which 
I have shown to be the integration and differentia- 
tion of function in correspondence with the increas- 
ing complexity of the social ^' organism," involves 
a further division of labor with fewer ^' checks and 
balances," and an attempt to establish better condi- 
tions of responsibility. The general plan by which 

'this can be effected will be discussed in the next 
chapter, but to summarise it the method involves 
three considerations of a practical kind. They are : 
(1) A division of the present executive functions so 
as to enlarge them in one direction and to curtail 
them in another. (2) The division of legislative 
functions in a way to relieve the present bodies of 
impossible duties. (3) The establishment of an in- 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 117 

dependent inhibitive agency which will secure ade- 
quate responsibility in both the executive and the 
legislative branches of government. 

The history of both theoretical and practical poli- 
tics shows the need of some such modifications of our 
institutional methods. On the one hand, the un- 
wieldy nature of the present burdens and the per- 
plexity of the problems which our present machin- 
ery is called upon to solve make necessary a further 
distribution of duties. I^either the legislature nor 
the electorate is qualified to perform the tasks im- 
posed upon it, and the executive is neither permitted 
nor able to do it. Between the constitutional 
disqualifications of the executive and the moral dis- 
qualifications of the legislative power the tendency 
seems to be straight toward chaos, and every one is 
afraid to entrust the executive with the power to/ 
organise a way out. In the absence of responsibil- 
ity for such power this jealousy is legitimate enough. 
Here we have to meet the fundamental difiiculty 
w^hich every one feels with the theory of Hobbes. 
We found that he made freedom and irresponsibil- 
ity of action convertible, and proceeding upon that 
assumption ever since we have found no alternative 
between accepting despotism and refusing all power 
and freedom to act at all. Afraid of central powers 
we decentralise everything, and think because we 
establish a policy which has a logical tendency to- 
ward chaos that we are sustaining the moral liberty 



118 DEMOCRACY 

and rights of man. But if we can distinguish be- 
tween the abstract and the concrete conception of 
sovereignty; that is, between the idea that there 
must be some irresponsibility somewhere, whether 
in society as a whole or in certain functionaries, and 
the idea that all irresponsibility shall be in the exec- 
utive, we may be able to solve our problem. JSTow 
Hobbes, as we saw, did not distinguish between the 
abstract irresponsibility of the state and the concrete 
irresponsibility of the executive: in other words, 
the sovereign and ^^ sovereignty " were combined 
so that the powers and duties of government could 
be exercised only on the condition that they were 
irresponsible. In trying to avoid the dangers of this 
doctrine, however, we have resorted to limitation or 
prohibition of power instead of its responsibility. 
But if we can only separate the idea of freedom to 
act from that of irresponsibility we can find a way 
out of the difficulty. The successful use of federal 
authority in certain important emergencies, on the 
one hand, and the existence of at least a large meas- 
ure of free power to act in the case of certain admin- 
istrative subordinates connected with responsibility, 
on the other, are facts that might suggest a method 
by which a proper adjustment of freedom and re- 
sponsibility could be combined in the executive au- 
thority of democracy. The freedom which I have 
in mind here is perfectly consistent with responsi- 
bility, but not with limitation, and had politics tried 



THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 119 

to determine this responsibility bj other means than 
short and elective tenure, the one limiting absolute 
power by time and the other by its transference, we 
might have escaped the necessary tendencies toward 
anarchy inherent in the exaggerated jealousy of ex- 
ecutive power. Such power requires to be condi- 
tioned, not prohibited, but the best way to do it is 
to divide its duties, leaving each functional agent 
freer than the executive is at present from either 
the interference or the co-operation of co-ordinate 
branches of government. Thus, for example, the 
enormous powers of the executive which are so much 
dreaded by democracy might be divided and dis- 
tributed, so that the function of appointment only 
shall belong to it and that of removal to another, es- 
tablishing what I shall call an inhibitive agency in 
government, equal in importance to the executive 
and legislative and subordinating them to it. In 
this way we could carry out the great law of evolu- 
tion and recognise what is true in the speculative 
theory of Hobbes; namely, the efficiency of im- 
perialism for preventing the tendency of individual- 
ism to anarchy. The doctrine of absolute sover- 
eignty, aside from its abstract necessity somewhere 
in pure theory, contains a practical truth of great 
value. The form of it which satisfies this practical 
conception is our Supreme Court, as I shall show 
again, but which represents this sovereignty only in 
a negative way. Here we have irresponsibility, but 



120 DEMOCRACY 

not in the exercise of positive power. Hobbes was 
right in his idea that government in order to be ef- 
ficient and successful must represent great central 
power, and it was only a misfortune that he did not 
see, and that the political and intellectual condition 
of his time did not permit or suggest the propriety 
of organising a method of attaching responsibility 
to what is known as the " sovereign " or executive 
power. In the attempt to reach the responsibility 
which every one saw was necessary development 
turned tow^ard the doctrine and practice of constitu- 
tional limitations of power and various '^ checks and 
balances '' with incidental and imperfect differen- 
tiation of function. This latter process, minus that 
application of the principle of " checks and bal- 
ances " which represented a mere transfer of irre- 
sponsible power to a number of bodies, requires 
further development, while it is equally imperative 
that we find means to extend executive authority 
without encountering its dangers. Is this possi- 
ble? The answ^er to this question will be attempted 
in the next chapter. 



CHAPTER III 

PRACTICAL EEMEDIES 

I have indicated in the discussion on the nature 
of the problem that the direction of political reforms 
should be that of integrating and differentiating the 
functions of government, and of increasing the pow- 
ers of the executive. I should also contemplate de- 
cided modifications of the power and influence of the 
legislature, though not by conferring them upon 
the executive. This proposition, however, will seem 
like proposing a reaction toward monarchical types 
of government, though the differentiation of the 
functions hitherto invested in the executive as a fact 
actually discards this tendency. But anything like 
a proposition to extend executive powers will appear 
to rush in the face of the determined jealousy 
against such increased powers as a restitution of the 
despised past, and hence to be foredoomed to repudi- 
ation without ceremony or consideration. The coun- 
ter-proposition to institute a method of responsibil- 
ity while conceding more influence to the executive 
ought to dispel illusion and alarm on this matter, at 
least until it is examined. Hence it is only fair to 

121 



122 DEMOCRACY 

demand some patience with the suggestion until the 
scheme has been fully presented. But I am aware 
that the momentum of the jealousy and suspicion 
against arbitrary power so long associated with the 
idea of a strong executive has a persistency w^hich 
the present theory must face, though these feelings 
in the present condition of democratic development 
are only the demagogue's capital which he uses to 
shield his own underground projects and irresponsi- 
bility. Is^evertheless, in spite of the natural preju- 
dices which such a proposition will excite I make 
bold at the very outset to say that my fundamental 
principle involves a vast extension of executive in- 
fluence over the functions of government, and a cor- 
responding limitation of the legislative, even though 
this proposition be qualified by a new method of re- 
sponsibility. Moreover I also recognise that the 
suggested remedies are not in the direction of those 
which present public opinion is inclined to adopt; 
namely, the referendum and the initiative, as the 
remedy for the same evils of which I have to com- 
plain. The measures that I have to propose are, to 
some extent at least, directly away from the tenden- 
cies of democracy for a century while the referen- 
dum and the initiative are simply its logical develop- 
ment. 

But I am not going to discuss the problem with 
the intention of preventing the occurrence of the 
referendum: for I recognise that it is most probably 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 128 

the policy whicli will be tried, to some extent at 
least, in tlie near fntiire, and I am inclined also to 
think that democracy should run the logical course 
of its development as the best and conclusive test of 
its capacity or incapacity to solve the political prob- 
lem. It is probable also that this tendency could 
not be prevented from pushing itself forward to its 
natural consequences, no matter how great its real or 
imaginary evils. It is certain that the law of history 
in politics has been to pass from one extreme to the 
other. This is true in every department of human 
activity, whether in literature, philosophy, religion, 
or politics. Moreover, the various social and moral 
forces represented in the hostility to imperial power 
in any but the electors themselves and in the indi- 
viduaFs supreme confidence in his ability to govern 
both himself and the w^orld show that men will not 
easily relinquish the presumed advantages of democ- 
racy. He still insists upon pursuing his encroach- 
ments upon the powers of government without ever 
reflecting that the evils of which he complains in bad 
legislatures and rulers are the direct results of his 
own action. He insists upon electing his own rulers 
and when his prayer has been granted he still clings 
to the tradition that the ^^ king " is to blame and 
not himself for his troubles. The momentum of an 
idea or principle will not always stop at the discovery 
of grievances. AYhen some political failure appears 
the habit of throwing the responsibility upon the 



124 DEMOCRACY 

government leads the individual to suppose that he 
has not wholly purified the past from its power to do 
evil, and flushed with victory over despotism and 
supremely confident in himself he will not suspect 
the weakness of democracy until, having abolished 
all rulers, he has no one except himself to blame for 
anarchy. As long as representative rulers exist they 
can be made the scape-goats for evils for which the 
citizen is loth to accept the responsibility himself. 
Hence the natural and logical tendency will be to try 
the referendum and initiative as the last resource of 
democracy against political corruption and tyranny ; 
and for one I cannot hope to prevent their develop- 
ment by any proposition that I can offer. Present 
tendencies in that direction are too strong to be 
counteracted by an attempt to strengthen the execu- 
tive, though qualified by a method of responsibility 
that deprives the traditional prejudice against it of 
cogency. 

There are facts, however, which favour as well as 
indicate this tendency of society to directly govern 
itself. l!^ot only is the fear of centralised power 
quite justified when we consider that in the present 
condition of politics it is practically irresponsible, to 
correct which has been the intention of the entire 
democratic development, however defective its 
method may be regarded; but the corruption and 
tyranny of the legislature is so great that there seems 
to be no escape from them except by granting the 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 125 

electorate a direct voice in legislation as a substitute 
for the representative system. It is worth remark- 
ing, however, that the hostility to large powers in 
the hands of a single person is only feigned by the 
politician and is artificial and inconsistent among the 
people : for it is irresponsible power that the politi- 
cian is always seeking and the voters, while repeat- 
ing the old phrases against kings and despots, blindly 
hand over to men whom they ought to hang and 
quarter the powers which would only excite hys- 
terics if the possessor of them were called a king. 
These voters cry out against monarchies, but say 
and do nothing when they are governed by political 
" bosses " and machines, which represent irrespon- 
sible power of the very worst kind, because, in ad- 
dition to being absolute, it has no constitutional 
legitimacy. This situation only necessitates the 
conclusion that things should take their natural 
course. But this jealousy of executive power and 
its freedom is after all not the natural propensity of 
the electorate as a whole, but it is an artificial culti- 
vation of the politician, who wishes to divert sus-, 
picion from his own deeds to the constituted powers 
and to usurp them in a form that cannot be reached 
by the law. The electorate is naturally willing to 
see strong government if only it is well administered, 
but the demagogue, finding himself thwarted in his 
nefarious schemes, seeks to avenge himself by sim- 
ulating deference to public opinion, invoking prej- 



126 DEMOCRACY 

udice against power in rulers, and encouraging tlie 
voters' confidence in their own omniscience, all the 
while covering up his own jobbery and rascality by 
surreptitiously securing governors who will let him 
alone. But this deference to public opinion, which 
is the logical and necessary assumption of democ- 
racy, in form at least, only encourages the masses to 
believe that their own judgment is final and trust- 
worthy in the most complicated affairs of govern- 
ment. This is true in respect to the ends of govern- 
ment. But it has not been the policy of limited 
monarchies, nor even of so-called democracies or re- 
publics hitherto representative, to defer anything 
to the electorate except the choice of legislators or 
rulers. The habit, however, of ascertaining public 
opinion, of pretending when convenient that one is 
only a representative of it and then ignoring it when 
possible, only increases the distrust of the men who 
thrive on abuses of their political power and stimu- 
lates popular confidence in the direct control of leg- 
islation. Moreover the whole policy of democracy 
in the past when confronted with bad rulers has been 
to take over to itself the powers that had been 
abused, and hence when the compromise with mon- 
archy, which the representative system was supposed 
to be, has failed to work the precedents are in favour 
of the referendum, so that if any concession is made 
to the idea of governmental intermediaries at all it 
will represent only the function of registering the 
popular decrees. 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 127 

Then again both the anarchy and the tyranny of 
our legislatures point in the same direction. They 
were intended primarily to be deliberative assem- 
blies where debate is supposed to be free and ra- 
tional, and where voting can be reached after a 
reasonable amount of time has been allowed for 
deliberation and discussion. But the majority of 
our legislatures are either constituted or controlled 
by men who either cannot or dare not discuss the 
measures proposed by them. They maintain silence 
against all reason and vote submissively in obedi- 
ence to a " boss/' or they open their mouths only to 
obstruct legislation and to make a ^^ strike." The 
consequence is that our assemblies have come to the ' 
pass where they must either cease to be deliberative 
bodies and put themselves under the ^^ sovereign '' 
power of the Speaker, a pretty pass for democracy, or 
place themselves at the mercy of the unscrupulous 
minority. This power of obstruction has no limits 
except either revolution or the autocratic authority 
of the Speaker, which is virtually a revolution 
against democracy. Either this power of the minor- 
ity to obstruct legislation and to prevent the ma- 
jority from carrying its measures by exacting con- 
cessions to the ^^ strikers " must be ruthlessly put 
down, or the government is conducted by the minor- 
ity. In either way the legislature becomes as tyran-' 
nical as the institutions against which the people j 
claimed the franchise. But not being inclined to 



128 DEMOCRAVY 

return to anything called monarchy, though there 
may he something worse than this in the autocratic 
powers of the Speaker, there is no escape from both 
this and the worse tyranny of the legislature except 
the referendum. Moreover, the constant encroach- 
ments of the legislative upon the executive power, 
with the politician's hollow and hypocritical obse- 
quiousness to the ignorant masses whose prejudices 
he crowns with the dignified title of public opinion, 
leads in the same direction. In fact, the whole ma- 
chinery of politics with its clubs, mass-meetings, 
organised bodies for the expression of individual in- 
terests, and all forms of pressure brought to bear 
upon representatives are so many concessions to the 
principle of the referendum, and leave our rulers 
nominally no other functions than those of clerks, 
though really it implies that in all matters not so 
expressly limited by promises to the electorate free 
reins are given to every form of political debauch- 
ery. The referendum is consequently the natural 
and logical outcome of present conditions. I am 
far from saying, however, that it will not be better 
than the method of conducting our present soi- 
clisant government. In fact, I can conceive that 
much would be better done by the referendum than 
it is now by men who are nothing but knaves in 
their business. Honest men who are intelligent 
enough to know that government of the proper sort 
cannot be determined by the off-hand judgments 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 129 

of the multitude do not want office at tlie price of 
sacrificing their knowledge, and with the majority 
of their compeers engaged in corruption of some 
kind, if they did secure office neither their judg- 
ment nor their votes would count for anything in 
the system of blackmail and tyranny that make up 
our average legislature's work. The referendum 
might put an end to some of these things. It would 
undoubtedly make some things harder that are now 
easy. It is more than probable, however, that cor- 
ruption would find means by which to gain its end 
as it does in manipulating elections. 

The problem of good government is to elect the 
intelligent and honest man to administer it, and to 
give him the power to do it when he is found. The 
policy of the past, as I have shown, has been to es- 
tablish such a system of limitations and obstacles to 
efficient action that the suitable man when elected 
could accomplish little or nothing where real gov- 
ernment was required. Some process of selection, 
natural or otherwise, should be secured by which the 
proper men might be obtained and then invested 
with the power to act. The condition, however, 
upon which freedom to act shall be granted must be 
some adequate method of determining responsibil- 
ity other than an ignorant electorate. If this cannot 
be done I admit that such power would not be desir- 
able. But it is certain that the present system does 
not secure it as needed, and equally certain it is, 



130 DEMOCRACY 

from the irresponsible conduct of our legislatures, 
that everything which can be said against monarchy 
or hereditary institutions on this account can be 
said against the referendum. The benefits claimed 
for it in Switzerland are to say the very least quite 
dubious, and many regard it as in reality a failure 
even there. Such good results as have accompanied 
its application in that country may not have been 
due to the referendum as a method, but to other cir- 
cumstances altogether, such as the fortunate coin- 
cidence between the natural conservatism of the 
common people and their knowledge of the special 
case. Quite as often, however, this conservatism 
has prevented reforms and improvements that more 
intelligence would have unhesitatingly adopted. 
But, admitting its success in Switzerland for the 
sake of argument, neither the economic nor the so- 
cial conditions in that country are to be compared 
with the same in America and hence precedents of 
that kind can hardly have much weight. But even 
in Switzerland the largest part of the public business 
of state is not administered by the referendum; the 
distrust of popular sovereignty that is shown in the 
election of any ofiicers at all proves some limits to 
the usefulness of the referendum, not to say any- 
thing of the time, intelligence, and moral will re- 
quired to solve many of the social and political prob- 
lems of civilisation. The referendum may be quite 
satisfactory for determining the most general prin- 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 131 

ciples of political policy, but it is not qualified to de- 
termine administrative methods nor to select the 
best agents for effecting good government. People 
occupied with their private affairs, domestic and 
social, demanding all their resources and attention, 
as a rule have little time and often less intelligence 
than is necessary to solve the complex problems of 
national life. The referendum is a call to perform 
all the duties of the profoundest statesmanship in 
addition to private obligations which are even much 
more than the average man can fulfil with any suc- 
cess or intelligence at all, and hence it can hardly 
produce anything better than the Athenian assem- ^ 
blies which terminated in anarchy. Of course it • 
might put a stop to mass-meetings every week which 
have to be called together in the present system in 
order to frighten public officers into the performance 
of their duties and to prevent legislation that is no 
better than piracy: but it will not secure dispatch 
except at the expense of civilisation nor deliberation 
except at the expense of intelligence. Very few 
questions can be safely left to its councils and these 
only of the most general kind. A tribunal that can j 
be so easily deceived as the electorate can be in com- ' 
mon elections certainly cannot be trusted to decide 
intelligently the graver and more complicated ques- 
tions of public finance, of private property, of ad- 
ministration, and of justice. It may be honest and 
mean w^ell, as I believe it would be; but such an 



7 



132 DEMOCRACY 

institution cannot govern., and it is government tliat 
tlie majoritj of mankind need, provided that it is 
wise and jnst, and this means as little interference 
as possible with the rights and liberties of the citi- 
zens. Most men are as willino; as thev find it neces- 
sary to delegate the power to administer the func- 
tions of government if only they have the proper 
guarantee that justice shall be executed. The ref- 
erendum is only a confession or a p^oof that this 
guarantee has not been secured. 

Moreover, it is important to observe that when- 
ever the referendum is applied, as it is in certain 
constitutional and other matters, it exhibits an as- 
tonishing amount of indifference on the part of the 
voters. In many cases the vote does not suffice to 
carry even the reforms that intelligent public opin- 
ion demands. It is true that most of the cases in 
this country, in which the appeal is made to the 
referendum, are instances like the adoption of a 
charter or constitution, amendments thereto, or 
some matter involving a public improvement, c^on- 
stitutional instruments involve extremely abstract 
questions and excite as little interest as they require 
great intelligence to settle them rightly. But this 
lack of interest shows either that the constituency is 
not qualified for the duties imposed by the referen- 
dum, or that it does not value the privilege which it 
is supposed to confer, and hence it can only result in 
leaving everything to the few who are interested in 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 133 

government problems. If this few represent the 
honest and intelligent classes the government will 
be good, but otherwise if the balance of power falls 
into the hands of knaves or fools. But the uninter- 
esting character of constitutional problems is no ex- 
cuse for the average voter, nor a reply to my accu- 
sation against the referendum. It only proves my 
contention. For, if our form of government be the 
correct one constitutional instruments are the most 
important part of it and should awaken a corre- 
sponding interest when proposed for consideration. 
But the majority of mankind are not often inter- 
ested in abstract questions of this kind, and even 
when they are they are not qualified to pronounce 
judgment upon them. They are more attracted by 
personalities than by abstract principles, and this 
fact alone shows both that they prefer to be gov- 
erned and that they do not care for constitutions if 
they are rightly governed. In this matter their in- 
stincts are correct : for government does not depend 
mainly upon machinery, but upon the kind of men 
who administer it. Machinery may be necessary, 
but it works well or ill according to the honesty, 
skill, and intelligence of the men who run it. 
Hence hero-worship has its value if only the citizen 
is able to choose his hero wisely. His primary in- 
terests are in other matters than politics. In fact, it 
may just as w^ell be recognised once for all that the 
large majority of mankind do not naturally care a 



134 DEMOCRACY 

picayune for what are called political questions, and 
can be goaded into it only by the necessity of taking 
part in politics for the sake of having social order of 
some kind, or by the alarms of some demagogue 
who has an axe to grind or a personal pique to sat- 
isfy against government. Jobbery and the spoils of 
office may easily be covered up under the pretence 
of saving one's country. A man may seem very 
patriotic for throwing a foreigner's tea overboard, 
but patriotism may be a cloak for controlling the 
market, and those who dance must pay the piper. 
Those who are unselfishly interested in civilisation 
and progress will always devote a fair share of time 
and energy to public duties and social welfare, more 
especially when the form of political constitution 
imposes this responsibility. But the primary in- 
stincts of the majority turn to domestic and social 
life with their occupations and pleasures, and unless 
forced to it by some real or imaginary danger to pri- 
vate rights eschew politics as of the devil. The 
kind of men who usually direct them are a complete 
justification of this feeling. In fact, there are just 
two subjects which are tabooed by all polite conver- 
sation: they are religion and politics. Both are 
affiicted with that bigotry and intolerance which so- 
cial and humane beings cannot endure, and politics 
adds to its burden of disrepute that contempt which 
intelligent and free men have for all those who are 
perpetually currying personal favours under the 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 135 

guise of devoting themselves to the welfare of the 
public. Besides, his private affairs are all that the 
average man can undertake to manage, whether well 
or ill, and a very large number cannot manage these 
with any success, not to say anything of the more 
delicate and complicated problems of government. 
It is only the nondescripts and failures in other 
forms of business, or men with personal ambitions to 
satisfy, that run after office to live at the expense of 
the public. The referendum, therefore, only 
threatens to increase the citizen's responsibilities 
without increasing his ability to perform, and inas- 
much as the widest extension of it compatible with 
organisation at all will not escape the necessity of 
police and executive agents and centralisation of 
some kind, I do not see that it can be utilised for 
any purpose except to abolish the scandals of legisla- 
tive fraud and tyranny by transferring the scoun- 
drel's resources to the management of the mob. It 
may be something to destroy the rottenness of our 
legislatures by depriving them of their power, but 
this does not dispense with the necessity of efficient 
and intelligent deliberative assemblies, while the 
referendum can only open wide the door to all the 
turbulent elements of democracy. Once concede to 
the masses the right of voting directly on legislation 
of all kinds affecting the delicate political and eco- 
nomic problems of civilisation and ignorance and 
brute force, combined with the envy of intelligence 



I 



136 DEMOCRACY 

and success, which De Toqueville says is the fatal 
vice of democracies, will hold the balance of power, 
as they do now in general elections, and we can only 
repeat the turbulent scenes of the ancient assem- 
blies of Athens. 

E'evertheless I shall not oppose the adoption of 
the referendum and the initiative. They are, as I 
have said, the logical consequences of democracy 
and may have to be allowed to develop their course. 
But what I have to propose in its place may be con- 
sidered either as a reconstructive scheme to be ap- 
plied after the referendum and the initiative have 
been tried, or as a substitute for them which will be 
more in accord with the very nature of successful 
government. The policy which this substitute in- 
volves, as the whole tone of this essay suggests, is the 
increase of executive powers in some directions and 
certain limitations of the duties of the legislative 
bodies. Briefly, the plan is to enlarge the executive's 
power of appointment, curtail its power of removal 
by the establishment of an independent court of im- 
peachment and removal, making this court the least 
responsible agency in the system, with the exception 
of the Supreme Court as at present, and modifying 
ithe legislature's method of passing its laws. I intend 
this court of removal to be the key to the whole sys- 
tem of reform which I have to propose and shall dis- 
cuss it in its place. But in the meantime I may refer 
to an interesting physiological function which is the 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 137 

best type of influence, by Avaj of analogy at least, 
that suggests this agency. 

This is the function of inhibition. In highly 
organised beings the nervous system shows a unique 
function called the inhibitive, and which co-ordi- 
nates the action of all others, not so much by any 
positive action of its own usurping theirs as by mere 
prevention of overaction and disproportionate en- 
ergy on the part of the others. In government we 
have not yet succeeded in imitating this inhibitive 
function. We have left both the positive and the 
negative, the initiative and the inhibitive powers 
in the hands of the executive, and naturally enough 
we create jealousy against so dangerous a combina- 
tion. But if we can divide or separate the initiative 
and the inhibitive functions of government, so that 
responsibility shall attach to the former more defi- 
nitely than at present, we shall deprive this jealousy 
of its excuse and need for vigilance, create a personal 
motive for good government and enhance the effi- 
ciency of the executive for better politics. The 
scoundrel will never endure responsibility. The dis- 
cussion of the system will show what value may at- 
tach to the suggestion of an agency for making the 
executive responsible, or amenable to public author- 
ity. For the present we have only to keep in view 
that its mere name is no safe indication of the part 
which it may be made to play in good government. 
The corollary proposals will be an application of the 



138 DEMOCRACY 

differentiation of political functions witli some cor- 
responding integration of them. 

I have said that the problem of good government 
is simply to secure the fit man and to qualify him 
with adequate powers for the task. In other words, 
it is to determine the method of combining power 
and responsibility. But the solution of the problem 
is not so easy as its statement. There are too many 
facts to be taken into account to make the solution 
an easy one. The complexity of social and economic 
life makes the simplest form of government as im- 
possible as it would be dangerous. Hence the need 
of a division of labour, as it has been partly devel- 
oped. But this differentiation of political functions, 
as already remarked, has not kept pace with the same 
process in the industrial and other agencies of mod- 
ern civilisation. Though we have local govern- 
ments, committees in Congress and our legislatures, 
a commission for interstate commerce, campaign 
committees, political conventions, etc., as necessary 
means for preventing anarchy, yet there are no at- 
tempts to modify executive and legislative functions 
in a way to meet the demands upon them. On the 
other hand, there are the omnipotence of Congress 
and its committees, with their partisan politics, and 
the small amount of knowledge for meeting their 
responsibilities, the power of political machines to 
put the voters between the devil and the deep sea in 
the choice of public officials, the organisation of the 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 139 

lobby, the incapacity of most voters to decide upon 
the complicated problems of finance and politics and 
their helplessness when they can decide upon them, 
the limited influence of the executive and the cab- 
inet upon legislation, the inadequate machinery for 
securing intelligent and honest representatives, and 
many other defects in our system of politics which 
require a remedy. Mr. Godkin's recent book on 
Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy is a proof 
of this accumulation of defects. One passage illus- 
trating it and showing the tenor of the whole book 
and the tendencies of politics will make this clear. 
Speaking of the legislature, he says: 

" If half the stories told about state legislatures 
be true, a very large proportion of the members 
meet, not with plans for the public good, but with 
plans either for the promotion of their personal in- 
terests, or for procuring money for party uses, or 
places for party agents. 

"' The collection of such a body of men, not en- 
gaged in serious business, in the state capitol, is not 
to be judged simply by the bills they introduce or 
pass. We have also to consider the opportunities for 
planning and scheming which the meetings offer to 
political jobbers and adventurers; and the effect, on 
such among them as still retain their political virtue, 
of daily contact with men who are there simply for 
illicit purposes, and with the swarm who live by 
lobbying, and get together every winter in order to 



140 DEMOCRACY 

trade in legislative votes. If I said, for instance, 
that the legislature at Albany was a school of vice, a 
fountain of political debauchery, and that few of the 
younger men come back from it without having 
learned to mock at political purity and public spirit, 
I should seem to be using unduly strong language, 
and yet I could fill nearly a volume with illustra- 
tions in support of my charges. The temptation to 
use their great power for the extortion of money 
from rich men and rich corporations, to which the 
legislatures in the richer and more prosperous 
Northern states are exposed, is very great ; and the 
legislatures are mainly composed of very poor men, 
with no reputation to maintain, or political future to 
look after. The result is that the country is filled 
with stories of scandals after every adjournment, 
and the press teems with abuse, which legislators 
have learned to treat with silent contempt or ridi- 
cule, so that there is no longer any restraint upon 
them. Their re-election is not in the hands of the 
public, but in those of the party managers, who, as 
shown in the Payn case in New York, find that they 
can completely disregard popular judgments on the 
character or history of candidates." 

This is a picture of only one side of legislative re- 
sponsibility, while executive and other administra- 
tive defects are not even mentioned in these accusa- 
tions. But they come under consideration in the 
course of the work. All of them show that simple 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 141 

methods will not meet tlie case. One reform is not 
enough, though this may be all that democratic 
methods in their direct application can secure at 
once. We require a whole articulated system of 
them. In order, therefore, to satisfy the theoretical 
requirements of the situation, providing an escape 
from both monarchy and anarchy, one of which 
must otherwise be the outcome of present tendencies, 
I venture to suggest, perhaps a little audaciously, 
such changes and additions in our present constitu- 
tional system as may be classified under the follow- 
ing heads. Explanation and discussion of them will 
come in their order. 

1. A permanent official class in subordinate ad- 
ministrative positions: that is, civil service reform 
extended to state and county governments, subject, 
of course, to efficiency and good behaviour. 

2. The establishment of a branch of government, 
or court, for securing universal official responsibil- 
ity, including both the executive and the legislative 
functionaries, other than to the electorate. This 
may be called a Court of Impeachment and Re- 
moval. 

3. The extension of executive powers of appoint- 
ment and influence over legislation. Many officers 
now elective could be made appointive. 

4. The establishment of an agency partly for 
limiting the abuse of executive powers in appoint- 
ments and partly for preventing Congressional usur- 



142 DEMOCRACY 

pations and interference in appointments by means 
of political bargains and intimidation. 

5. The adoption of the English system of rep- 
resentation with some modifications in favour of 
local conditions. 

6. The further differentiation of legislative func- 
tions so as to bring the duties of the legislature with- 
in the limits of intelligent performance. 

7. Compulsory service from all officials whether 
appointed or elected. 

8. The appointment of all judiciary incumbents. 

9. The differentiation of the elective franchise. 
Simply in outline these proposals look rather large 

and formidable, and when the particulars and condi- 
tions of their application are seen they will appear 
still more formidable and radical, and the charge 
will probably be made that they are not practicable 
in the present state of public opinion. The probabil- 
ity of such a criticism may just as well be anticipated 
and met, because society is in the habit of doing but 
one thing at a time in its attempts at reform. Com- 
plicated readjustments of political institutions usu- 
ally follow sudden revolutions, and are not easily ac- 
complished in times of order. Hence I do not dis- 
guise from myself, in any ignorant simplicity, the 
audacious magnitude of the changes here proposed, 
especially if it is imagined that there is any pretence 
on my part that the scheme as a whole is immedi- 
ately practicable, even if it be taken up and consid- 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 143 

ered at all. The practical adoption of it might or 
might not be possible according as men had or had 
not the will to put it into effect. But it is undoubt- 
edly too much to expect society all at once to adopt 
some new and untried constitution, as this would be 
accused of being, though this is not exactly the case, 
because what is here suggested is nothing but the 
adoption or modification of functions and institu- 
tions already somewhere in use, excepting perhaps 
the court of impeachment and removal, though I 
shall undertake to show that even this is suggested 
by some forms of actual practice in this country and 
by certain features in the constitution of England. 
As just said, reforms usually and rightly come one 
at a time, since this method is best adapted to the 
conditions of public intelligence. But when they 
are wisely established it will generally be found that 
they follow logically from some successful policy, 
or institution already tried and found beneficial. 
Hence there can be no harm in suggesting an artic- 
ulated system of logical consequences from the bet- 
ter principles of the social organism, at least for the 
sake of theoretical completeness, just as if they 
might be simultaneously applied, in order to see how 
such a system will appear. Besides, this is a con- 
venient way to show how complex the problem is 
and how many reforms are necessary before any 
proximate solution of the political questions of the 
day can be obtained. "Whether it is practicable to 



144 DEMOCRACY 

attain them all at once is not the question, nor even 
whether any of them are immediately practicable, 
but only whether, if adopted, they would help to 
produce better government. Hence I am only en- 
deavouring to outline methods which, in the light 
of evolution and experience, might save a great deal 
of reactionary speculation on the part of those who 
are not satisfied with democratic institutions. Some 
readers would be astonished if they knew how many 
people say frankly that they believe a monarchy 
would be better than our present methods of govern- 
ment. But in my own conviction there are other 
alternatives than the popular conception of mon- 
archy and our present democracy. Theoretical elas- 
ticity is not exhausted by the scholastic simplicity 
of these two conceptions. The ingenuity of political 
students ought to be able to devise any number of 
schemes intermediate between these two extremes. 
Certainly the remedy for present evils is not so 
simple as the sympathisers with monarchy assume. 
The problem is entirely too complex, as I have al- 
ready asserted, for any single reform to solve, and 
any man who expects political salvation short of 
complicated changes does not understand his task. 
The theoretical consideration of the whole complex 
problem, therefore, will help to correct hasty infer- 
ences in favour of obsolete or obsolescent forms of 
government, and exhibit the tendencies of evolu- 
tion along several coexistent lines. 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 145 

Having conceded, then, that I entertain no illu- 
sions in regard to the probable tendencies of democ- 
racy toward the referendum and initiative and no 
expectations regarding a speedy adoption of the sug- 
gestions here made, I may proceed to discuss each 
aspect of the scheme and its relation to every other 
proposal. The system as an articulated whole will 
come in for general consideration at the end. 

The first measure proposed must not be misunder- 
stood. Hence I have identified it with civil service 
reform, not yet a fully accomplished fact anywhere, 
and in state and county governments hardly thought 
of at all. But it is important to guard against mis- 
interpretation of the proposition to have a perma- 
nent official class in the subordinate administrative 
positions. It is not a demand for a permanent gov- 
erning class. A permanent governing class after 
the type of a hereditary monarchy is especially to be 
avoided in the interests both of responsibility and of 
adjustment to changed and changing social condi- 
tions. But this is not the case with subordinate ofB.- 
cers. They are responsible, on the one hand, and 
are serviceable in proportion to their intelligence 
and tenure of office, on the other. Hence the meas- 
ure is only a demand for permanency of official 
tenure for those whose work is clerical and subject 
to the direction of administrative heads. It is sim- 
ply a method of securing fidelity and capacity in the 
fulfilment of duties not involving the organisation 



146 DEMOCRACY 

of policies, but only the execution of the orders of 
superiors. It applies natural selection to official ap- 
pointments as this has been applied in industrial and 
commercial occupations, and so realises one of the 
laws of evolution upon which stress is here laid. 
Consequently it is nothing more than what is known 
as civil service reform, to be applied according to the 
present intentions on the widest scale both in gen- 
eral and local governments. 

But since it is to some extent an accomplished fact 
for the federal government, as evinced in President 
Cleveland's recent extension of the merit system 
and in the constitution of ^N^ew York state, and since 
it commands the approval of all intelligent men, in 
its main principles at least, it is not necessary to dis- 
cuss it at length, or to give the reasons justifying it. 
Its value may be assumed as self-evident. At any 
rate, it has not been my intention to prove its merits 
in proposing it as a condition of good government. 
I have had an entirely different object in alluding 
to it at all. This object has been to display or secure 
the assumption which lies at the basis of civil service 
reform, and which may serve as the key to all other 
constitutional problems. Civil service reform when 
secured is an admission and application of the idea 
that goi^ernment can he successful only when iden- 
tified with the service and amhitions of its hest men, 
and when the mere politician, shorn of patronage 
and its powers of mischief, is confined to his proper 



, PRAGTTCAL REMEDIES 147 

duties. It is, therefore, the clearest concrete rep- 
resentation of what the problem is and what must 
be done to solve it, not so much by mere tenure 
of office as by the application of intelligence and 
honesty to the functions of government. 

There are, however, other as23ects to civil service 
reform that make it interesting in the study of the 
problems of government. Its importance is a truism 
to certain classes of men, but it is not suspected that 
this importance is purely conditional upon the re- 
tention of our present methods of politics. I have 
said that its chief value lies in the assumption at the 
basis of it; namely, that fitness should determine 
the selection and tenure of men for office. But the 
real nature of the problem involved is not under- 
stood even by many of those who are in favour of it. 
The more intelligent leaders of the movement in its 
favour appreciate fully its importance for other re- 
sults than the introduction of business methods into 
politics, though I hope to show that even the spoils- 
man, dishonest as his purposes are, unconsciously 
stands for an important principle which the civil 
service reformer does not see. Of this again. The 
present intention is to show how the usual argument 
for the reform conceals its true import. The argu- 
ment with which we are most familiar is that it is 
necessary to prevent constant disturbance and con- 
fusion in the public business. This is purely an ad 
liominem appeal to the ordinary business man, who 



148 DEMOCRACY 

is in the habit of selecting and retaining the fittest 
em'pJoyes that he can find for his work. He un- 
derstands the importance of this method in his af- 
fairs and can appreciate the value of applying the 
same principles to government business. But this 
argument conceals the moral and political problem 
and consciously or unconsciously inculcates the idea 
that the chief value of the reform is merely the 
economic one; namely, the economical management 
of public affairs. This is an important end, but 
cheapness is not the most important matter in the 
management of government. The public business 
and finances may be conducted in perfect order, and 
yet the government be morally rotten, though the 
men who make their living by black-mailing corpora- 
tions are not likely to respect business methods in 
government any farther than is necessary to gain 
the political positions which enable them to carry on 
their nefarious schemes of black-mailing property. 
Hence while it was necessary to adapt the argument 
for civil service reform to the ideas and experience 
of those whose support was required to secure it, the 
real motive of its more intelligent advocates was 
based upon an entirely different conception of the 
problem involved in the adoption of their policy. 
The real object of the defenders of civil service re- 
form is or ought to be the removal of tJiose condi- 
tions wliicli make the pursuit of office a mercenary 
vocation. They saw that in the Roman Empire, 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 149 

when office was sold to the highest bidder in the 
army, or became an object to be sought for its op- 
portunity to plunder the public, the social fabric 
crumbled to pieces, and they have sought to pre- 
vent the repetition of a catastrophe from which it 
required five hundred years to recover. But they 
could not effectively present so philosophical a con- 
ception of the situation to the public who knew and 
understood little or nothing of history and as little 
of the abstract principles of government, and hence 
have been compelled to put the case in a form to ap- 
peal to personal experience, even if this method con- 
cealed the most important aspect of the reform. 
Behind it all, however, was the conception that office 
must not be regarded as a position for exploiting 
society, but as an opportunity for serving it, 
whether as a vocation in which the quid 'pro quo 
is a salary and security of tenure for faithful service, 
or as a work of grace in which the quid pro quo, 
if any, is the honor attaching to it. But such a con- 
ception of public office is not the prevalent one, and 
the very necessity of making an ad horninem argu- 
ment in terms of the commercial ideal with its indi- 
vidualistic and economic policy is evidence that the 
real nature and importance of the reform is not 
generally appreciated. The social feeling does not 
exist in the majority in terms of which the appeal 
for the reform can be made. The economic ideal 
has seized the conception of public office, aided by 



150 DEMOCRACY 

the socialistic demand for state assistance and pro- 
tection in business and poverty, and by tlie same 
socialistic spirit demanding the multiplication of 
laws wbich imply a decline in the sense of liberty 
and offer increased opportunities for deception and 
black-mail. 

The great cry of the enthusiasts for democracy is 
that this country is the home of liberty and the para- 
dise of the poor man. And '^ poor man " in this 
conception means the socially as well as the econom- 
ically poor. The sentiment of equality upon which 
our institutions were founded came in to reinforce 
these ideas and every man, wise or ignorant, rich or 
poor, is said by the ignorant or poor man to be equal 
to every other. This is true in respect to the right 
to justice, to opportunities for the pursuit of happi- 
ness, and to the protection of the law against the in- 
fringement of his legitimate liberties ; but it is not 
true in any other sense. But the feeling of equality 
has ignored this distinction and extended itself to 
the so-called right to hold office. The masses main- 
tain that they have the same right to hold office and 
to govern the social organism as the more intelli- 
gent classes. I do not say ^' better " classes, nor 
aristocrats, because these expressions are perpetually 
misunderstood by the ignorant part of the popula- 
tion. ^' Aristocrat " has come to mean only the rich 
and has no flavour of social and moral quality which 
once attached to the term. Unfortunately there is 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 151 

too mucli truth in the changed conception: for our 
modern " aristocrats/' as a class, are only rich and 
anti-social, while their predecessors were both rich 
and social, and the change has been as much due 
to democracy as to any other influence. For 
democracy has intended to level all distinctions, and 
having raised the spirit of equality must expect it,; / 
in the hands of" the indiscriminating, to extend its/' 
claims from the right to justice to the alleged right 
to govern. I grant again that the poor have the . 
same right to govern as any other class, but only on 
one condition; namely, tliat they should he as fit 
and honest as the m,ore intelligent classes. The fact 
is that they are not this, as is clearly proven by the 
class of men they elect to serve society, these very 
officials all the while creating the very conditions of 
which the plebs complain so bitterly, by favouritism 
toward corporations, by political corruption and 
piracy, and by every form of cunning deception. 
But this aside, the feeling of equality extends itself 
from the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness to the use of power, and puts the claim to 
office upon the same basis as all other rights, reduc- 
ing it from a social function to an individualistic in- 
terest, a personal instead of a political vocation in 
the best sense of that term. To maintain the ap- 
pearance of this equality the plebs insist that they 
should elect the incumbents of office if they cannot 
hold it themselves. If they elected or were capable 



153 DEMOCRACY 

of electing the best men to political places no resist- 
ance would be made to this claim. Biit on the plea 
: of choosing one of their own kind they seem onl}- 
to elect thieves and pirates to office. They are so 
morbidly envious of what they call ^' aristocrats," 
who in the proper sense of that term are the only 
persons fit to exercise the functions of government, 
that they ignore the part of intelligence and honesty 
in the successful use of those functions. They are 
just as nuich possessed with the economic ideal as 
the plutocrats whom they affect to hate, and treat 
public office as an economic pursuit; namely, as a 
place for making a living without regard to the ques- 
tion of service to the community. They regard it 
from the egoistic instead of the altruistic point of 
view, if I may borrow a distinction from ethics to 
describe the moral temperament of the plebs. They 
have simply carried over to the political world the 
ideals and motives of the industrial field. Industrial 
occupations are governed by egoistic impulses. I 
do not assert or imply that selfishness is absolutely 
necessary to industrial success, but only that, as a 
matter of fact, selfishness is the predominant mo- 
tive in the business or economical wjrld. The 
one means by which we limit its power to do evil is 
the enforcement of the right to exploit others under 
the conditions of private contract. Service to the 
community, however, is either not performed under 
any contract, responsibility not being adequate, and 



PRAOTIGAL REMEDIES 153 

hence requires an altruistic and honest will to ful- 
fil social duties, or it should be placed under some 
conditio7is of responsibility that mil perform the 
function served in the economic world by the con- 
dition of private contract, where whatever evils 
occur are the consequences of the voluntary acts 
of the subject instead of being the arbitrary im- 
position of a foreign will. Hence we have no right 
to treat public office as a place for any other func- 
tions than the consideration and protection of other 
interests than our own. But the plebs and their 
representatives do not see it in any other light. 

The whole difficulty lies in the failure to dis- 
tinguish between three forms of exploitation of 
which men are capable: (1) There is the exploita- 
tion of nature, an undoubted case in which men can 
be said to have an equal right. (2) The exploitation 
of fellow men under the conditions of private con- 
tract, a case where rights can also be equal, subject 
to the limitation just mentioned and the principles 
of morality. (3) The exploitation of fellow men by 
the use of political power, a case in which no right 
exists at all. But the right to hold office, under the 
conditions mentioned, is confused with the right to 
exploit nature. Men suppose that because they 
have an almost unlimited right to make their living 
from nature they have the same right to make it 
at the expense of their fellows, which may be true 
in a state of savagery, but not in contravention of 



154 DEMOCRACY 

the social contract wliicli organised society is sup- 
posed to represent. These distinctions of rights, 
however, are not made, by the masses when urging 
their equality with others, though it is hard to see 
how their demands and conceptions differ much 
from the plutocrats' claim to plunder the community 
in the name of protection and the black-mailer's pol- 
icy of legalising the plutocrats' piracy in return for 
his freedom to share in the spoils and to plunder any- 
body else he can. But this equality with knaves 
and scoundrels of any kind only proves what I am 
contending for ; namely, that the public service can- 
not safely be put on the same basis as the economic 
pursuits. It is not a place to make a living except on 
the condition that the function he made adequately 
responsible. Political office is a service for other 
than personal objects. It has no resemblance to 
economic industry, in so far as its object is con- 
cerned, but only in regard to the intelligence neces- 
sary to make it successful. It is for the protection 
of social order and rights and so requires a wholly 
different set of motives from the purely economic 
impulses. The economic world permits a primary 
reference to personal gain, even at the expense of 
others, if only under the limitation of private con- 
tract. The political world must repudiate this con- 
ception or terminate in anarchy, unless it can apply 
perfect responsibility to all its servants. Govern- 
ment requires that order of mind and character 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 155 

which can put the rights of others above personal 
considerations and temptation to exploit society. 
But the struggle for existence among the proletariat 
shows them unfit for the exercise of any such quali- 
ties. It represents above all the egoistic class, and 
yet when society requires the limitation of exploi- 
tation to operations against nature except under the 
condition of private contract, this class still clings 
superstitiously to the idea that office is one of the 
inalienable rights which it possesses without either 
intellectual or moral qualifications for it. I may 
illustrate this by an interesting fact from the recent 
municipal campaign in JSTew York City. 

One of the Tammany leaders remarked after the 
election that the success of the candidate for the 
Citizens' Union " would have been the greatest dis- 
grace and the greatest evil that can ever happen to 
this country." I give his language as reported. It 
sounds very strange to most of us, and perhaps ab- 
surd or false. We can understand why Tammany 
should desire to prevent the success of that move- 
ment, but it seems strange that what most of the in- 
telligent people all over the United States earnestly 
worked for should be a disgrace and dangerous, as if 
intelligence were poison. Ordinarily the ideas of 
intelligent people, as that expression goes, would 
be respected and require intelligent refutation. 
But here they are characterised as producing only 
disgrace and evil, and this by a Tammany tough! 



156 DEMOCRACY 

When the devil assumes the garb ot virtue we can 
only put our arms akimbo and gasp, supposing that 
he is going to reform. But from the point of view 
of this Tammany heeler his conception of the case 
was entirely right. He with his kind look at office 
as a vocation for making one's living, and so demand 
that the proletariat have the same right to get it as 
the more intelligent classes, or as the Tammany 
heeler would say, the ^^ aristocrats," with a dash be- 
fore the term. What he saw was that adoption of 
the idea that special intelligence and morality are 
required for public duties would discriminate 
against him and his compeers, and overthrow the 
assumption of the whole proletariat class; namely, 
that the right to make one's living out of public 
office is as much the privilege of the '^ plain people " 
as of the " better classes." This assumption is true, 
but only on the condition that this privilege be de- 
nied to both classes. E'obody has any right to a 
social function except on the condition that he es- 
tablish his fitness to exercise it rightly. Such a 
qualification is not required for the exploitation 
of nature, in which rights are not limited. But 
when it comes to a claim to exercise the powers of 
government political rights are limited absolutely 
to the disposition and the ability to serve the public 
and cannot be conceded to any economic idea of of- 
fice except on the condition of perfect responsibility. 
This can be proved by the only two conceptions of 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 157 

society possible. They are the individualistic and 
the socialistic ideals. The individualist maintains 
that government exists purely for the protection of 
equal rights, to enforce the method of private con- 
tract in men's dealings with each other; that is, to 
prevent them from eating each other up. The so- 
cialist maintains that government exists for the pur- 
pose of taking care of its citizens instead of allowing 
everyone to provide for himself subject to the equal 
rights of others. K^ow it is clear that the socialistic 
form of government must require that its rulers 
shall look upon office as an opportunity for the ex- 
ercise of benevolence and not for the exploitation of 
anyone. This view is a logical consequence of the 
'' plain man's " claim on government expropriation 
of all property as an escape from the exploitation of 
the capitalist. But the ruler must be either this 
same capitalist who has no moral and benevolent 
disposition to give up exploitation, having in his of- 
ficial capacity the full powers of government, in ad- 
dition to superior intelligence and prudence, to en- 
force his personal interests without any limitations 
by the principle of private contract; or he must be 
some other man than this capitalist with the benevo- 
lence in order to secure citizens against exploitation. 
But if he, the latter, like the capitalist, looks upon 
his office as a personal perquisite, a mere means for 
making his living or improving his economic and 
social condition, all the evils of the capitalistic sys- 



158 DEMOCRACY 

tern would be restored without any of its benefits. 
Consequently, on the socialist's conception of gov- 
ernment there is no alternative to the conception 
that office cannot be treated as an economic pursuit 
except on the condition of perfect responsibility. 
On the other hand, the individualistic system 
equally requires a public spirit on the part of its 
officials as a condition that their power is not used 
for the exploitation of society, except again on the 
supposition of adequate responsibility, which means 
that we have a method of subordinating personal 
motives in official conduct to the service of the 
public. 

All this shows very clearly that in a system where 
the officials or executive agents of government are 
not responsible moral character and intelligence are 
the only guarantee of good service, and that any 
other view of the matter only creates a paradise for 
the spoilsman. The maxim in politics that ^^ to the 
victor belongs the spoils " is only a direct applica- 
tion of the principle that office and its opportunities 
are the free power to live upon others. It is the 
maxim at the basis of a military regime which is 
anti-social in its organisation and government. Mil- 
itary methods not onh^ represent absolute power in 
the ruler, but also involve the coercive subordina- 
tion of the minority and tend, by virtue of their ir- 
responsibility, to create a disposition to exploit the 
minority, unless the despot is benevolent. ISTow de- 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 159 

mocracy deifies government by the majority and if 
it adopts the maxim of military power with its dis- 
regard of the minority it will construe public office 
only as an opportunity to " spoil '^ others. Social 
policy involves as much respect for the welfare of 
the minority as for the majority ;, but the ^^ plain 
people's " conception of it makes oflace nothing more 
than the distribution of the chances to get at the 
public '^ pap/' this " right " being the reward of 
" political " warfare, the henchman's claim upon 
the gratitude and power of the politician. The 
whole force of the principle comes from the univer- 
sal admission of the spoilsman's maxim in military 
affairs and the assumption that government by ma- 
jority shall imitate this policy. 

^ow I am not going to quarrel with abstract prin- 
ciples. The real difficulty is not with the maxim, 
but with the men that apply it. l^o one cares a pica- 
yune about the forms and maxims of government, 
except the scoundrel who is envious of power, if only 
they secure honest men and good government. 
Hence it should be the practical application of the 
doctrine, that " to the victor belongs the spoils," 
which should excite the opposition of the civil ser- 
vice reformer. If there is anything ^vrong in the 
principle this is wholly due to our democratic in- 
stitutions. The practical results depend upon either 
or both of two facts : (1) Who the " victor " is, and 
(2) AVhat the spoils are. As to the first of these con- 



160 DEMOCRACY 

siderations if the " victor " be a conscientious public- 
spirited man no one but those who know that our 
institutions are not likely to secure such men gener- 
ally for their servants will object to the power in- 
volved in the principle; because everyone can see 
that such a person has the character and intelligence 
to enforce respect for the public service. It is the 
" victor '' who has no regard for society that deter- 
mines the practical limits of the spoilsman's maxim, 
while its theoretical limits are determined by the 
fundamental defect in our democratic constitution 
which provides no responsibility for the politician. 
The real difficulty, both theoretical and practical, is 
the fact that the rotatory system of appointments 
makes subordinates responsible to men who neither 
have any moral sense of responsibility to the public, 
nor are subject to any adequate limitations of their 
power to do evil by legal or constitutional agencies 
other than the electorate who are themselves to he 
governed. The whole problem here is the responsi- 
bility of the appointing power. Moreover, taking 
the second consideration, there are some things 
which never come within the legitimate reach of 
any victor, martial or political, and whether con- 
scientious and public-spirited or not. Even warfare 
limits the field of legitimate spoils. Napoleon was 
not allowed to appropriate permanently for France 
the art treasures of Europe on the ground that they 
were not contraband of war, though still grant- 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 161 

ing the retention of all that could be so regarded. 
Consequently, the spoilsman's maxim is not so uni- 
versally true as he would like to make us believe, 
and certainly the liberty to exploit society is not 
" contraband " for the politician, except that he can 
be made amenable to social discipline. He must 
show that the irresponsible power which he claims 
is for the benefit of the community, and not that it 
is a maxim of war, a curious analogy for politics. 
1^0 man except a knave would attempt to claim this 
power as an abstract right. But no other principle 
animates our average politician. Hence what we 
find in the use of his power when he obtains it is the 
fact that he displays no sense of responsibility to the 
public, and in the absence of adequate machinery 
for controlling the action of both the executive and 
the legislative incumbents, and not willing to under- 
take the tremendous task either of converting an 
indifferent public to a better theory of responsibil- 
ity for higher officials, or of getting it, when found, 
through our almost impossible methods of consti- 
tutional change, the civil service reformers limit 
their energies to the immediately practical problem 
in which a direct interest is possible; namely, the 
security of a permanent tenure for men in subor- 
dinate positions who show their fitness for the duties 
of their office. As I have shown, the reformers are 
limited to the commercial argument in attracting 
support. They are of course helped to their ends 



162 DEMOCRACY 

by tlie scandals of the spoilsman's administration of 
government. 

But the civil services reformer, after all, by this 
policy, simply rushes from the frying-pan into the 
fire. In attempting to limit the power of executive 
and administrative officers, and to secure indefinite 
tenure for subordinates, to that extent he diminishes 
the responsibility of the latter to their chiefs with- 
out creating it in the superiors. He may create a 
situation in which better men will be willing to take 
public office, but he curtails the principle of re- 
sponsibility to the same extent, and this is theoreti- 
cally opposed to the very principle of democracy. 
Security of tenure is the fundamental characteristic 
of hereditary monarchy, and this is the hete noire 
of democratic people. This limitation of the power 
of appointment and removal, for civil service ex- 
aminations, on the one hand, and security of tenure, 
on the other, amount to this limitation, may prevent 
scoundrels from effecting their purposes, from loot- 
ing the public service and rewarding their hench- 
men by treating office as a personal perquisite; but 
it also prevents good officials from improving the 
public service when they are in the position to do it. 
I^ow if we succeeded in electing trustworthy rulers 
in all cases there would be no demand for civil ser- 
vice reform, so that the very existence of this de- 
mand is unimpeachable proof that democracy has 
failed to secure its best citizens for its rulers. Even 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 163 

the partial adoption of it is testimony to the same 
fact and also to the fact that in lien of obtaining re- 
spect for the public in executive officials, or of con- 
triving a method for making them responsible, we 
have to be content with depriving them of their 
power to make things worse, though we prevent the 
honest man, whom in some unaccountable case of 
good luck we may obtain, from making things bet- 
ter. Hence I confess frankly that civil service re- 
form, important as it is in the absence of a power 
to control appointing officers and for the idea that 
fitness is the only proper title to public office, has 
totally failed to solve the problem which its advo- 
cates put before themselves. It does not effect the 
responsibility of the executive and diminishes that 
of subordinates. Like the principle of " checks and 
balances " it is only an increase of irresponsible 
power in the operations of government. 

The spoilsman, therefore, is right in his position: 
I do not say in his intentions, but in his position. 
For it would hardly be too severe or untrue to say 
that the average spoilsman is a knave and a hypo- 
crite when he is not a fool. He does not insist upon 
the right of the victor to the spoils for the sake of 
good government, but only for the sake of using an 
accepted premise to enforce a conclusion which con- 
ceals his real purpose. But stripped of the interpre- 
tation and practical application which the politician 
gives the formula, it still has at its basis the impor- 



164 DEMOCRACY 

tant conception that subordinates slionld fee com- 
pletely responsible to those who direct the govern- 
ment. The executive should be able to remove and 
appoint subordinates as the improvement of the 
public service requires. He should be able to carry 
out his policy without restraint, with the proviso of 
course that he intelligently and honestly serves the 
public, the fact that limitations to his power of ap- 
pointment and removal have to be established only 
proving that such officials cannot be often enough 
obtained. But with adequate security for the proper 
use of executive power this official should be allowed 
to organise and direct the service under him with 
all the efficiency and freedom from constitutional 
and legislative restraints possible. The opponent of 
civil service reform, therefore, stands for the princi- 
ple of responsibility in government officials, though 
this is not his avowed object, especially for himself. 
On the other hand, the reformer has to sacrifice re- 
sponsibility all around, in lieu of a method to estab- 
lish it, in order to correct the abuses of the spoilsman, 
and hopes that security of tenure may compensate 
for the loss of responsibility by obtaining better sub- 
ordinates and saving their experience, intelligent 
and conscientious men being unwilling to place 
their lives and fortunes at the mercy of the spoils- 
man who does not respect fidelity to the public. 
The way out of the difficulty is, at least theoreti- 
cally, an easy one, and is to establish the responsibil- 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 165 

itj of the executive, which I shall here attempt to 
do in a practical way. But in the present situation 
the spoilsman, for his own reasons and unconscious 
of the real strength of his position, seeks the re- 
sponsibility of subordinates at the expense of it in 
himself, while his opponent, looking only at the 
practical working of the present system, sacrifices 
responsibility altogether and creates as serious a 
problem as he solves. He requires to go much 
deeper into the case and to make power with its 
duties responsible instead of withholding it. But 
his present policy, though it restricts bad appoint- 
ments, also either checks necessary removals and 
relaxes discipline or nullifies itself. If an executive 
cannot use his discretion in the removal of subordi- 
nates, but is hampered by the necessity of satisfying 
everybody about the cause and by presumptions in 
favour of permanent tenure, reforms may be pre- 
vented or delayed: if he can remove at pleasure 
civil service regulations amount to nothing, since 
the power of removal at discretion involves the 
same power of appointment. 

That this is the situation is shown by a recent 
decision of the Supreme Court.* In a case of re- 

* Parsons versus the United States. — United States 
Reports, Vol. 167, p. 324. After stating- the appellant's 
case in favour of tenure as ag-ainst removal, the Eeport 
says: " This could never have been the intention of 
Congress. On the contrary, we are satisfied that its 
intention in the repeal of the tenure of office sections 



166 DEMOCRACY 

moval by the President an appeal was made to the 
courts to show that he had not the right of removal 
under the law, and the Supreme Court denied the 
appellant's claim, maintaining that the right of re- 
moval under the law remained intact. The spoils- 
man won a legal victory in this decision, because 
discretionary powers are a very indefinable thing 
and the power of appointment must go with that of 
removal; and consequently the whole fabric of the 
reform was threatened by it, in so far as the law 
was concerned. There was, therefore, no hope for 
the reformers' policy except the intelligence and hon- 
esty of the appoi7iting power. If the executive shall 
thus be practically irresponsible the only guarantee 
of good government must be the personal character 
of the electorate's choice. The spoilsman has won 
the abstract right of removal, with which goes the 
right of appointment to fill vacancies, and unless 
the decision is modified, he has now only to secure 

of the Revised Statutes was again to concede to the 
President the power of removal if taken from him by 
the original tenure of office act, and by reason of the 
repeal to thereby enable him to remove an officer when 
in his discretion he regards it for the public good, al- 
though the term of office may have been limited by 
the words of the statute creating the office. This pur- 
pose is accomplished by the construction we give to 
section 769, while the other construction turns a statute 
meant to enlarge the power of the President into one 
circumscribing and limiting it more than it was under 
the law which was repealed for the very purpose of 
enlarging it." 



PRACTICAL RE MED FES 167 

the election of executives who are in sympathy with 
him. Hence if democrac}^ does not select for its 
executives (as the very existence of civil service re- 
form laws prove it does not) men who will volun- 
tarily respect the reformers' ideal, then we shall be 
forced to seek some other means to this end. The 
determination of responsibility for the executive will 
effect this object, if it is itself possible. Establish 
this and we could sacrifice the present civil service 
laws, fulfil the unconscious demand of the spoils- 
man for complete executive efficiency, and secure all 
the objects that the reformer hopes to get by security 
and permanence of tenure. The whole problem, 
therefore, is to contrive a method of applying re- 
sponsibility to the executive without impairing its 
efficiency for action in the interest of good govern- 
ment while limiting its influence for evil. Is this 
possible ? At any rate the problems associated with 
civil service reform indicate very clearly that this 
is one of the issues to be settled. 

Before developing or proposing a plan for this 
end I must indicate an important reform in the se- 
lection of representatives and the differentiation of 
legislative functions. The former is the fifth and the 
latter the sixth of the general changes suggested. 
The first of these, put in a concrete form, is a propo- 
sition to adopt the English system of representation 
with a slight modification, the change being a com- 
promise with our policy. Much that is attempted 



168 DEMOCRACY 

by civil service reform would be effected by this 
metliod. It is the application of natural se^?ction to 
the choice of representatives in Congress and the 
legislatures. It can be embodied briefly in two 
propositions. (1) Select candidates for the Lower 
Houses without regard to residence, except that, in 
Congressional representatives, they shall be citizens 
of the state from which they are chosen. (2) Se- 
lect members of the Senate or Upper Houses with- 
out regard to residence, except that State senators 
shall be residents of the state for which they are 
chosen. 

It is apparent at a glance what the modification of 
the English system is. Concession is made to the 
principle of local representation which is based upon 
population, while both are extensions of present 
policy to introduce competition among the best men 
for honor and power. The system would offer a good 
man the opportunity for vindication against the 
whims of some local constituency, as it does con- 
stantly in England, and for exhausting the resources 
of corruption in the attempt to prevent honest men 
from securing political power. The advantage of 
it is found in the premium which it would place upon 
intelligence and independence of the ignorant 
masses, while it at the same time curtails the oppor- 
tunities of unsavory political reputations, though it 
may not suppress them. But in this country the in- 
fluence of an overwhelming defeat in any constitu- 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 169 

ency almost always means political death to an able 
man. Generally, if he turns up with political power 
and influence of any kind at all, it is not in the form 
of a vindication of his judgment and action, as in 
England, by an election from another constituency, 
but in the form of an executive appointment as a 
person to be ^^ taken care of '' by the party. This is 
not the survival of the fittest, but encourages all 
sorts of corrupt influences for killing off the best 
men one by one in our legislatures, leaving accessi- 
ble only those characters who are subservient to ma- 
chines and lobbies. The practical difficulty, which 
I fully recognise, in such a proposal is the actual 
prejudice against any but local representatives. 
But a systematic series of attempts to realise the sys- 
tem might gradually educate the electorate to see its 
merits, though it met only with failure at first. Its 
value is well attested in the experience of the Eng- 
lish Parliament. Mr. Gladstone would have been 
retired long ago in our system. If our method had 
been prevalent in England he might not have sur- 
vived his defeat at Oxford early in his career. Sir 
William Harcourt could not have secured re-elec- 
tion after his recent defeat before an old constitu- 
ency, and Mr. John Morley could not have been be- 
sought to re-enter Parliament after his recent defeat 
at E^ewcastle, had it not been that representative 
men can have constituencies which are proud to 
secure their services without regard to local resi- 



170 DEMOCRACY 

dence when the accidents of political fortune are 
against them in some other locality. In fact it is 
comparatively easy for even distinguished Ameri- 
cans to enter Parliament by election, and with 
greater facility than they can enter their own Con- 
gress. In this country the lack of such opportuni- 
ties drove Judge Thurman from public life after a 
defeat secured by corporate influences whose self- 
ish aims he would not favour at the expense of the 
public : and the same could be said of others whom 
it may not be best to mention. But after the practi- 
cal demonstration of its value in England it ought 
to be perfectly clear that it is far superior to our 
present method which is a concession to the idea 
that all persons have the same right to office with- 
out regard to intelligence or honesty, and so does 
nothing to accomplish the survival of the fittest in 
political life. On the contrary, it does the very op- 
posite, and our politics are only an illustration of 
the " devil's chicane.'' I do not propose it in the 
pure form which it takes in England because this 
country is so large that a greater diversity of in- 
terests is noticeable and men have less opportunities 
to be acquainted with various local conditions than 
in England. Hence a larger concession has to be 
made to the principle of local representation in this 
country. But we have gone to the opposite extreme 
in our system and offered too much encouragement 
to the habit in a representative of considering only 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 171 

the interests of his locahty, while we need the habit 
of larger federal views, especially as social and 
economic solidarity is extending its area far beyond 
the old idea of local interests. The only value in our 
present system is an unconscious one. In the ab- 
sence of adequate responsibility for the executive 
and imperial functions, and with the presence of 
the conflict which the domination of local represen- 
tation gives to legislative action, with its " check 
and balance " on the sacrifice of one community 
to another, we have an escape from socialism. But 
with the responsibility of the executive, on the one 
hand, and security for the election of more intelli- 
gent representatives there is no reason why we 
should not accept as much of the English system as 
the conditions of our country will permit or allow. 

It is the proposition to differentiate legislative 
functions and to strengthen the influence of the ex- 
ecutive over legislation that is one of the most im- 
portant, and perhaps the majority of people would 
think, one of the most dangerous innovations here 
suggested. But the simple reason for this change 
is the mixed corruj)tion and impotency of our legis- 
latures in spite of their theoretical omnipotence. 
Representatives are too often either absolutely un- 
able or unwilling to meet the enormous responsibili- 
ties resting upon their shoulders. In the early 
period of our history their duties were more easy 
of accomplishment, owing to greater simplicity of 



172 DEMOCRACY 

social and economic conditions, and custom imported 
from the mother country assisted in the choice of 
better men. Machine politics and their concomi- 
tants were not yet known. But the growth of com- 
plexity in our industrial, social, and political in- 
stitutions, with political '' bosses," methods of black- 
mail by legislators, and facilities for jobbery of all 
kinds have opened a thousand sources of indiscover- 
able and unpunishable political actions, where rep- 
resentatives are disposed to avail themselves of them, 
and when they do this legislation demands of them 
capacities for general knowledge that cannot be ac- 
quired by the average man sent to Congress and the 
legislatures for such short periods and with only a 
little local experience to guide him. Congressmen 
require considerable omniscience to fulfil their re- 
sponsibilities, but they possess very little of that 
qualification, and too often no honesty, public 
spirit, or devotion to the real interests of the country. 
Too poor to disregard the salary attached to the of- 
fice, they must consider their personal interest to 
secure a re-election, which puts them at the mercy 
of any unscrupulous man or men who may hold the 
balance of power in their districts and consequently 
the man who will follow the " boss," or " work " 
the proper portion of his constituents can get the 
place and salary while the intelligent and conscien- 
tious man who thinks less of the remuneration than 
of his duty to the public must remain at home. The 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 173 

timeservers, demagogues, and men T\4th an elastic 
conscience are tlie successful bidders for tlie offices 
and salaries. They know liow to use good senti- 
ments and patriotism for votes, the voters all the 
while running trustfully after the devil, who is sure 
to draw them into the bottomless pit. Mephistoph- 
eles always gets Faust at last. You may say that 
Faust is finally saved. This is true: but it is not 
by the devil. Bad politics the office-seekers know 
well enough, but of state-craft they are as innocent 
and ignorant as the people who send them to the 
legislatures. But whatever their character, which 
in many cases cannot be painted blacker than it is, 
they are undoubtedly overburdened with responsi- 
bilities which no body of men elected as they are 
can possibly fulfil to satisfaction. Make them as 
honest as we please, the complexity of human inter- 
ests is so great with our large population, our rail- 
ways, 'our vast and varied industries, that any body 
of men, picked out by political methods worthy of 
Pandemonium, cannot possess the knowledge to 
meet such questions as taxation, banking, currency, 
international affairs, political, social, and institu- 
tional, and the thousand problems of justice involved 
in them. Hence for the purpose of relieving them 
of impossible duties, and securing better intelligence 
and more independence, let us propose a method, 
which divides the work of legislation and which is 
recognised in principle by the appointment of Con- 



174 DEMOCRACY 

gressional committees, and more especially by tlie 
Interstate Commerce Commission. It is the latter 
type of institution, however, which I suggest, as it 
takes us outside the legislature altogether. The sus- 
picion that it would be a form of bureaucracy is re- 
moved by the fact that its powers will be neither 
executive nor legislative, but deliberative. Exam- 
ination of it will show this. The proposal, therefore, 
is not new, as it has frequently been mentioned in 
recent years for tariif problems. But the powers 
which are here to be conferred upon them represent 
a most important modification both of the legislative 
system and of such a body as the Interstate Com- 
merce Commission. What I would suggest, there- 
fore, is a complete system of Commissions, covering 
the whole field of legislative functions, appointed 
by the executive, and qualified with an influence 
over legislation to be defined and discussed again. 
In general they are to have functions not unlike 
the Parliamentary Commissions of England in 
some respects, though as decidedly different in 
others. I shall first enumerate them. 

1. A commission on Banking and Currency. 

2. A commission on Taxation and Revenues. 

3. A commission on Appropriations and Internal 
Improvements. 

4. A commission on Industrial and Labour Prob- 
lems. 

5. A commission on General and Unclassified 
Legislation. 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 175 

In this scheme I have left the control of inter- 
national aifairs as at present in the hands of the ex- 
ecutive and the Senate. The modification of the 
Senate to be considered later will justify the reten- 
tion of the present powers in that direction. The 
efficiency and usefulness of the Commissions, how- 
ever, will depend wholly upon the method of their 
appointment and the powers which they possess. 
Even if they possessed no more powers than some of 
the English Parliamentary Commissions, or our own 
Interstate Commerce Commission, which are 
largely advisory, they would be extremely useful. 
Though our Commission has not solved many rail- 
way problems, because its powers are restricted, it 
has nevertheless collected an immense mass of im- 
portant information for the guidance of public men, 
and prevented a large amount of crude and hasty 
legislation by Congress. This result is no mean 
service when we consider either the ignorance or the 
knavery of the average legislator in this country. 
The need of such Commissions is suggested by this 
condition of things and by the nature of Congres- 
sional and legislative Committees. The fatal defect 
of these latter committees is the fact that they are 
purely political in their formation and motives, and 
so are poisoned by that spirit which looks and per- 
haps must look after votes for the retention of office 
and its opportunities for gain. They are made up 
of the very men whose resjDonsibilities are greater 



176 DEMOCRACY 

than tlieir abilities, and whose powers are limited 
by no check but the ill-will of the electorate, which, 
however, is pliable enough to the arts of the politi- 
cian. Congressional Committees are necessary and 
I do not mean to wholly supplant them by the Com- 
missions : for even party spirit, when responsible or 
limited in power, may be useful. Congressional 
Committees should be retained for the same reason 
that they now exist; namely, for the division of 
legislative labour and as a check on the anarchy of 
the legislative bodies. The very existence of these 
Committees is an illustration and proof of two facts 
which sustain the proposals here made. They are: 
(1) The operation and necessity of the law of dif- 
ferentiation of functions, here made the basis of 
further reforms, and (2) the fact that large bodies of 
men are hetter voting and defensive than they are 
deliherative and constructive agencies. Hence to 
give the Commissions wdiich I propose adequate 
powers for constructive work and influence over 
legislation, I suggest the following constitutional 
qualifications, reducing the constructive and 
strengthening the defensive functions of legisla- 
tive bodies. 

1. Appointment by the President or Governor. 

2. Tejiure of office during the executive term, 
though subject to reappointment, and liable to re- 
moval by the Court of Impeachment. 

3. The presentation of all legislative bills to the 



phactical remedies 177 

proper Commission and the right of initiation of 
bills by the Commissions. 

4. Compulsory report, favourable or adverse, on 
all bills before the close of legislative sessions. 

5. The right of participation in legislative delib- 
erations and debate without the right of voting on 
proposed legislation. 

6. Meetings and deliberations of the Commis- 
sions to be open to the public. 

It is evident that this system introduces a power- 
ful influence to limit the powers of the legislative 
bodies as constructive agents, though only as powers 
that are capable of enforcing intelligent deliberation 
upon important matters of law and administration. 
We have seen that the anarchic tendencies of legis- 
lative debate and action have necessitated clothing 
the Speaker with despotic powers either for pre- 
venting legislation, or controlling the conduct of 
the legislature, and also that Congressional and leg- 
islative Committees are practically irresponsible, 
doing their work in the dark and never being called 
to account for it. These Commissions make the leg- 
islatures deliberating assemblies, granting or refus- 
ing the legislation desired by the executive and the 
Commissions, and make unnecessary enormous ex- 
tension of the present Speaker's powers, while they 
also diminish the constructive duties of the legislat- 
ure, though the Commissions themselves have 
neither administrative nor voting powers in deter- 



178 DEMOCRACY 

mining laws. But before further considering their 
functions it is important to propose a further divis- 
ion of labour, whose value will be determined by the 
manner in which the two Houses are constituted, as 
outlined later in the discussion. They will favour 
dispatch and intelligence in the conduct of legisla- 
tion, while enforcing the necessary deliberation on 
matters requiring it, and all with the security that 
comes from responsibility to the Court of Impeach- 
ment and Eemoval, so that there will be the mini- 
mum amount of apprehension from dangerous po- 
litical action. To attain this end I would propose 
the following distribution of powers and duties : 

1. The submission of all bills on Banking and 
Currency to the Upper Houses alone. 

2. The submission of all bills on Appropriations 
and Internal Improvements to the Upper Houses 
alone. 

3. The submission of all bills on Taxation and 
Revenues to both Houses. 

4. The submission of all bills on Industrial and 
Labour Problems to both Houses. 

5. The submission of all bills on General and Un- 
classified legislation to both Houses. 

6. Joint deliberations at pleasure of the Com- 
missions on Appropriations and Taxation, and com- 
bined action on bills to be reported, though a 
majority of each Commission must be necessary 
for a report. 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 179 

7". The executive right to veto individual items of 
expenditure in bills of appropriation. 

The joint deliberation and action of the Commis- 
sions on Appropriations and Taxation are in imita- 
tion of the English and Continental methods where 
there is no conflict between the money-collecting 
and the money-spending agencies. The English 
Exchequer, for instance, both makes up the budget 
of expenses and suggests the taxation to meet them. 
Two Commissions are named here in order to divide 
the work of collecting the necessary information for 
presentation of the special subject to the proper 
House, and for the defence of the bill in the delib- 
erations of the legislature. The control of appro- 
priations is left to the Upper Houses alone because 
expenditures should be regulated by the property 
interests that have to bear them and by the most in- 
telligent functionaries of government. How this 
disposal of them will effect the desired result will 
be apparent when we have considered the franchise 
and the constitution of the Upper Houses. On the 
other hand, all bills of taxation and revenue are to 
be submitted to both Houses because the incidence 
of taxation can be made to affect non-property 
holders as well as others. Appropriations should 
not be made by any parties that can black-mail 
property and ignore intelligence in their conduct, 
and taxation should not be imposed upon non-prop- 
erty holders without an opportunity to prevent any 



180 DEMOCRACY 

unfair distribution of it. Tins is simply a recogni- 
tion of the intentions of the present system. Bank- 
ing and currency should be in the hands of those 
who have intelligence enough to manage the deli- 
cate economic problems involved. If some general 
principle fixing the interests concerned, such as a 
prohibition upon the issue of irredeemable curren- 
cies, should be embodied in the constitution, the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Impeachment and 
Removal could be relied upon to prevent abuses of 
banking privileges. Moreover, the fact that the 
constituency composing the electorate that chooses 
the Upper Houses will consist of both debtors and 
creditors, the labourer being neither unless he owns 
property or borrows money, will be a decided check 
against financial favours and monopolies, while the 
exclusion of the proletariat from influence in mat- 
ters about which they know nothing can only give 
us the better currencies, lower rates of interest, and 
more stable finances of Europe. The restraining 
effect of giving the executive a veto power over in- 
dividual items of expenditure in appropriation bills 
is apparent without comment of any kind, save that 
we may be permitted to remark that it must effectu- 
ally put a stop to that " log-rolling '' and political in- 
timidation on the part of individuals and minorities 
holding the balance of power, by which such bills 
are loaded down with shameful provisions as a con- 
dition of getting even necessary appropriations made 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 181 

at all. This veto power would force every item to 
stand on its own merits. The disposition of Indus- 
trial and Labor legislation, and of General political 
matters involving the rights and personal liberties 
of citizens and not affecting property interests, is 
designed to consult all the parties concerned. All 
questions of contract between different interests and 
the use of police power should be referred to both 
Houses. 

The same general scheme can easily be adjusted 
to municipal governments, with an increase of the 
appointments to be made by both Governors and 
Mayors to cover a number of offices now elective. 
There would be no need for Commissions in munici- 
palities ; the heads of departments would suffice for 
this purpose, if appointed, as I should make them, 
instead of elected. All officers, state and munici- 
pal, except the legislative and executive may be 
made appointive. The chief advantage of this 
comes from its simplifying the duties and claims 
made upon the elector. At present the multi- 
plication of officers to be voted for, and the com- 
plicated problems of administration to be con- 
sidered, tax beyond all measure the intelligence 
and abilities of the voter to determine wisely. 
Yery few men have knowledge enough, either of 
the subjects involved or the persons appearing as 
candidates, to choose with equal wisdom the whole 
number of officers in a large municipality like ISTew 



182 DEMOGMACT 

York, Philadelphia, Boston, or Chicago. It is the 
same with state officers other than the executive. It 
requires much wisdom and knowledge of men and 
things to choose a good Sheriff, a good Comptroller, 
a good Recorder, a good Coroner, a good Commis- 
sioner of Public Works, etc., and this knowledge is 
not possessed by many of the voters. The most 
highly educated men feel a difficulty here, if not in 
regard to the kind of qualifications involved, cer- 
tainly in regard to a personal knowledge of the 
ability and character of so many candidates. The 
masses do not lack in confidence regarding the mat- 
ters, and are ever ready to assume the gravest re- 
sponsibilities with a light heart. This is because 
their only criterion of fitness for office is a ^' hail- 
fellow-well-met " manner in their representatives 
and the readiness of the latter to pander to their 
vices, or to their self-confidence if not to their vices. 
But wiser men would prefer to have their duties 
proportioned to their knowledge. Hence, as it is 
much easier to choose a fit man to make these ap- 
pointments than it is for the electorate to ascertain 
the qualifications of a dozen men for as many im- 
portant departments of public service, the advisable 
course is to make the executive elective and all other 
officers appointees. The qualifications for appoint- 
ing fit men to office are much more easily determin- 
able than the executive abilities and general fitness 
of men for special functions. I shall not settle at 



Practical remedies i83 

present the question whether the mimicijoal legislat- 
ure should consist of one or two bodies. This will 
depend upon considerations to be discussed later 
and when the limitation of franchise comes up for 
notice. 

It will be quite apparent from the scheme as thus 
far developed that it enormously extends the influ- 
ence of the executive, at least indirectly if not di- 
rectly, over the course of legislation, and to the same 
extent curtails the powers of the legislature. Here 
is where the advocates of democracy may be ex- 
pected to make their stand and to object most 
vehemently. If nothing further were to be pro- 
posed as a limitation of this influence the criticism 
that it involves a dangerous increase of political 
power would be admissible, or at least intelligible. 
But there now comes that part of the system pro- 
posed which includes a limitation of executive au- 
thority without limiting its duties, an agency for 
determining the responsibility of all government 
officers, other than to the electorate, and a further 
division of the functions now belonging to the legis- 
lature. It consists of two independent courts which 
may be denominated as follows : 

1. A Court or Board of Confirmation. 

2. A Court or Board of Impeachment and Re- 
moval. 

The Court of Confirmation is intended partly as 
a restraint upon executive powers of appointment 



184 DESfOCRACY 

and partly as a means of preventing the legislature 
from bartering with the executive for favours. 
With this limitation the executive cannot be arbi- 
trary in the selection of his subordinates and the leg- 
islature cannot dictate the terms upon which the 
executive shall obtain necessary legislation. The 
'' check and balance '^ system cannot under this 
proposition have the temptation, or at least the same 
temptation, to grant the necessary legislation on 
condition that certain personal favours are conceded. 
Thus, by taking away the Senate's power to confirm 
executive appointments, except in one case, we 
should restrict its power to do harm and should se- 
cure a body of men equal in dignity with it and 
qualified by its long tenure and circumscribed duties 
to act in the interests of the public. The under- 
ground politics of " bosses " and knaves demanding 
a quid 'pro quo for serving the public cannot be so 
easily carried on. It will be only a question of serv- 
ing or not serving the public according to their 
promises and the declared duties of their position. 
The objection that the Court being appointed by the 
executive, will not act as a restraint upon his action 
will not weigh in the case, because the long tenure 
of the Court will make it like the Supreme Court at 
present in respect of independence, and in addition 
the limited amount of duty imposed upon such a 
Court will make it possible to have its services given 
without a salarv and the selection of incumbents 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 185 

made from men of intelliiience and leisure. Its con- 
stitution and functions may be defined as follows : 

1. Appointment by the executive. 

2. Long tenure of office, twelve, sixteen, or 
twenty years. 

3. Confirmation in office by tlie Upper Houses. 

4. Its function to be the confirmation or rejec- 
tion of all appointments by the executive, except its 
own members. 

But it is the Court of Impeachment and Removal 
that constitutes the most important of these two 
functions of government, and that is the key, as I 
have already remarked, to the whole scheme which I 
have proposed, since it is the institution that intro- 
duces a direct method of applying adequate respon- 
sibility to the executive and legislative agencies 
beyond the reach of the Supreme Court, the execu- 
tive not being affected by this last Court at all. It is 
intended also to divide the functions of the exec- 
utive, so that the only interest which it will be safe 
for that officer to cultivate will be the public service. 
At present, as we know, the executive has the power 
both to appoint and to remove subordinates at pleas- 
ure, subject to the civil service regulations, which 
we have seen in a large measure defeat themselves 
if they destroy the power of removal and are saved 
only by the personal character of the executive it- 
self, so that the control of both appointment and re- 
moval involves the opportunity to organise ad- 



186 DEMOCRACY 

ministration in behalf of purely personal or party 
objects, which last can be made to conceal personal 
ambitions and profits. But if the sole interest of the 
executive be to make appointments that are not 
responsible to himself, and removals only with the 
permission of the Court of Impeachment and Re- 
moval, political motives will be largely eliminated 
and w^e can expect a better use of the appointing 
power, while this Court of responsibility super- 
vises with almost absolute powers the conduct of 
government officials. Instead, therefore, of giving 
Hobbes's sovereignty to the executive, or limiting 
its responsibility to the electorate, we propose to 
give that '^ sovereignty," or irresponsibility, at least 
almost this, to the inhibitive agents of government. 
The constitution and functions of this Court, there- 
fore, may be characterised as follows: 

1. Appointment by the executive, and to consist 
of three members. 

2. Appointment of a certain number of persons 
who shall not serve at the time, but shall succeed im- 
mediately on the death, resignation, or removal of 
serving members. 

3. Life tenure of office, except in case of impeach- 
ment. 

4. Exclusion from appointment to any other of- 
fice, even after resignation. 

5. Confirmation of their appointment by the 
Court of Confirmation. 



PRACTICAL BEMEDTES 187 

6. Summary and absolute power of removal over 
both elective and appointed officers (within the ter- 
ritorial jurisdiction for which it is appointed), and no 
power of appointment. 

7. The power of suspension to remain in the ex- 
ecutive, and also, with ilie consent of the Court of 
Impeachment and Bemoval, the removal of officials 
and the reorganisation of departments in the in- 
terest of economy, efficiency, and the public wel- 
fare. 

8. Power to dissolve the legislative assemblies 
and to order new elections. 

9. The election of one of its own members as 
President of the Court and in whom shall be vested 
the absolute control of the military, except in 
the conduct of international affairs and foreign 
war,* though even in these its use by the executive 
must be subject to the consent of this Court. 

10. The division by the Court of its own super- 
visory duties so that each member may exercise the 
power of removal subject to the revision and ap- 
proval of the President of the Court, except that 
the dissolution of the legislatures, the ordering of 
new elections, and the removal of the executive 
shall be made by a majority vote of the Court. 

11. Subject to removal only through impeach- 
ment before the Supreme Court. 

* The navy may at all times remain in the control of 
the executive. 



188 DEMOCRACY 

The second provision of this system is designed to 
eliminate politics absolutely from the appointment 
of the Court. In the first organisation of it this in- 
fluence perhaps could not be wholly excluded, 
though it would at least be minimised as at present 
in the Supreme Court. Most of the other provisions 
explain themselves. I have retained the executive 
power of suspension and of conditional removal for 
the purpose of maintaining all the possible efficiency 
of that function in connection with its complete re- 
sponsibility, while the Court has an independent 
power of removal in order to strengthen the appli- 
cation of responsibility to the whole public service. 
Removals in the interest of the public could be made 
which the executive might not be disposed to sug- 
gest. 

The value of some such general scheme for apply- 
ing responsibility to the instruments of government, 
and putting the " sovereignty " or irresponsibility 
in the authority which shall mix as little as possible, 
or not at all, in the positive functions of politics and 
government must be justified. The general con- 
ception of this court which I entertain, perhaps 
with some modifications, is well illustrated by an 
observation of Burke in the Reflections on the 
Revolution in France^ apropos of the English 
constitution. Speaking of those who led in the 
English Revolution of 1688, he says: ^^ They 
left the crown, what, in the eye and estimation of 



PMAGTICAL REMEDIES 189 

law, it had ever been, perfectly irresponsible. In 
order to lighten the crown still further, they aggra- 
vated responsibility on ministers of state. By the 
statute of the 1st of King William, sess. 2d, called 
^ tlie act for declaring the rights and liberties of the 
subject, and for settling the succession of the crown/ 
they enacted that the ministers should serve the 
crown on the terms of that declaration. They se- 
cured soon after the frequent meetings of Parlia- 
ment, by which the whole government would be 
under the constant inspection and active control 
of the popular representative and of the magnate of 
the kingdom." 

There is here a remarkable recognition of the 
principle for which I am contending; namely, the 
adjustment of irresponsibility to the negative, and 
of responsibility to the positive functions of govern- 
ment. The crown is relieved of positive administra- 
tive duties and granted the power to dissolve Parlia- 
ment, while the principle of responsibility of the 
Ministry and of Parliament to the crown is thus 
recognised, as well as to the electorate. The Minis- 
ters, who constitute the real executive in the Eng- 
lish system, have a threefold responsibility; namely, 
to the electorate, to Parliament, and to the crown. 
The division of powers thus instituted, with the 
choice of the ministry from Parliament in deference 
indirectly to the principle of popular government, 
has many resemblances to the institution which I 



190 DEMOCRACY 

have here suggested with some important differ- 
ences. What I have suggested is more easily ad- 
justed to our present constitution and poHtical senti- 
ment than the English method would be. I cannot 
but think also that the success of the English consti- 
tution has been due very largely to this adjustment 
of functions in separate agencies, the responsibility 
being placed upon the positive or executive, and the 
irresponsibility upon the negative agent. There are 
differences on which I cannot dwell at length, and 
which prevent the analogy from being complete. 
For instance, the responsibility of the Ministry or 
executive to Parliament or the legislative is wholly 
excluded from the system proposed here. The rea- 
son for this is that our executive is directly elected 
by popular vote. If the English system of electing 
representatives were the same as our own, adapted 
only to local abilities, the kind of men selected 
would put the Ministry at their mercy as Congress 
tries to do with the President. It might be said, 
however, that the proposition to adopt the English 
system of representation would supply the condition 
of an improvement in representatives which would 
prevent the harrying of the executive by demands 
for patronage. This is true, but the omnipotence of 
Parliament in the matter of determining the con- 
stitution, there being no written law and no Su- 
preme Court to limit Parliament, it is natural that 
the English system should make the Ministry or real 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 191 

executive responsible to itself. But for the inliibi- 
tive powers of tlie crown the democracy of England 
is more thorough than our own and may even be 
more consistent already than our own. Without the 
right of the crown to appoint the Ministry, however, 
the responsibility of this executive to Parliament 
would be dangerous under any system of representa- 
tion, and as no power of appointing the executive is 
given to the proposed Court of Impeachment and 
Removal and the executive is elected by popular 
vote, it would not be best to make this office directly 
amenable to the legislative. If the English constitu- 
tion as a whole were adopted the matter would be a 
different one altogether. But all political develop- 
ment and change must follow as closely as possible 
the conditions and institutions in which they are 
made. The method proposed here is a mean be- 
tween the idea of imperialism which is so important 
in all government, and the democratic idea of re- 
sponsibility, the natural tendency of the English 
system being to democratic responsibility alone. 
The only thing in England that prevents the com- 
plete consummation of this tendency is the appoint- 
ing power of the crown, and in the United States, 
the non-responsibility of the executive to the legisla- 
tive. Abolish monarchy in England and tliat coun- 
try would go to the referendum more rapidly than 
we should do under the present system: abolish the 
Presidency in this country and we should have noth- 



193 DEMOCRACY 

ing but the referendum. The executive here has 
some of the old monarchical irresponsibility with the 
advantage of great efficiency but with the dangers of 
corruption and tyranny. In England the executive 
is responsible, but retains its efficiency partly by the 
grace of more intelligent representatives and partly 
by retention of the appointing power of the crown. 
Why not, then, complete the development, as the 
Ministry's responsibility to the legislative is counter- 
balanced by the appointing power of the crown, by 
giving the executive the efficiency which is limited 
or destroyed by responsibility to the legislative, and 
the responsibility of the Ministry to the crown with- 
out that agent's appointing power ? That is, reduce 
the " sovereign " to a court of responsibility with- 
out any appointing privileges and give the execu- 
tive all the efficiency that it can have subject to this 
court with the legislative prescribing the lines of 
executive action, but not its appointments. 

tTust as the Court of Confirmation is intended to 
be a body that shall have no patronage to buy and 
no legislation to sell, thus making the action of both 
the executive and the legislative more independent 
of each other in one respect and imposing a limita- 
tion upon the executive in another, so the Court of 
Impeachment and Removal will operate as a power- 
ful influence for good government by virtue of its 
inability to cultivate personal interest in determin- 
ing a positive policy of its own, on the one hand, and 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 193 

of its power to make officials directly responsible to 
intelligent public sentiment, on the other. The in- 
tended value of the institution lies in the division of 
power involved in the separation of the appointing 
from the removing function. The executive, in this 
conception, can use its power only in a positive direc- 
tion and will be under fewer temptations to abuse it : 
the Court of Impeachment can exercise no positive 
functions in government, but only that of restraint 
and punishment, so far as removal may be consid- 
ered punishment. The objection to any such divis- 
ion of functions, that deprivation of the power of 
removal by the executive hampers his power for 
good as much as it does that for evil is answered by 
the fact that he still retains this privilege subject to 
the approval of the Court. The objection to this 
limitation upon the executive in our present system 
obtains its force from the fact that when it exists no 
one else is given any summary powers of discipline 
and restraint. Besides civil service methods en- 
deavour to limit both the powers of appointment and 
removal, as I have shown, with their curtailment of 
the principle of responsibility. Hence we have to 
choose between the tendency to irresponsibility in 
every government agent and the attempt to establish 
responsibility in the executive by a division of 
power, not by removing all of it. If we could ob- 
tain political machinery that would guarantee with- 
out failure the selection of absolutely trustworthy 



194 DEMOCRACY 

men there would be no reason for separating tlie 
appointing from the removing power, but experience 
has taught us that a division of powers both hghtens 
the task of government and weakens the power to 
do eviL If then while limiting the executive's 
power of removal we constitute a court of summary 
procedure for this purpose, we ought to avoid the 
evils of limiting removal as is attempted in our pres- 
ent system, and accomplish all that civil service re- 
form aims to do, while increasing executive effi- 
ciency in the direction most important for good 
government. 

I think the principle here maintained can be sup- 
ported by a comparison with the Supreme Court, 
which I wish to interpret, not only as a restraint upon 
the omnipotence of Congress, but also in the more 
general sense of an institution which has no positive 
functions in government, but is purely negative. 
The Supreme Court simply prevents illegal, if I 
may say so, or unconstitutional legislation. It has 
no power to enact or to enforce legislation of any 
kind, constitutional or otherwise. Hence it operates 
merely as a restraint upon the irresponsibility of 
Congress or the legislature. Its function is inhibi- 
tive, not positive or constructive, and herein lies its 
great strength and usefulness. It throws the whole 
responsibility for legislation within the limits of 
the fundamental law upon the law-makers, re- 
sembling the Crown's power to dissolve Parlia- 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 195 

ment and to test public sentiment, and encourages 
as well as utilises the respect for the constitution 
which is supposed to guarantee individual rights 
and liberties as much against the tyranny of the 
legislature as against the arbitrary power of mon- 
archy. So strong does this make the Supreme 
Court that it certainly would not have survived if 
it had possessed any executive or legislative duties 
from the outset of its history. The constitution is 
assumed to be or to represent an agreement among 
the citizens to abide by its provisions until altered 
by the same method that adopted it. The Supreme 
Court simply says that representatives must not alter 
this instrument at their will, but that their duty is to 
respect it until the '' sovereign " power, the people, 
change the rules for the direction and limitation of 
their representatives. Consequently, not being re- 
sponsible for positive legislation, but only for the 
constitutionality of the laws that are enacted, their 
consistency with the fundamental law, it exercises 
only a negative or inhibitive function against ten- 
dencies to commit infractions upon this fundamental 
law, and leaves society the choice between modify- 
ing its constitution and shaping new legislation in 
conformity with the existing instrument. With con- 
structive or executive powers added to its present 
irresponsibility it would have perished long ago, be- 
cause it could not have withstood the onslaughts of 
the public or the politicians demanding a policy 



196 DEMOCRACY 

without regard to the constitution, which is sup- 
posed to embody a large experience as well as an 
agreement of these very people to carry out a defi- 
nite course of action. But having no power to make 
laws, only to unmake those that are inconsistent 
with the fundamental law and to shift the respon- 
sibility for political evils either upon the people who 
make the constitution, or upon ignorant and irre- 
sponsible legislators whose duty it is to conform to 
this instrument, the Supreme Court both limits the 
power of the legislature by enforcing its respect and 
submission to law, and disarms the spirit that might 
otherwise mass its opposition against such a court. 
It thus enjoys the position of being the highest au- 
thority in the government beyond which there is no 
appeal, and consequently is invested with Hobbes's 
" sovereignty " or irresponsibility, without being 
liable to as much suspicion or assault from the per- 
sistent jealousy which a democracy directs against 
this kind of immunity, for the reason that it is not 
constructive or executive. As a consequence its 
value for a democracy is beyond calculation, and per- 
haps this form of society could not long exist with- 
out some such a body, simply because democracy 
requires an institution to make its representatives 
respect the law or to compel it to keep faith with its 
own promises which a constitution is. At any rate, 
it is an inliihitive agency in government and derives 
its power and usefulness from that fact. 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 197 

Tlie Court of Impeachment and Removal, wliicli 
has been proposed, is precisely an analogous institu- 
tion, and should be the organ for the irresponsibility 
that attaches to the executive power as at present en- 
dowed. It is not responsible for the positive func- 
tions of government, as its specified qualifications 
indicate, but its dutv will be the administrative 
check against the abusive powers of appointees. It 
establishes a direct responsibility for the executive 
and subordinates, shifting public evils of an admin- 
istrative sort upon the shoulders of those who act 
or fail to act, and leaving to the legislature and the 
electorate the duty of constructive work and no 
power to intimidate or limit the action of the execu- 
tive, except by law. The Court itself, it will be 
noticed, is amenable to the Supreme Court for im- 
peachment if necessary. This retains the latter as 
the one central authority that is absolutely irrespon- 
sible. The long tenure of the Court of Impeach- 
ment and the various provisions mentioned will give 
it independence, and its summary power of removal 
which may be exercised in behalf of economy, effi- 
ciency, and good behaviour in government, will in- 
spire a wholesome respect for the public welfare. 
In this way it may do much to substitute public 
spirit for personal interest, being itself unable to di- 
rect any action in any but the interest of society. 
Consequently, it ought to put most decisive limita- 
tions upon all executive and legislative attempts to 



198 DEMOCRACY 

aggress upon society by policies that the electorate 
has not directly or indirectly intended, or by such 
executive piracy as we too often find in both state 
and municipal administration. 

The investiture of the Court of Impeachment 
with the military power will act in the same direc- 
tion as that which has been described. This asser- 
tion will undoubtedly appear to involve a new con- 
ception of the functions performed by the army in 
the hands of the executive, but a little reflection 
ought to show that the position here taken is in 
reality the proper interpretation of what the mili- 
tary should represent in government, and, in fact, it 
actually does remain in the practical policy of de- 
mocracy a force to be used, not for executive gov- 
ernment in general, the police being the proper pro- 
tection here, but as the power to maintain social 
order against rebellion and anarchy. In a civilised 
country, not engaged in foreign war, there is no use 
for the military except to suppress insurrection and 
riot. Democracies do not like to entrust the army 
to the executive because they are afraid of its abuse 
in the interests of monarchical or similar ambitions. 
It has often been the instrument of tyranny in the 
hands of the executive, and legislative bodies are 
absolutely unfit to control it, for reasons that do not 
require mention. Hence even democracies, recog- 
nising the necessity for an army in certain emergen- 
cies and the inability of the legislature, which is a 



PJ^ACTICAL REMEDIES 199 

deliberative assembly, to represent any efficiency in 
the control of the military, have been forced to put it 
into the hands of the executive, with all the dangers 
incident to the opportunities which disturbed social 
conditions offer to unscrupulous men. In crises it 
is a terrible force to possess. Hence since it is not 
necessary for the executive and legislative work of 
ordinary times, and its proper function is to suppress 
disorder and anarchy, leaving to the people the re- 
constructive work of society, it also should be inter- 
preted as an mhihitive influence, both in times of 
order and during and after disturbances which re- 
quire more than the police to quell, and so turned 
over to such a body as the Court of Impeachment. 
Its sole duty in domestic affairs, leaving the contin- 
gency of foreign wars out of account, will be to put 
down mobs, rebellion and anarchy, as at present, and 
not to take any part directly or indirectly in the 
reconstructive work of society, whether executive 
or legislative. By putting it into the hands of the 
Court of Impeachment we could make the executive 
solely a representative of the law in purely social 
conditions and obtain far more prompt action in the 
suppression of disorder. At present either the am- 
bition of the executive or other personal interests 
not so respectable and various political considera- 
tions tempt the executive to avoid unpopularity by 
withholding an appeal to military force until, often, 
the loss of property and life is greater than should be 



200 DEMOCRACY 

the case. In a democracy the executive must natu- 
rally hesitate to employ the army to enforce what 
will always appear to represent the policy of his 
party rather than the interest of the whole. But in 
times of riot and social disturbance there should be 
no hesitation. Action should be prompt and vig- 
orous. Only such a power as the Court of Impeach- 
ment represents could avoid the embarrassment 
from which the executive must suffer and the jeal- 
ousy which the people show against force used to 
carry out a political policy, because this Court by its 
constitution cannot do any positive or constructive 
work in the adjustment of order, but only keep op- 
posing parties at bay until they agree to voluntarily 
preserve the peace. It enforces the law only by say- 
ing that it shall prevail until repealed by the people. 
But with the military in the hands of the executive 
it puts the power in that agency to maintain the law 
against change. If the executive can in no case 
force his policy on the public and if the mob can be 
promptly checked in its attacks upon the law, which 
the executive administers, without awakening sus- 
picion and jealousy against that power in govern- 
ment, the want of constitutional qualifications in the 
Court of Impeachment for enforcing the desires of 
either party in contention compels them to settle 
their differences by some form of agreement, com- 
promise, or arbitration. 

An important argument for this Court may be 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 201 

found in the working of tlie present power of im- 
peachment conferred upon the legislature. The 
right or necessity of a power of impeachment and 
removal is already recognised by our system, even 
the very irresponsibility of it, but it is not recognised 
in any form that enables it to act as efficiently and 
safely for the public welfare as the Court which I 
have here proposed. It is combined with the legis- 
lative function which cannot indulge in impeach- 
ment and removal without exciting political animos- 
ities and usurping the powers of the executive. The 
power of the legislature to remove the executive 
virtually carries with it the power to determine 
executive action, while it is the real intention of 
modern political institutions, in theory at least, to 
confine legislative bodies to deliberation and the 
enactment of laws which define the course and 
limits of executive action, and not to administer 
them. But then in the absence of responsibility 
for the executive there seemed no way to con- 
trol his action, to compel the execution of the 
laws, except to put in the hands of the legislature 
the additional power of impeachment in order 
at the proper time to exert pressure upon the 
executive to carry out the commands of the legis- 
lature and the people. This was an attempt to ap- 
ply to the executive the responsibility which the 
whole movement of political history shows is desir- 
able in some form. But to have the irresponsible 



303 DEMOCRACY 

power to impeach and remove executive officers at 
pleasure, while the power remains, as in our Con- 
gress, to elect them, and at the same time to fix the 
laws and to have neither the power nor the duty to 
order new elections for an executive, favours the 
tendency of the legislature to usurp influence and 
power over the executive and to create further mo- 
mentum toward the referendum and the anarchy 
which it involves. In the responsibility of the Eng- 
lish executive, or Ministry, to Parliament the power 
of this legislative body to elect the executive, at 
least directly, does not exist and hence the respon- 
sibility of the Ministry to it is not so dangerous as 
that of the executive to Congress in this country. 
The power which makes the laws should not have 
the right both to remove the executive and to elect 
another, and the danger of its exercise, as the im- 
peachment of one of our Presidents abundantly 
shows, is the only thing that prevents its use even 
when it is necessary. Such an act, even when most 
necessary, would establish a precedent that might 
not await equally necessary conditions for the exer- 
cise of that power. Precedents are dangerous ex- 
amples for the politician who may be interested in 
extending his own power by limiting that of some 
one else, and in order to effect his purpose will seize 
upon any precedent without regard to differences 
of circumstances, if only he rely on some analogy 
for enforcing his claim. But with a separate Court 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 203 

of Impeachment and Removal tliis temptation 
would not exist. Having no power constitutionally 
to increase or to usurp influence over government it 
could safely exercise the function of removal with- 
out creating the tendencies involved in our present 
system, which show a perpetual disposition of the 
legislative to usurp the functions of the executive. 
When Parliament refuses a vote of confidence to 
the Ministry, the crown can either appoint a new 
executive in harmony with the legislature or dis- 
solve the latter and order new elections. The re- 
moval does not involve appointment by the party 
that refuses confidence, and the appointment by the 
crown involves either harmony with the legislature 
or an election by the people. In our system the peo- 
ple do not require to be consulted, and hence the 
danger. But the plan which I have proposed, what- 
ever else it does, keeps the legislature at its proper 
functions and leaves to the electorate the choice of 
the executive, a power which it at least shares in the 
English constitution. 

Another fact sustains this view. The state of 
ISTew York endows the Governor with the power to 
remove the mayors of municipalities but not to ap- 
point new ones. This is as distinct a recognition of 
my principle as could be desired, power of removal 
without power of appointment. But it has two se- 
rious defects. First, it violates the principle of home 
rule. Second, it introduces politics into the question 



204 DEMOCRACY 

of removals, so that tlie dangers accompanying tliis 
influence will often prevent even justifiable action 
in the use of such a power. Bnt the plan which I 
have suggested conforms to home rule and excludes 
politics from the exercise of the power of removal, 
Avhile it embodies exactly the principle involved in 
the effort to make municipal executives responsible. 
The argument can also be reinforced by a further 
comparison which states the case a little more fully, 
and coincides with the interpretation just made of 
the functions performed by the Supreme Court. I 
have shown, or endeavoured to show, that the main 
function of this court is inhibitive, and that the 
Court of Impeachment and Removal is to serve the 
same purpose. ]^ow the Supreme Court serves 
partly to limit the arbitrary power of Congress by 
keeping it within the lines of the constitution and 
partly to strengthen its responsibility to the elector- 
ate. It is consequently, as I have shown above, an 
institution that recognises and applies, in a measure 
at least, the principle here contended for; namely, 
a definite and concrete body for inhibiting arbitrary 
power and securing the responsibility which our in- 
stitutions require and nominally supply, but not in 
a concentrated and efiicient form. It is, to the ex- 
tent indicated, a means of making the legislative 
power responsible. But there is no similar limita- 
tion or accountability for the executive except 
liability to impeachment, which it is not safe to 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 205 

apply with any frequency. All, therefore, that 
my proposition for a Court of Impeachment and 
Removal demands is a similar means of making 
the executive responsible and of completing the re- 
sponsibility of the legislature. The power of disso- 
lution affects actions of the legislature which the 
Supreme Court cannot reach, and prevents the dis- 
regard of issues which the representatives were 
elected to settle. The short period of representative 
tenure in the lower House of Congress as at present 
constituted in some measure limits this tendency to 
evade issues involved in elections and to substitute 
others, so that it could be said that the power of dis- 
solution in the hands of the Court of Impeachment 
is not necessary. This objection has some force. 
But I introduce this proposed constitutional change 
for two reasons. First, some control of the disposi- 
tion to evade issues even in short periods of legisla- 
tive tenure is necessary, while extraordinary emer- 
gencies occur when it is necessary to send Congress 
to the electorate. Second, the change is intended to 
make possible a longer period of legislative tenure 
in the lower House of Congress and state legislat- 
ures, somewhat after the manner of the English 
system. At any rate, my proposition only recog- 
nises the same principle as the power of dissolution 
by the crown, and certainly if the legislature re- 
quires any inhibitive power against its tendency to 
usurp authority, as is admitted by the Supreme 



206 DEMOCRACY 

Court, which only holds it to the constitution and 
does not prevent abuses within this limit, there is 
nothing anomalous in establishing a similar court 
for fixing responsibility upon the executive, while 
enlarging its power of action, and strengthening the 
application of the same principle to the legislature.* 

* The sug-gestion or objection may be made that the 
Court of Impeachment and Kemoval is only a restora- 
tion of the old Koman Tribuni PlcMs, or Tribunes of the 
Commons. This conception, however, is only partly 
true, while it escapes or conceals the most essential 
differences between the two institutions. This can be 
best broug-ht out by a comparison between them. But 
I must first state the nature and powers of the Tribuni 
PleMs. I quote the language of Mommsen. 

" The power of the Tribunes " (Plebis), says that his- 
torian, " was of no avail in opposition to the military 
imperium, that is, in opposition to the authority of the 
dictator everywhere or to that of the consuls beyond 
the city ; but it confronted on a footing of independence 
and equality the ordinary civil powers which the con- 
suls exercised. There was, however, no partition of 
I)owers. The tribunes obtained on the one hand the 
right to cancel any command issued by the magistrate, 
by which the burgess whom it affected considered him- 
self aggrieved, through a protest duly and personally 
tendered; and on the other hand they obtained or as- 
sumed the prerogative of pronouncing criminal sen- 
tences without limit and of defending them, if an appeal 
took place, before the assembled people. To these there 
was very soon attached the further prerogative of ad- 
dressing the people in general and of procuring the 
adoption of resolutions. 

" The power of the tribunes therefore primarily in- 
volved the right of putting a stop at their pleasure to 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 207 

There ought, perhaps, to be some means of 
determining when this Court should interfere to 
dissolve the legislature and order new elections. 
As I intend its powers to extend to the removal of 
individual representatives for any form of miscon- 
duct, there might be few occasions for dissolving 

acts of administration and to the execution of the law, 
of enabling" a person bound to military service to with- 
hold himself from the levy with impunity, of preventing- 
or cancelling" the arrest of the condemned debtor or his 
imprisonment during investigation, and other powers of 
the same sort." 

Now it is to be admitted that there is one important 
resemblance between the Tribunes of the Commons and 
my Court of Impeachment. The trihunatus plebis was an 
inhibitive function exercised against the consuls. But 
here the similarity stops, and the differences become 
radical. Those differences may be classified as follows: 

(1) The trihunatus plebis represented no partition of 
powers between itself and the consuls, but rather a 
conflict of them: the Court of Impeachment does repre- 
sent such a partition between itself and the executive, 
with the responsibility of the latter to the former. 

(2) The Court of Impeachment and Removal cannot 
interfere to prevent the administration of the law, but 
merely to remove from office for the failure to attempt 
its administration, for various malfeasances in office and 
failure to meet the demands of the public service: the 
tribunatus plebis could not remove from office the consuls 
with whose administration it interfered. 

(3) The Court of Impeachment can inflict no penalties 
or punishment upon the men whom it can remove from 
office, nor upon anyone else. 

(4) The Court of Impeachment possesses the military 
imperium, while the tribunatus plebis did not. 



208 DEMOCRACY 

the legislature as a whole. iLvTevertheless, there 
ought to be some criterion other than the apparently 
arbitrary power of the Court. In England, as we 
know, it is a defeat on some bill or a vote express- 
ing a want of confidence in the Ministry that de- 
termines when the crown can act. In the present 
proposed system a similar vote of want of confidence 
by both Houses against the Commissions might 
enable the Court to interfere either to order the 
appointment of a new Commission or to order a 

(5) The trihunatus pleMs was based upon the distinc- 
tion of classes and was intended to perpetuate it: the 
Court of Impeachment assumes no such distinction. 

These differences are fundamental and eviscerate at 
least most of the objections that might be based upon 
the abstract resemblance in the function of inhibition. 
The trihunatus plebis seems to have been conceived after 
the same principle which had introduced the constitu- 
tional policy of two consuls, where there was a desire 
to limit the power of a single ruler hy the dissent or 
inhibition of another of the same rank. But in this 
case, as in that of the tribunus plebis, it was merely two 
rulers with the same powers and had all the defects of 
such a system. It was the " check and balance " system 
of antiquity, and failed as this always does. The inhi- 
bitions of one consul simply made him the ruler, if he 
succeeded in carrying- out his purpose, so that the ab- 
solutism of the single consulate, which the dual con- 
sulate was designed to prevent, simply returned under 
an unconstitutional form. It was not a differentiation 
and integration of functions, as it should have been. 
The tribunatus plehis involved a conflict of " sovereignty " 
with the consulate. This conflict with the executive is 
avoided in the Court of Impeachment. 



PRACTICAL REMKDFES "00 

new election of legislators with also tlie appoint- 
ment of new Commissions. These conditions ought 
to remove the objection just stated above and which 
was admitted to have some force. 

These general limitations upon executive and 
legislative organs, and the necessity for securing in- 
telligent and honest officials, as well as the estab- 
lishment of responsibility for them, require that 
compulsory service be exacted of both appointed and 
elected agents. This requirement will seem to be a 
hardship to many persons and strong objections may 
be raised against it. Without the proper conditions 
attached to the requirement I should admit the full 
force of the objection. For it is hardly fair to ask 
busy men who have large interests at stake and who 
have no political ambitions to gratify, to give up 
their time and labour to the public at a total sacrifice 
of their private aft'airs, especially in a country that 
means to grant complete freedom to its citizens in 
the choice of activity. Hence, unless these rights 
can be preserved with the requirement mentioned 
they will be final in the matter and the exaction can- 
not be fairly made. It is the spoilsman's conduct 
that has created the dislike for office in the Republic. 
Men who wish to make a success of life and a calling, 
who prefer some regular vocation to the shiftless 
career of a politician cast about by the whims of 
popular elections, and who know that success and 
usefulness as well as happiness depend upon perma- 



210 DEMOCRACY 

nence of tenure in any vocation offering the oppor- 
tunity for success, will not submit to a system that 
intends to turn them out of office and a livelihood 
without regard to the manner in which they have 
served the public. Prudent and intelligent men 
wish to calculate for the future. The spoilsman's 
policy will not permit this. Hence there has grown 
up in this country a disgust with public office that 
will not look favourably upon a measure intending 
to exact compulsory service from its citizens. But I 
think that it is comparatively easy to evade the diffi- 
culties which I have mentioned. First, it would not 
be necessary to apply the requirement to all offices. 
Second, proper civil service reform with its perma- 
nent tenure for efficient and honest officials would 
oifer inducements that would limit the necessity of 
compulsion in the largest number of cases. Third, 
all the positions that need to be put under such con- 
ditions are those which are administrative in their 
nature and represent heads of departments. Where 
the man elected or appointed to such a position can- 
not well devote all his time to official duties he can 
be allowed to use his salary, or a part of it, for the 
assistance of a competent person who shall do all 
the work except that of the general direction of 
affairs. But by far a better course would be to al- 
low the incumbent the right of a secretary or assist- 
ant of his own appointment, so that as little demand 
as possible would be made upon the chief for time 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 211 

and energy in anything but the executive direction 
of affairs, while he is made responsible for the proper 
performance of duty. What is wanted is the knowl- 
edge and experience of the best men for the general 
supervision and direction of administrative duties 
by way of determining methods and applying the 
proper discipline to subordinates. This will remove 
the ordinary and well-founded objection to such a 
policy and enable the executive to secure suitable 
men for public service. The trouble with the present 
policy is that fit men do not want office and nearly 
all men that want it are not fit for it. The main 
reason for it, of course, is the fear of the spoilsman. 
But even after civil service reform has removed this 
evil there will be positions which will demand the 
abilities of men who do not require the emoluments 
of office and who have no political ambitions, while 
they have ample time and power to serve the public. 
But not being able to compel service, executives 
have to choose from those who seek office, and too 
often, in the spoils system, these are the failures in 
every other form of business. But government re- 
quires abilities of the highest order and ought to be 
able to command them either by the force of the 
emoluments that it offers or by the force of its au- 
thority, especially when we consider that it is the 
very character of the social organism that renders 
possible the leisure and resources of its more success- 
ful citizens and it ought to be able to require some 



212 DEMOCRACY 

quid fro quo for the advantages whicli they enjoy. 
The same reasons that prevent the best men from 
seeking office make it inviting to politicians with an 
appetite for piracy and black-mail. But since re- 
sponsibility to the Court of Impeachment makes 
such positions less inviting to cupidity, or even ob- 
jectionable, it is necessary that society should be 
able to command the services of its best citizens. 
This compulsion, practiced already in Germany if 
I mistake not, will be wholly unobjectionable if or- 
ganised in the manner described, which will respect 
individual liberty as much as possible. 

I come next to a proposition which is a much more 
delicate problem to handle, that of differentiating 
the franchise, and is yet one of the most important of 
all the changes that I have suggested. When it is 
stated it will at once be interpreted as a limitation 
of the suffrage. But this view will be only half -true, 
as that limitation is understood in common parlance. 
I am willing to say, however, that I should not wince 
under the accusation that I meant to restrict the 
right of the suffrage, because those who usually 
make objection to such a limitation are either dem- 
agogues or labour under a wholly inexcusable illu- 
sion in regard to the nature of this right. If any 
one suggests the propriety of limiting the franchise, 
a whole class of public hypocrites, newspaper editors 
playing the part of Mephistopheles for the sake of 
financial success, and men who ought to know bet- 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 313 

ter, along with tlie ignorant electorate, taught to 
believe that political salvation can be obtained by 
allowing those who cannot govern themselves to 
govern others — these raise the absurd cry that we are 
proposing to rob men of their ^' rights," as if the 
■ privilege of voting were on a par with the right to 
live, to work, to act in self-defence, etc., or what are 
called natural rights by virtue of conditions not per- 
taining to the franchise. But the fact is, dema- 
gogues and politicians to the contrary notwithstand- 
ing, that the suffrage is not, or ought not to be, a ] 
natural right, possessed or possessable equally by all \ 
persons alike. It is, like office, wholly subject to the I 
interests of the community and ought to be con- 
ferred or withheld according to the requirement of \ 
those interests. There are two classes of wholly dis- J 
tinct rights, which I shall call 'personal and political \ 
rights. Personal rights are those in which the sub- 
ject can claim immunity in self -activity in reference 
to his own interests alone; that is, self-government. 
Political rights are those in which the subject can 
claim immunity in the exercise of power over others ; 
that is, the government of others. In practice it 
may be difficult to draw the line between the two 
classes of rights, but only, perhaps, because we have 
not sufficiently differentiated our institutions to en- 
able us to avail ourselves of the distinction, which 
is one of undoubted importance to theory, and only 
awaits the intelligence to apply it in practice. 



214 DEMOVRAaY 

Among the personal rights I would reckon Life, 
Liberty, and Personal Property, or the product of 
one's own labour: among political rights I would 
reckon Property in Land (land in the economic 
sense), or ISTatural Resources, the Franchise, and Of- 
fice. It will be seen in this classification that I put 
the suffrage on a par with the right to hold office and 
so imply that it is subject to the same kind of condi- 
tions, though perhaps not so general, if we diminish 
properly the number of agents to be elected by the 
citizens, as I have done in the present scheme. 

It would be much better for society if this con- 
ception of the franchise were more prevalent than it 
is, and if public opinion were more ready to treat 
those applications of it which are injurious to social 
welfare as it treats minors, foreigners, and certain 
criminals, not to say anything of women, who are 
here unfortunately classed, but still the victims of a 
wholly illogical policy. If the suffrage be a natural 
right; that is, classed among those which I have 
called personal rights, it cannot be excluded from 
women, minors, foreigners, and criminals. The 
tendency, or rather necessity, to treat it as such a 
natural right is apparent in the agitation for female 
suffrage and the logical difficulties encountered by 
men in refusing this demand. But the conclusive 
instances of minors and foreigners show either that 
we should not place the limitation where it is or that 
fitness to serve the public is the only legitimate title 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 215 

to the privilege. Then having drawn the line we 
ought to see that the question is not one of abstract 
moral rights, based on the general nature of man, 
but only public utility, and should limit it accord- 
ingly by qualifications consonant with this end and 
view of it as in fact a mere privilege. 

But it is not necessary here to define the right to 
vote, nor to defend the method of limiting universal 
suffrage which characterised the policy of the past, 
since the proposition which is to be advanced for 
consideration in the present discussion does not aban- 
don all appeals to it. ^or would I favour a total 
abandonment of it for all the functions of govern- 
ment. In some respects it has most desirable feat- 
ures and ought to be retained for certain specific 
purposes. This concession is not made as a sop to 
Cerberus, because universal suffrage may be useful, 
perhaps necessary, where it may serve as a defensive 
measure against aggression upon personal rights, 
but it is not a fit means for constructive ends. But 
whatever its merits for the purpose mentioned, if 
it have any, it is certain that the present system 
fails to secure, as a general rule at least, perhaps 
an almost universal rule, desirable men for office, 
and is too expensive economically and too dangerous 
morally to be continued much longer without some 
guarantee of better government by some other 
means, if not by the limitation of the suffrage. 

]^or does our escape from anarchy in the recent 



216 DEMOCRACY 

presidential election by a million votes serve as a 
defense of it. E"ot only was it secured by playing 
upon conservative tendencies to support the status 
quo in our financial policy and political institutions, 
and upon fears that had no experience to guide the 
voter in a new direction, but we have to consider 
what the result might have been had the combina- 
tion of circumstances been slightly different. For 
instance, in the election mentioned the labouring 
classes were interested in overthrowing '^ govern- 
ment by injunction " and the agricultural classes, 
supposed to be in the main the debtors, were pre- 
sumably interested in free silver, so that both prin- 
ciples were embodied in the platform of one of the 
parties. As the labouring classes were supposed to 
represent 52 per cent, of the population and the 
agricultural classes 40 per cent, of it the game was 
to unite the two and secure the election. But as 
free silver would have depreciated the purchasing 
power of wages, the labouring classes had a more 
immediate interest in preventing the reduction of 
their standard of living than in the remote question 
of constitutional and Supreme Court problems and 
the issue of wages divided the forces on the other 
side, so that it seemed that we could yet trust the 
humblest voter to decide the deepest questions 
wisely. But had the matter of wages been out of 
the way in the campaign we should have had fewer 
reasons to congratulate ourselves upon the value of 
universal suffrage. 



Pit AC TIC AL REMEDIES 217 

Moreover in estimating the value of an unlimited 
franchise we have to consider the price at which 
such a victory was won. This price is made up of 
several factors. There is the cost in money to carry 
on such a campaign and to overcome the effects of 
crass ignorance on a delicate and profound problem, 
and this probably involved large sums for very 
questionable purposes. Moreover the moral con- 
sequences of feeling that this ignorance must either 
be deceived or bought off, when it could not be 
educated, are terrible, because such a situation cre- 
ates a habit of mind which makes indignation at 
bribery impossible or difficult. Self-preservation is 
the first law of nature, and when envy and ignorance 
make an assault upon property in violation of the 
confidence which the laws had established, it is no 
wonder that even sensitive minds resort to the in- 
fluence of money instead of revolution for self-de- 
fence. Such conditions sear the public conscience 
and offer it too few opportunities to train itself to 
delicacy and honor in matters requiring a lofty sense 
of justice and respect for moral law. Then again 
there are the sums of money that are lost by dis- 
turbance to business, and these run up into many 
millions every four years. But above and beyond 
all this, the economic, social, and political problems 
of government are too complicated for the limited 
intelligence of the multitude to decide upon wisely, 
especially when this multitude is little given to the 



218 BE MO GRAVY 

calculation of remote consequences, and does noth- 
ing to inform itself upon the fundamental princi- 
ples of government and economics. The masses 
either read the gossip, fabrications, deliberate lies 
and ignorant newspapers, and are as credulous as 
children of what is told them by politicians and 
partisan journals, or they have come to believe that 
newspapers are too often the paid hirelings of inter- 
ests, political or otherwise, and thus feel compelled to 
follow their own judgment, which is too often worse 
than nothing in the problems of government. They 
never study political questions until the excitement 
of a campaign is on, and then they rush off to knaves 
and mountebanks for wisdom upon the profoundest 
problems of life. But even with all the wisdom de- 
sirable, political campaigns neither offer the time 
nor favour the temper of mind necessary for a calm 
and scientific study of the questions of government, 
and politicians are willing enough to spring sudden 
issues and to produce a state of confusion in the 
public mind: for this condition is a paradise for 
their peculiar talents which prefer darkness to light 
for their work. In the excitement of such a time 
men have only a chance to consult their fears and 
prejudices, and to follow demagogues who can make 
the most and fulfil the fewest promises. And fur- 
ther, when we consider that in the recent presiden- 
tial election six out of thirteen millions of voters 
voted either against their own previously confessed 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 219 

principles out of mere partisan regularity, or against 
the light of all reason and experience, no matter 
how honest they may have been, we may safely ask 
how many of the other seven millions were governed 
by any better motives, or knew any more about their 
side of the problem than their opponents. When 
this is the condition of things we can well under- 
stand why representatives and public officials are 
not more intelligent and honest than they are. 
Hence it is apparent from the manner in which the 
suffrage is exercised that it only confers upon the 
ignorant masses the same impossible duties that leg- t 
islation demands of Congress, and we require to 
limit these responsibilities for the same reason that 
we feel it necessary to exempt legislators from the 
demands of omniscience. A system is imperative 
which shall place the main powers of government 
in the hands of the intelligent and honest class of 
citizens, while we can contrive at the same time a 
means for making universal suffrage an instrument 
of defence against the tyrannical use of power in 
directions affecting the rights of all. The maxim 
that a man who cannot govern himself should not 
be allowed to govern others is a sound one, and until 
we apply it in earnest we are certain to increase our 
troubles. Government in its last analysis can only 
be an illustration of the " survival of the fittest," 
and we should see that the ^^ fittest '' are the intelli- 
gent and honest as well as the strong. To obtain 



220 DEMOCRACY 

the proper results we require a method that will 
array the right on the side of might, or better, 
might on the side of right, if we have to discriminate 
between men to secure the result. But before giv- 
ing further reasons for the modification of the fran- 
chise, let me formulate the proposals to be discussed. 
They include the following propositions. 

1. The stricter and more extensive exclusion of 
criminals from the recovery of citizenship. 

2. The election of the Upper Houses by a 
limited suffrage. 

3. The election of the Lower Houses by univer- 
sal suffrage. 

4. The election of the executive by universal 
suffrage, except the Mayors of municipalities, who 
shall be elected by the limited suffrage. 

The stricter exclusion of criminals from the re- 
covery of citizenship is a most important entering 
wedge in the determination of a limited franchise. 
The exclusion ought also to be extended even to a 
much larger number of crimes, at least for a period 
and under severe conditions for redeeming it in 
some cases and with the perpetual loss of it in others. 
There is no class to whom the principles of a limited 
franchise can be so reasonably applied, or in regard 
to whom the maxim of civil rights can be made so 
clear. This maxim is, in one form at least, that 
civilisation cannot be regulated by its own parasites, 
or that the class which requires to be governed by 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 221 

jails and penitentiaries is not fit to act in the selec- 
tion of civil officers. The same principle will apply 
to vagabonds. The exclusion might be applied be- 
yond the reach of recovery for habitual criminals 
who should include all that have been convicted a 
second time for penitentiary and other offences more 
seriously affecting the life, liberty, and property 
rights of fellow-men. If the system of indefinite 
periods of punishment were adopted the courts might 
restore citizenship to such as had shown sufficient 
evidence of improved character and regular habits 
after a definite number of years. Under such regu- 
lations the scandals of our pardoning executives 
would not occur, especially as the intention in the 
present system is to deprive the executive of the 
pardoning power and to have all judiciary incum- 
bents appointed. But by this limitation alone a very 
large number of men would lose their influence for 
evil upon our politics while we should be imbuing 
the public with a better idea of what the franchise 
means. "^ 

It may be asked why I make an exception of 
municipal executives in the manner of their elec- 

* In the recent Presidential election, where the issue 
was largely the repudiation of public and private debts, 
and the withdrawal of federal interference in labour 
strikes against railways and enterprises inyolving pub- 
lic interests, and perhaps all strikes whatever, the reg- 
ular Democratic nominee of the Chicago Convention 
supporting this demand, which threatened to lead 



222 DEMOCRACY 

tion. Why not also choose them by universal suf- 
frage ? Do not the same principles apply to them as 
to other executives? I must answer this question 
in the negative. The conditions are, in fact, very 
different. The duties of municipal executives are 
mostly those of an officer who supervises the gen- 
eral administration of city appropriations and ex- 
penditures. In some cases his appointing powers 
are not large. In the present scheme they are very 
large, and responsibility for the whole administra- 
tion of city finances, public works, and police de- 
partment would rest upon him. But the following 
facts show that the same reasons that favour the elec- 
tion of the Upper Houses by a limited franchise 
apply to the choice of municipal executives: (1) 
The control of public finances and improvements 
which falls more to the mayors than to the councils 
requires responsibility to the property holders. (2) 
The inability of municipal governments, executive 
or legislative, to affect in any material way the gen- 
eral civil liberties of citizens. (3) The inability of 
municipalities to impose such taxes as justify the 
representation of the non-property holders in the 

straig-ht to anarchy, the inmates of the New Haven 
(Conn.) jail were asked their presidential preferences. 
Of 291 prisoners, 284 were for the regular Democratic 
nominee, and only 6 for the Republican, and one unde- 
cided, he being" insane. It would have been interesting 
to have obtained a general census of the preferences 
among the criminals of the whole country. 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 223 

choice of a municipal executive. Practically all 
taxes are upon real estate or property of some kind, 
and not upon either the necessaries or the luxuries 
of life. The duties and responsibilities of the 
mayor's office, therefore, pertain to the same kind 
of interests that require direction by the classes who 
have to furnish both the financial means and the 
business ability for administration that affects the 
personal liberties of the majority very little if any at 
all. Universal suffrage in the election of the coun- 
cils, assuming that it is to be retained in municipal 
affairs, has all the control necessary over legislation 
affecting municipal liberties. Also with a limited 
suffrage for the choice of the mayors, and with the 
initiative powers of the heads of departments to 
serve instead of Commissions after the manner of 
the state and federal governments, it might suffice 
to have but a single legislative body in municipali- 
ties. This problem, however, it is not necessary for 
me to decide. If an Upper House be necessary or 
desirable it should be elected by a limited franchise. 
Three alternatives present themselves in regard 
to the election of municipal legislative assemblies. 
(1) Two Houses, an Upper and a Lower, elected 
after the manner already outlined for federal and 
state governments. This assumes that one House 
shall be chosen by a limited and the other by uni- 
versal suffrage. (2) A single House elected by 
universal suffrage. As the present scheme proposes 



324 DEMOCRACY 

that municipal executives shall be chosen by a lim- 
ited franchise the conception of a single House 
elected by universal suffrage would recommend 
itself to those who believe in "" checks and bal- 
ances/' and who give up the necessity for two 
Houses. (3) A single House chosen by a limited 
suffrage. The facts which favor this last proposi- 
tion are the nature of municipal government and its 
decidedly limited functions in regard to matters af- 
fecting personal liberties. All the arguments in 
favour of electing the municipal executive by a lim- 
ited franchise also favour the election of the muni- 
cipal legislature by the same method, if this body is 
to be a single House. Neither matters of taxation 
nor the problem of personal liberties stand in the 
way of this last system. The administrative, finan- 
cial, judicial and sanitary business of municipalities 
is such that non-property holders are both incapable 
of intelligently directing them by political influence, 
and unable to plead personal interests in behalf of a 
voice in them. I should myself incline to support 
this alternative as the best of the three. The whole 
history of municipal government in this country 
sustains it. Under present conditions the future of 
our institutions depends upon the success or failure 
of government in the cities. They are the seats of 
more corruption, if possible-, than any other forms of 
our politics, at least if we can accept the united 
testimony of competent observers and writers. The 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 225 

fact coincides with the distribution and character of 
their population, so that if any reason exists for a 
limited franchise it is found in a conclusive form in 
the status of our municipal governments. But be- 
fore considering this question in the narrower field 
its larger aspects must receive attention. 

The first objection to the proposed policy would 
probably be that, if the franchise is to be limited 
at all, the simpler process would be to elect all of- 
ficers by the limited suffrage. This is true, but as I 
have admitted that there is a function for universal 
suffrage, and as there are political duties which it 
cannot perform, I see no alternative to that division 
of duties which involves a differentiation of the 
franchise which will assign to each class of citizens 
its proper functions. The concentration of the most 
important matters of legislation in the Upper 
Houses, such as appropriations and internal im- 
provements, finances, and an equal voice in all other 
affairs, assumes that the intelligent and property 
classes can best manage the legislation connected 
with these matters. The power of these branches 
also in the right of vetoing appointments to the 
Court of Confirmation involves a demand upon bet- 
ter men than we now obtain in our Senates and only 
the intelligent classes can select the delegates fitted 
to perform this service rightly. Hence there ought 
to be a limited suffrage for their selection. Such a 
limitation is practically implied in republican insti- 



226 DEMOCRACY 

tutions, whicli simply limit the franchise for direct 
legislation to their representatives. We already as- 
sume that government must be conducted by the 
more intelligent members of the community and 
limit the legislative franchise to a few persons, and 
if we do not make this assumption we have no right 
to delay the referendum and the initiative. Ac- 
cepting, therefore, the tacit admission of the very 
principle for which I am contending in the very 
nature of our institutions, the only further problem 
is to apply it in a more consistent form than we do. 
The differentiation of its functions should coincide 
with the differences of abilities and duties in the 
exercise of political power. 

The second objection might be that, if limited at 
all, the executive, with its enormous powers over ad- 
ministrative appointments and legislation involving 
the highest intelligence, should be elected by the 
limited suffrage. If it were not for the Court of 
Impeachment and Removal which the present pro- 
posed system offers I should unhesitatingly admit 
the force of this objection. But the check .of the 
Court of Confirmation, of the Upper Houses elected 
by a limited franchise, and the responsibility of the 
executive to the Court of Impeachment make it 
quite safe, in the writer's opinion, to entrust the 
selection of the executive in all cases, except that of 
municipalities, to universal suffrage, and besides it 
will accord more distinctly with the English system 



PE ACTIO AL REMEDIES 237 

which makes the Ministry responsible to the electo- 
rate as well as to the crown. Bnt comparisons aside, 
the interest of the whole people in the administra- 
tion of justice, as involved in the appointment of the 
judiciary more especially, might justify the appli- 
cation of universal suffrage to the election of the 
executive, especially that it is made adequately re- 
sponsible and the Upper House can so effectually 
protect property against "the black-mailing propensi- 
ties of politicians who use universal suffrage for 
power to control all financial affairs which the pro- 
posed system puts into the hands of the classes that 
have not only been the productive but also the pru- 
dent members of the community and must have the 
power to protect themselves against demagogues and 
political pirates. But the administration of justice 
is a different matter. It requires intelligence no 
less than other functions of government, but it also 
requires a regard to others which the economic sys- 
tem under the rights of private contract does not 
make necessary, though perhaps obligatory morally. 
Hence it may be fair to apply universal suffrage to 
the election of the executive, while its responsibility 
with the power of the intelligent classes to restrain 
abuses of administrative functions makes universal 
suffrage less open to the objections that now incum- 
ber it. 

The third objection to the limitation of the fran- 
chise is that it is now impracticable, after having 



228 DEMOCRACY 

adopted it universally, because we should have to re- 
sort to it to obtain its own restriction. Such an ap- 
peal would appear to most persons as absurd as the 
voluntary relinquishment of an important right 
which had just been won by a hard fight. Put in 
this form and without regard to the actual nature 
of our institutions the objection seems to have much 
practical cogency. But I am far from considering 
the difficulty insurmountable, and much less do I 
respect the intelligence of those who assume in this 
objection that the franchise is not now subject to 
both theoretical and practical limitations which are 
impossible according to their arguments. I espe- 
cially think the difficulties largely imaginary for the 
reason that it is still possible, as at present, to use 
universal suffrage for the legislative purposes de- 
scribed and also for its own limitation. The forms 
of applying the suffrage are not yet exhausted. 
Moreover nothing is clearer than the fact that it is 
now resorted to as a means of self -limitation. The 
boasted freedom and independence of universal suf- 
frage is an illusion. The election of executive, leg- 
islative, and judicial officers is nothing but the self- 
limitation of it. It gains some deference and the 
semblance of power in the homage of hypocrisy with 
which the politician conceals the real limitation of 
the franchise. But it is of the very essence of rep- 
resentative government appealing to universal suf- 
frage that it should involve a self-limitation of the 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 229 

franchise, and it is only the increasing impotency of 
the executive and the equally increasing omnipo- 
tence, anarchy, and tyranny of the legislative powers 
that render that self -limitation ineffective, so that 
the natural demand arises for the logical conse- 
quence of pure democracy ; namely, the referendum 
and the initiative, the only form of polity in which 
the suffrage is unlimited. But these, if proposed for 
all purposes, are universal suffrage run mad, unless 
we assume that government is unnecessary and that 
men are intelligent and honest enough to agree 
upon some universal rule and to let it work itself 
without an executive and police system. I confess, 
however, that they would hardly be much worse 
than the kind of government which political 
'' bosses " and knaves generally, with their hypo- 
critical wheedling and flattering of the electorate, 
and irresponsible executives and legislatures are rap- 
idly preparing for us. But in the end, between this 
present tendency and the referendum, we shall be 
obliged to choose some differentiation or limitation 
of the franchise, and it is the business of political 
students to provide a way for securing the better 
of the two alternatives, which I regard as a qualified 
suffrage. 

The only difficulty which I admit is of a practical 
nature, and even this applies only to the attempt to 
introduce the qualification suddenly on a wide scale, 
owing to the number of persons who would have to 



230 DEMOCRACY 

be converted to tlie advisability of the limitation if 
it involved the education and consent of the major- 
ity of the voters in the whole country. There would 
be a serious difficulty either in the attempt to amend 
the constitution of the United States or in the enact- 
ment of legislation limiting the franchise by the 
federal government. I do not conceal from myself 
the impossibility of this attempt at present. But, 
although I am arguing for the differentiation of the 
franchise on a large scale, representing it to be the 
best way to exhibit the true theory of government 
as I conceive it, fortunately we are not left by our 
constitution to federal initiative in this limitation. 
The states have full control over the extension and 
limitation of the suffrage. A property qualification 
once existed in many of them, and this policy still 
survives occasionally in the poll-tax of some states 
as a qualification.* Consequently it ought, on the 

* The following statement from the New York Evening 
Post is of interest as showing that a property qualifica- 
tion still exists for the exercise of the franchise in 
municipal affairs in Khode Island. " Ehode Island," 
says this paper, " is the only state which has always 
retained some sort of a property qualification for the 
suffrage, and it seems loath to give it up. Formerly 
every citizen must be possessed, in his own right, of 
real estate worth $134, or renting for $7 a year, in order 
to exercise the right of suffrage. In 1888 this provision 
of the constitution was amended so as to remove the 
property qualification as regarded all elections save 
those for the choice of a City Council, or upon a propo- 
sition to impose a tax, or for the expenditure of money 



PRACTWAL REMEDIES 231 

principle of the poll-tax, to be comparatively easy 
to reinstate a limitation on the suffrage in some 
favourable state or locality. Perhaps it might even 
be tried in the manner just suggested in some city, 
suburb, or county as an experiment, and then ex- 
tended or abandoned according to its success or fail- 
ure. But for the sake of clearness and effectiveness 
of argument I prefer to construct the theory of the 
differentiation or limitation of the suffrage upon a 
large scale, where its relation to vast and important 
interests can be better appreciated, while the practi- 
cal application of the system might begin on a small 
scale. 

It is incumbent upon political students advocat- 
ing such a limitation of the franchise to provide some 
practical criterion to determine it, and I proceed to 
consider this question. It must be remembered that 
the plan contemplates a limitation of the suffrage 
only for those who elect the representatives of the 
Upper Houses, or Senates, and the problem is to 

in any town or city. A commission for revision of the 
constitution is now (1897) holding- sessions, and it has 
decided not only to maintain this qualification, but to 
increase the amount from $134 to $300, which may be 
either in real or personal property. Some members of 
the commission held that the system had been out- 
grown, and that a citizen was not more trustworthy 
because he had property; but others insisted that the 
old requirement had worked well, and ought to be 
strengthened, rather than abolished, and they carried 
the day by a vote of 9 to 5." 



232 DEMOCRACY 

fix the qualification or method of determining the 
class better fitted to select these bodies, while univer- 
sal suffrage remains, as at present, to elect the exec- 
utive (except the Mayors of cities) and the represent- 
atives of the Lower Houses. 

The qualification which seems to gain adherents 
among those who are beginning to favour limitation, 
and this of a universal sort, is the intellectual one, 
to which resort is made because of the deeply 
founded prejudice against the traditional property 
qualification. But I regard the so-called intellectual 
qualification, with the proposed methods of deter- 
mining it, as opposed to free institutions, or as not 
evading the frauds and injustice of our present elec- 
tioneering practices. This method is some court or 
body to decide whether some would-be voter can 
read and write sufficiently to possess the franchise. 
l^ot that an intellectual qualification, such as its 
advocates mean would not secure better voters and 
public officials, but that there is a vast difference 
between the ^^ intelligence " which the advocates 
of an intellectual qualification mean to assert as 
necessary to good government and the " intelli- 
gence '' which their method of limiting the fran- 
chise determines. The ^' intelligence '^ which will 
guarantee good government must imply or involve 
honesty and morality. But the educational test is 
no necessary indication of this additional quality. 
The '^ intelligence " shown by it may be of the 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 233 

most anti-soeial sort, as iu the average politician, 
Avho is '^ intelligent " enongh, so far as shrewdness 
and knowledge of his immediate wants are con- 
cerned, but he too often has about as much honesty 
as the devil. To see that the " intelligence '^ in- 
volves morality also would require inquisitorial 
methods that are worse than universal suffrage. 
Moreover, the use of a court or public officers to de- 
cide who can and who cannot read and write does 
not give a self-determining method of limiting the 
franchise. It puts the power of limiting it in the 
hands of others than the subject of the right. The 
method which I shall propose is self-determining, 
and puts the whole responsibility for possessing or 
not possessing the franchise upon the person who de- 
sires it, and besides I maintain that it supplies a 
criterion for both the intellectual and the moral 
qualities necessary for good government. 

There are two ways in which this limitation might 
be imposed, one of which would be an appeal to 
universal suffrage, and the other an application of 
the principle implied in the poll-tax. The first of 
these methods would require such a modification of 
the constitution as would establish long intervals be- 
tween the appeals to universal suffrage, in order to 
secure in the limited electorate that it involves the 
intelligence and character desired, if that be possi- 
ble. Those who desire a limitation of the suffrage 
for all purposes might consider this method, be- 



234 DEMOCRACY 

cause, if practicable at all, it does not involve an 
acceptance of any other features of the scheme 
which I have proposed. Also if it has difficulties 
and absurdities for the political student it never- 
theless has the merit of creating as slight a devia- 
tion from universal suffrage as common prejudice 
might yield. The idea would be to fix upon a defi- 
nite portion of the population, the nearest to a given 
ratio, perhaps one-third or one-fourth, to serve as an 
electoral college for a long period, say twelve or six- 
teen years, and which must possess certain specific 
qualifications and be elected by universal suffrage. 

This plan, however, I do not regard as a satis- 
factory one. It has no other merit than that of be- 
ing a compromise with universal suffrage and with 
the superstition that the franchise is a natural right. 
The second plan, which is the one that I should 
favour, and which follows precedent in its main 
principle, is much simpler and more rational, and I 
think more practicable, whether or not it is possible 
to obtain it at once on a national scale. It is to 
admit to the electorate all who pay an income tax 
to he determined hy law. This electorate body 
should have a permanent registry of its members, 
with decrements caused by death and failure to pay 
the tax and increments by fulfilment of the legal 
conditions. Moreover, the right to exercise the suf- 
frage should be limited to those who have paid their 
income tax at least one year before the election in 



PR A CTICAL REMEDIES 235 

which they are to participate. This provision is in- 
tended to guarantee protection against those abuses 
incident to the poll-tax which the politicians are in 
the habit of paying, especially when this qualifica- 
tion is put very low. At least some security must 
be exacted that the elector has paid his own tax, 
and that candidates for office have not paid it, and 
I consider that a long and definite period before 
issues and candidates have been determined as the 
best form in which this security can be expressed. 

It is important to remark that the concessions 
which I make to universal suffrage at all are condi- 
tioned upon the adoption of the Court of Impeach- 
ment and Removal, the extension of the appointing 
powers of the executive, and the limitation of leg- 
islation pertaining to appropriations, banking, etc., 
to the Upper Houses. These provisions so 
strengthen the power of the intelligent classes that 
the arguments for universal suffrage in the remain- 
ing functions of government will appear more co- 
gent and the objections to it less forcible. In fact, 
if such reforms were not adopted the responsibili- 
ties of the electorate would be so great that I should 
favour the extension of the qualification that I am 
advocating to the whole body of voters. Perhaps the 
average political reformer might think it a simpler 
process to limit the whole franchise in some such 
way as I propose than to Avork out any articulated 
system of constitutional changes. I should agree 



236 DEMOCRACY 

that, if the responsibility for electing all our of- 
ficers as at present, and leaving them with their 
present quantum of power and irresponsibility shall 
remain, the best process would be to adopt a univer- 
sal qualification for the suffrage. But with the sim- 
plification of the duties of the electorate involved 
in the election of only an appointing power and rep- 
resentative of the Lower Houses, and with the re- 
sponsibility of the executive and legislative and all 
subordinate administrative offices to the Court of 
Impeachment, I would conceive it a legitimate pro- 
tection to other classes, if not also a prudent prac- 
tical concession to existing prejudices, to limit the 
franchise in the manner proposed only for the Upper 
Houses and municipal executives. But in the argu- 
ment for a limitation of it I shall not assume uncon- 
ditionally the system of other changes that I have 
proposed, but adapt them to the general problem, 
though defining the qualification in terms of an in- 
come tax in both cases. If my system be practicable 
then I should defend a differentiation, otherwise a 
universal limitation of the franchise. 

The cry, of course, which will be raised against 
this form of restriction is that it is a property quali- 
fication, and hence a resort to an institution that 
has been tried and found wanting. But I have a 
frank reply to this charge which will consist of two 
assertions: First, I do not care if it is a property 
qualification. That fact would not make it any the 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 237 

worse for my estimation of it. In these socialistic 
times everything associated with property is sup- 
posed to be a Medusa head on which no political 
student and reformer can look and live. I for one 
am willing to accept the challenge which the ac- 
cusation implies. Second, I deny that it is such a 
qualification in any sense in which experience has 
represented that policy. This is apparent from the 
little noise made about the poll-tax limitation. 

In regard to the first of these contentions I do not 
know any fact which it is more important to keep 
in view, whatever we think of property qualifica- 
tions for the suffrage, than the fact that property 
ultimately rules civilisation, no matter how much 
we may endeavour to prevent it. It is bound to suc- 
ceed. When it cannot do it by constitutional and 
legitimate means, it will do it by unconstitutional 
and illegitimate means, and there is no way to pre- 
vent it. This is the experience of all history since 
society emerged from savagery. It is not because 
property represents mere brute power that it ac- 
complishes this result, but because it invariably 
joins superior intelligence to the fact of possession, 
though this superiority may be nothing more than 
the prudence which invests savings. Property is 
power, but it is power combined with intelligence, 
enterprise, and prudence, and if the laAV of evolu- 
tion be true at all, it represents the survival of the 
fittest, if not in each individual case judged accord- 



238 DEMOCRACY 

ing to the standard of morality usually in vogue 
certainly in the matter of economic prudence and 
intelligence. Consequently it is bound to rule by 
fair means or foul, wherever there is the struggle 
for existence and as long as nature favours superior 
intelligence, even if it be of no higher kind than 
economic thrift. It is useless to antagonise property 
in the abstract or as an institution: for whether 
ideal or not, it represents the power which foresight 
embodies against improvidence, and every effort to 
invest the non-propertied class with political power 
equal to that of the propertied class only succeeds 
in producing unconstitutional methods for evading 
its influence. Government of this kind is terribly 
expensive and demoralising. But it is less costly 
than anarchy, and obtains toleration in comparison 
with this condition. One of the worst evils that 
follow all attempts thus to suppress the influence, 
not to say the rights of property, is that it forces a 
combination of the moral class with the unscrupu- 
lous and anti-social rich for the protection of the 
very first condition of survival and civilisation, when 
the two ought to be divided. Attack property and a 
common interest arises between all property holders 
to let their differences in morality alone, and the 
unscrupulous rich will come to the helm because 
they can buy, frighten, or deceive the proletariat in- 
to granting them official power to further enrich 
themselves at the public expense. When property 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 239 

questions are not the issue the plutocrat and the 
politician have universal suffrage to use, one of 
them to threaten the rich with black-mail and 
the other to buy off the politician and the plebs 
in self-defence, and both to crush morality and 
intelligence in the operations of government. But 
if we should give property such a constitutional 
recognition as the limited suffrage implies, assum- 
ing that it is in reality such a recognition, we should 
divide the social from the anti-social rich in politics, 
eliminate the influence of the proletariat, and put 
the competition for political power within the prop- 
ertied class between those who respect morality in 
their methods and those who do not, with a reason- 
able chance that the former would carry the day as 
they cannot in the present regime. Consequently, 
I am not frightened by the ordinary objections to 
the property qualification. I shall return to this 
question again. 

The second reply to the accusation is that the lim- 
itation proposed is not a property qualification, as 
that has been construed in the past. In antiquity 
and until comparatively recent times land was the 
title to civil rights, and this gave the definition to 
property until the conception of real estate made it 
broader, so as to include houses and buildings of all 
sorts. The title to civil rights had to be some tangi- 
ble object easily identifiable, and when real estate 
came to be a source of revenue as well as land its 



240 DEMOCRACY 

ready identification put it on the same plane. But 
later civilisation had to extend the idea of property, 
as a social and political influence, to what is known 
as personal property, first chattels representing mov- 
able things and then stocks, bonds, bills of credit, 
and similar instruments. But the fluid nature of 
personal property in every form prevented it from 
being a safe criterion for civil rights of a special 
kind, and hence with the increase of the number of 
persons representing the second form of personal 
property mentioned, which consists of claims on the 
future production of land, the old qualifications had 
to be abandoned and either a tax substituted for it, 
or universal suffrage accepted as the alternative. A 
property qualification to-day, based upon land or 
real estate alone, would exclude, not only large num- 
bers of property holders, but also a very large class 
of intelligent persons who are equal or even superior 
to all others in the judicial qualities necessary for 
exercising the powers of government: (1) It would 
exclude all those who trade in chattel and manufact- 
ured goods. (2) It w^ould exclude all those who 
own and depend upon instruments of credit which 
bear income as well as real estate. (3) It would 
exclude large numbers of the professional classes 
who are at least equal to property owners in the 
moral qualifications for civil rights and duties. It 
was not land or real estate as such, but what it 
implied in antiquity that constituted the real quali- 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 241 

fication for citizenship and the franchise. This was 
prudence and intelligence with the social qualities 
involved and directed to ideals above physical satis- 
faction alone. Or if the satisfaction was only physi- 
cal it was above savagery. But these qualities to- 
day belong in a greater degree to the commercial 
and professional classes, commanding credit, on the 
one hand, and intelligence on the other, and in a 
less degree to those who depend upon rents. This 
is apparent in the comparison of the two classes of 
people. Land and real estate, when not used, one 
of them for exploiting nature by personal labour, and 
the other for the enjoyment of domestic life, but for 
the exploitation of others by rents which put the 
world's work upon one class and its leisure upon an- 
other, do not to-day favour the social type of mind 
upon which the best form of government must rest. 
This is well illustrated by the majority of the mem- 
bers of the English House of Lords of ancient stand- 
ing. There are few of the hereditary peers, whose 
claims are based upon estates, that show the social 
and intellectual qualities suitable to the moral direc- 
tion of modern government. As evidence of this 
notice the small number of peers that take part in 
the deliberations of the English Upper Chamber 
and the large number of them that is entitled to do 
so. They are largely a sporting class, enjoying the 
community's contribution to their leisure and per- 
forming no social duties in return. Those are the 



242 DEMOGRAOY 

really social classes who either exploit nature alone 
and live an independent domestic life, or lead that 
commercial life in which the quid 'pro quo is mutual 
services. The commercial and professional classes 
represent these conditions more distinctly than land- 
owners. IsTow it is the prudence and intelligence of 
the higher classes, with the social qualities that are 
encouraged by the principle of private contract in 
economic relations, that should constitute the title 
to citizenship and the exercise of the most important 
civic functions. The only question is, how to ob- 
tain a criterion for the most general possession of 
this qualification. As real estate or land will not do, 
with their loss of power to furnish social qualities, 
and as the broad definition of property, including 
even the whole range of personal possessions, will 
often exclude the professional classes who have 
every social quality to citizenship that property 
owners can have, and will also often be as indeter- 
minate a criterion as the educational test, the best 
tangible index of intelligence and moral or social 
qualities will be a tax on incomes, which the pro- 
fessional classes can bear as well as property holders. 
In thus admitting the professions to the limited elec- 
torate, we should check the power of those who 
merely live on rents, and prevent the frauds inci- 
dent to a property qualification to be defined by 
negotiable or transferrable values. That is to say, 
the income-tax would represent the widest range 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 243 

of intelligencej prudence, and moral or social quali- 
ties making for civilisation and against barbarism, 
thus enlarging the class that shall conduct the oper- 
ations of government. Moreover, the system could 
be made quite automatic, and by the size of the 
income taxed, or by the rate of tax imposed, to ap- 
proximate as nearly as possible to universal suffrage, 
giving encouragement to economic prudence as a 
condition for social and political privileges. On 
the other hand, the prejudice against taxes could 
be used for pushing the limitation as far up the 
scale as possible, in order that the egoistic tempera- 
ment might voluntarily relinquish his present politi- 
cal power for the economical. If it be desirable to 
call this restriction a property qualification, critics 
are at liberty to do so, but I should simply insist 
upon what I have already said about the history and 
meaning of that qualification in the past and that 
it imports something very different from that to 
which objection is made when interpreted in terms 
of landed property. By using an income-tax as 
the criterion in the case we obtain all the combined 
advantages of a property and an educational test 
for the suffrage, and add also to these a system com- 
pletely adjustable to the prejudices of the com- 
munity. 

But here again I am met with the old objection in 
a new form. It is that my test is economic, not moral. 
In the examination of this criticism I return to the 



244 DEMOCRACY 

function of property in civilisation. The accusa- 
tion, that a limitation of the suffrage by a tax in- 
stead of some educational criterion is economic, not 
moral, gets its cogency partly from the influence of 
Cliristianity which has exalted moral and spiritual 
ideals above the material, with a tendency to make 
the material and the economic coincide, and partly 
from the jealousy which the sentiment of equality 
has cultivated against social distinction created by 
mere wealth. The old opposition between spirit- 
ualism and materialism here comes to the front in 
political controversies, and idealism reluctantly 
yields, or resists to the death, any claims that are 
made for a superior value in material standards. 
But the prevalent distinction between moral and 
economic forces, a distinction that puts the moral 
at the basis of the higher and the economic at the 
basis of the lower civilisation, depends for its truth 
upon one or the other of the following two assump- 
tions: (1) That there is a complete and irreconcil- 
able antithesis between economic and moral stand- 
ards ; that is, that economic standards are not moral 
at all. (2) That the moral and intellectual test for 
citizenship which is supposed to be superior to the 
economic is equally determinate and more general. 
I deny both of these assumptions. I must therefore 
take up this objection and show again more fully 
what the " economic " criterion really represents in 
the way of virtues qualifying for civil rights and 
duties. 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 245 

Assuming that the economic test at least repre- 
sents property in the broad sense of the term, the 
question is whether it does or does not represent also 
at the same time a moral quality of any importance. 
]^o doubt there is a distinction between the moral 
and the economic in common parlance. But it is not 
one that involves any antithesis between them to the 
extent of saying that the economic is never moral. 
In so far as the economic represents material objects 
and values in exchange, and the moral certain other 
means of satisfaction not commercially exchangeable 
there is a difference. But this difference in the data 
which define the moral ideas beyond the sphere of the 
physical does not imply that morality of some kind 
is not coincident with the economic. It only makes 
the common conception of morality a little more 
comprehensive than that of economics. But even 
this difference is only in the number of objects com- 
prehended while the distinction of value is merely 
relative. In fact the economic is the moral at a cer- 
tain stage of its development, and is the absolute 
condition of all realisation of ends beyond the satis- 
faction of the physical appetites. In this way the 
economic impulse becomes an ethical fact of tran- 
scendent value, and would be appreciated as such 
were it not that the conception of morality tends to 
become identified with the objects which require 
strong social pressure to get them respected, while 
the economic impulses require nothing but the press- 



246 DEMOCRACY 

lire of natural appetite. But it is not the kind of 
pressure that is exerted upon the individual that de- 
termines the moral: it is the part which any volun- 
tary action whatsoever plays in the development and 
improvement of the agent's condition and character 
that constitutes morality. This makes the moral in- 
clude the economic. 

Property is the expression of the economic virtues 
which are indispensable to all forms of government, 
whether public or private, social or individual : that 
is, whether government of self, or government of 
others. Civilisation emerged from savagery and bar- 
barism only on the condition of private property. 
The intelligence that could extort from nature more 
than her spontaneous production of food, the capac- 
ity and willingness to work without social and politi- 
cal pressure, and the prudence that would provide 
for future wants and the responsibilities entailed by 
the family, were virtues of such a high order, com- 
pared with the savage condition, that the only se- 
curity for them, as well as justice to the individual 
for his labour, was the institution of private property. 
Hence it came to represent the existence of those 
qualities in men which are essential to survival and 
progress, and which give the possessor of them 
rights, rights by nature if that phrase be allowable, 
that indolence, improvidence, and ignorance cannot 
claim, especially when population begins to extend 
beyond what the spontaneous products of nature will 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 247 

support. Property is simply the reward of the man 
who will work to sustain either a higher ideal than 
nature alone will permit, or the population that 
spontaneous products cannot satisfy. Hence it is 
the index of the first and most important virtue that 
brings man out of savagery. This virtue compre- 
hends intelligence, prudence, and social habits if 
only within the limits of the family. ]^o matter 
whether property takes the form of real estate, per- 
sonal possessions, or incomes, it embodies these virt- 
ues in some degree and is entitled to that importance 
and recognition in social and political life that is 
commensurate with its influence upon human prog- 
ress. Power has to be placed somewhere in gov- 
ernment, and there are not two opinions as to the 
virtues that should represent it, though we delude 
ourselves with the idea that property is not an index 
of them and that universal suffrage as applied to-day 
excludes the undue influence of wealth. But the 
fact is that the franchise without qualification is so 
much power in the hands of those who do not possess 
the virtues which property represents, power to 
govern others when they have not the intelligence 
and prudence to govern themselves. This class is 
dominated by economic desires of the lower type 
and is at the mercy of all who show superior intelli- 
gence. Consequently, their political privileges only 
confer power without the ability to use it rightly 
even in behalf of their own interests, and enable any 



248 DEMOCRACY 

set of men, Avhen well organised, to play upon cupid- 
ity, prejudice, and envy for the power of public of- 
fice, wliicli is used in forms of corruption past all 
description. Our ruinously expensive government, 
shameful system of national taxation, black-mailing 
of individuals and corporations, and bribery at elec- 
tions and in the legislatures, show clearly enough 
that universal suffrage does not eliminate the in- 
fluence of wealth from politics, or produce the mil- 
lennium and paradise for any but scoundrels. In 
fact, our present system only puts wealth, or the 
power which it represents, into the hands of the un- 
scrupulous who can always use the proletariat for 
any irresponsible power that is wanted, and for 
plundering the community in some form, whether 
by taxation or black-mail. They have become so 
bold that they do not discuss the problems of govern- 
ment at all, but carry on their business with the au- 
dacity of pirates and the immunity of saints. Uni- 
versal suffrage is simply the useful instrument to 
this end, and the boasted policy which was to cure 
poverty and destroy the influence of wealth has only 
increased its power and handed government over to 
the anti-social classes, with a struggle between the 
anti-social rich to plunder everybody else and the 
anti-social poor to do the same. The proper limita- 
tion of the franchise would cut off the sources of the 
politician's influence over the proletariat and place 
the balance of power in the great middle class whose 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 249 

social and moral qualities are superior to tliose of the 
rich who buy the plebs with a mess of pottage or 
false promises in order to mulct society, and whose 
intelligence and prudence are superior to those of 
the proletariat. 

I do not hesitate to say that every form of govern- 
ment by the property classes is better than the mob 
rule which is government by the non-propertied 
classes and the logical consequence of the doctrine 
that the ballot is a natural right. Mob rule as I 
use the term here does not necessarily imply riot and 
insurrection. Mob rule exists when the ignorant 
and vicious classes select pirates and black-mailers 
for our governors, and make honesty and fidelity to 
the public impossible except at the expense of every- 
thing honourable men prize. Mob rule may make 
and then conform to bad laws because they are 
shaped partly to satisfy the sense of vanity and 
power in the masses, and partly to favour their eco- 
nomic and social interests at the expense of the com- 
munity. The property classes have never done any 
worse than this, and when they can keep the egoistic 
type of their own numbers out of political power they 
have always done better. This is true in spite of the 
fact that government by the property classes in the 
past is marked by conspicuous failures. But this re- 
sult was caused partly by the exclusion of intelligent 
classes equal or superior in social qualities to the 
owners of real property and hence by the undue 



250 DEMOCRACY 

amount of power in tlie liands of the latter, and 
mostly by tlie want of adequate means for making 
the executive responsible for the use of its political 
privileges. In the system which I have proposed 
the conditions exist which will keep the competition 
for political power wdthin the limits of the intelli- 
gent and prudent classes, enabling the more social 
elements of the community to prevail and prevent- 
ing the anti- social rich irom overriding the moral 
portion of society by purchasing or deceiving the 
anti-social poor. The flexibility of the test for citi- 
zenship, which I offer, concedes all that the most 
ardent antagonist of the old system which universal 
suffrage supplants can urge, while the inhibitive 
functions still left to the whole population, outside 
the jails and penitentiaries, in matters not pertain- 
ing to the interests which the poor do not and will 
not control, are all that the proletariat can legiti- 
mately claim in behalf of the individual. Intelli- 
gence, enterprise and prudence are qualities which 
natural selection and the struggle for existence have 
shown to have the right, as well as the power, to con- 
trol the destiny of history, and it only hinders and 
delays progress, or even produces ruin, to endow the 
opposite characteristics with the police power to con- 
vert economic forces into the channels of black-mail 
and various forms of illegitimate exploitation and 
evasions of just contribution to the world's necessary 
work. The artificial selection of politics should aid 



PRACTICAL BE ME DIES 251 

or imitate the natural selection of the cosmos. 
Otherwise the cosmos will have its ow^n way, with 
vengeance for neglect of its laws. Property is 
power, and unless the rewards go to the legitimate 
uses of this powder we shall be left with the brute and 
internecine struggle foi existence as the only re- 
source for intelligence and prudence to employ in 
their self-defence. For might will always win, and 
it will win against the more ideal right unless the 
latter, giving up sentiment, is shrewd enough to 
produce conditions in which it is the interest of mere 
power to respect the claims of conscience. The im- 
munities of political power should fall to the honest 
as well as the intelligent, and universal suffrage, 
especially in economic matters, only throws the bal- 
ance of power into the hands of those who do not 
know enough to use it in behalf of their own inter- 
ests and are not willing or social enough to use it in 
the service of the public: but becoming the dupes and 
prey of the politicians, keep on producing the Pan- 
demonium from which they profess a desire to es- 
cape. But we cannot expect good government from 
those who cannot govern themselves. '^ Self-indul- 
gence," says Mr. F. H. Wines, " on the part of the 
individual, if carried to excess, necessitates control 
ab extra. This extraneous control may be parental, 
monarchical, or legislative. The struggle between 
opposing forces for a greater or less measure of com- 
munal restraint assumes largely the form of a con- 



25!^ DEMOCRACY 

flict between the principles of individnalisni and 
collectivism in social organisation, tlie result of 
wliicli is to assure the individual so much personal 
freedom as he is capable of using to his own advan- 
tage and that of the community, but no more. Self- 
control is the condition of freedom, and the degree 
of growth in self-control is the standard of prog- 
ress/' * The whole philosophy of government is 
embodied in this statement, and unless the suffrage 
be based upon this principle democracy cannot suc- 
ceed in anything except the extension of freedom 
at the expense of morality and good government. 
Limit the franchise, therefore, in some such way 
as I have proposed, adjusting it as the social condi- 
tions require, if need be by a graduated income-tax, 
w^hicli may draw the line between those who are 
interested in social institutions and those who are 
not, and political power will not be controlled by 
the ignorant, improvident, and vicious, but will be 
held by those whom neither bribery nor deception 
can influence and who always stand as strong bar- 
riers against the two anti-social extremes of society, 
the conscienceless rich and tbe incompetent poor. 

An important reason for putting political power 
into the hands of the middle classes is the fact that 
they furnish the best combination of moral qualities 
for the purposes of evolution and progress. They 
supply the best quality of population and in propor- 
* Charities Review, Vol. VII., p. 721. 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 253 

tion to their abilities to support it. The plutocrats 
furnish prudence, but neither population nor social 
habits and instincts: the proletariat, who are the 
majority, furnish population, but neither prudence 
nor intelligence, and often no better social instincts 
than the rich. Good government depends as much 
upon social and moral qualities as upon the intel- 
lectual, and so should fall to the class that combines 
them. But if the anti-social classes, whether rich 
or poor, are free to secure, one of them the wealth 
and both of them the political power of society, the 
morality of the world will be ground to pieces be- 
tween them. ]^ow as all forms of government, ex- 
cept that of the referendum or pure democracy, rep- 
resent a very small majority, which by virtue of a 
constitution written or unwritten, has all the power 
to make the laws and to do the governing, their suc- 
cess depends wholly upon the wise and just use of 
that power. There is, therefore, no inherent objec- 
tions to the possession of political power by the few 
as such, but only to the machinery that makes this 
few anti-social. If then the franchise and political 
power be confined to the class with the largest por- 
tion of intellectual and moral qualities we should ex- 
pect in this policy, and in this alone, the best results 
of government. The only problem is to find an ade- 
quate criterion for the existence of these qualities, 
not necessarily in every individual, but in the class 
from which the selection for official functions is to 



254 DEMOCRACY 

be made. The virtues that produce property and 
support the family and other social institutions are 
this criterion, and an income-tax is the best method 
for showing the widest distribution of them. 

The distinction between the right to exercise 
political power in governing others and the right to 
liberty in the regulation of one's own conduct, which 
has already been mentioned, has an important bear- 
ing upon the problem of the franchise. The dis- 
tinction cannot be too strongly insisted upon in this 
connection, since it has either not been recognised 
at all or has been ignored too much by political stu- 
dents. It is natural that it should be forgotten when 
we come to consider both the way that history is 
usually made and the mental laws that influence 
the application of general ideas. When we examine 
political history closely we shall discover that its 
struggles have a double aspect. This has been vir- 
tually hinted at in showing that resistance to any 
given government usually takes the form of a trans- 
fer of power rather than a mere modification of leg- 
islation. When nations undertook to secure exemp- 
tion from offensive laws they transferred sovereignty 
from the king to the subjects. Government had so 
often interfered with personal liberties in private 
matters, thus transgressing the police functions of 
political institutions and exploiting the citizen, that 
the only cure for the evil seemed to be a privation 
of power. But this was effected by a transfer of it. 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 255 

or of the sovereignty adhering in the state, to the 
citizen with all the political influence that it implies. 
It may have been necessary, owing to social and 
other conditions, that political power, the right to 
exercise the functions of government, should be 
conferred in order to secure personal liberties and 
exemption from, oppressive legislation. But an ex- 
pedient necessary to secure an immediate and impor- 
tant end does not carry with it the same imperative- 
ness for all conditions of life. It is possible to draw 
a line between the range of political and the range 
of personal rights, as is already done in some cases. 
But however important it may seem to many politi- 
cal students that the defence of individual rights 
should be placed in the possession of civil and politi- 
cal rights, it is certain that republican institutions, 
or representative governments, do not treat political 
and personal rights and liberties as convertible either 
in their character or their extent. The fundamental 
assumption of representative government is that the 
ruler is better qualified to exercise political power 
than the citizen. If this is not true the referendum 
is the only condition in which the ordinary theory 
of the relation between political rights and the de- 
fence of private and personal liberties can be main- 
tained. Either our present institutions are wrong 
or the referendum is so according to the common 
standard. If the referendum is a redudio ad ah- 
surdum of government, the distinction which pres- 



356 DEMOCRACY 

ent institutions imply between civil and personal 
liberties must be the one upon which to base the 
practical operations of government. 

But aside from this ad hominem argument the 
case can be stated more effectively in the clear fact 
that the right to freedom in the regulation of one's 
own personal matters does not involve the right to 
govern or regulate the liberties of others. Some 
measure of political or civil rights may be necessary 
to protect private liberties, but there is no absolute 
necessity that they should involve as much power to 
govern others as the present system confers. The 
proposition in this work to separate somewhat 
the functions of Upper and Lower Houses, to limit 
the number of elective officers, and to strengthen the 
executive, is based upon the distinction here assumed 
and asserted between political and personal liberties, 
while it yields the protection of personal rights by 
the possession of the civil to that extent, but re- 
stricts the liberty to exercise government functions 
over others. The limitation of the franchise also 
as here proposed is based upon the same function in 
so far as governing power is concerned. But I do 
not desire self -consistency to be any argument for 
a limitation of the suffrage. I make the appeal only 
to throw the case theoretically back upon the prin- 
ciple itself, and if it can be seen to be certainly true 
the issue is won. 'Now in private life and conduct 
affecting only the welfare of the individual himself 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 257 

there can be a very wide range of liberty, and the 
individual can have as many rights as you please to 
conceive. As society and government are consti- 
tuted we can rely u]3on the demand that his social 
and commercial relations with others shall be sub- 
ject to the conditions of private contract. This con- 
dition establishes a limitation upon both parties to 
social intercourse, or mutual responsibility, in which 
the only inequality between the two shall be the nat- 
ural one determined by the struggle for existence. 
But it is not so with political rights which confer 
the functions of government upon the citizen. They 
add police powers to personal liberty, and in the 
present system which does not adequately recognise 
executive responsibility the conferment of power to 
govern without a check similar in effectiveness to 
the principle of private contract in personal matters 
only applies in government the irresponsibility 
against which in the doctrine of Hobbes and abso- 
lutism democracy was a revolt. The opposition to 
irresponsible imperialism was based upon just this 
complaint that it involved no limitation upon gov- 
erning powers similar to the principle of private con- 
tract in individual life, but added the power of the 
police to personal immunity in the exercise of gov- 
ernment over others. The reaction against this ideal 
of government has simply carried this conception of 
power and immunity over to the citizen, instead of 
establishing the proper responsibility of the rulers 



258 DEMOCRACY 

and securing a criterion to distinguish between those 
wlio are qualified to govern others and those who 
may be free to govern themselves. The limitation 
of the franchise which is here proposed is an at- 
tempt to supply such a criterion, and if it eliminates 
the ignorant and anti-social classes so as to qualify 
the right to political power by social character it 
effects the desired end and conforms to the distinc- 
tion between political and personal liberty, or to put 
it otherwise, the distinction between the right to 
govern others and the right to govern one's self. We 
talk about democracy being self-government. It is 
nothing of the kind, unless there is no police agen- 
cies at all and the referendum is the only source of 
all legislation. Democracy, as it is applied in this 
and all other countries, involves, to consider it from 
the stand-point of universal suffrage, the government 
of the prudent, the intelligent, the property and the 
social classes by the imprudent, the ignorant, the 
non-propertied and the anti-social classes; and to 
speak of it from the stand-point of constitutional 
methods it involves, theoretically at least, the ex- 
clusion of the right to directly govern others from 
the masses and the limitation of it to those who are 
presumably best qualified for such duties. 

That the right to govern self and the right to 
govern others are not convertible or coincident can 
be sustained in another way which will bring out 
the incompatibility of socialism with democracy. 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 259 

In economic, social and political conditions where 
industry is not highly concentrated; where com- 
munities and individuals are more independent of 
each other in their interests than in modern times; 
where this independence affords an adequate 
check upon the abuses of political power; where 
the exercise of government functions can be 
tyrannical only when it interferes with personal 
rights and liberties, it is natural and legitimate 
enough to link the protection of the latter with the 
possession of the former. But in a social system 
where industry is highly organised and concen- 
trated, so as to represent a vast number of imperia 
in imperio; where social and economic solidarity is 
widely distributed, connecting places like 'New 
York, San Francisco, London, and Calcutta more 
closely than ever were Athens and Sparta; where 
government interference and action either affects 
social interests more than those of the individual or 
compensates the infringement of personal rights in 
individual cases by some equivalent benefit to 
others; where, consequently, there are no adequate 
checks upon abuses of political power, the majority 
being able to exploit the minority with impunity; 
where political power is sought, not for adjusting 
the competition between individuals upon the prin- 
ciples of justice, but for the opportunities which it 
affords to escape the individual struggle for exist- 
ence by sharing in the exploitation of others; and 



260 DEMOCRACY 

where pro23er government can be secured only by the 
social as opposed to the individualistic moral tern 
perament — in these conditions we have to establish 
some criterion for distinguishing between social or 
political and personal liberties. E'othing but a 
limited franchise will accomplish this unless men 
are made intellectually and morally equal. Assum- 
ing, then, that economic prudence is the most gen- 
eral index of the intelligence and moral character 
which the social man possesses, we have in some such 
proposal as I have advanced a measure of a nec- 
essary political reform. The socialist cannot escape 
this view of the case. He pleads in behalf of his 
system the solidarity of economic interests on the 
one hand and the tyranny of individualistic govern- 
ment on the other, while clinging to a democratic 
suffrage which provides the very government invok- 
ing his hostility. He would immensely enlarge the 
functions of government and the range of its benev- 
olence, though suggesting nothing to secure the 
agents who respect the socialistic ideal. But the 
socialistic ruler must be the social man, while our 
present system only gives us the anti-social man for 
governor. Hence the socialist must choose between 
the limitation of the franchise and the failure of his 
system. 

As a further reason for limiting the suffrage to the 
more intelligent classes, at least in the matter of the 
more important functions of government, I may call 



PE ACTIO AL REMEDIES 261 

attention to the revolution which has taken place 
in modern ethical ideals, a revolution that has oc- 
curred only in the last generation. The conscious- 
ness of this change is not so general as might be ex- 
pected. Those who were educated and lived under 
the ideals of the past generation still show a fixed 
disposition to judge the present age by the standards 
of one that has vanished. This conflict between the 
old and the new ideal is a most interesting object of 
observation and reflection. The old ideal had its 
origin in Christianity, the new one in the doctrine 
of evolution. I have already remarked more than 
once the influence of the belief in immortality in 
creating a consciousness of the value of the individ- 
ual. It was associated with and reinforced by the 
social ideal of human brotherhood, which grew into 
the sentiment of equality. The whole mediaeval 
and modem system of benevolence embodies this 
ideal and petrified it into a generous sympathy for 
the weaker classes. The Church fostered and still 
fosters it. Liberty, equality and fraternity are the 
shibboleths of this comprehensive conception. It 
was this sentiment alone that overthrew slavery in 
this country and intensified the momentum as it pre- 
served the consistency of democratic impulses: for 
it turned the balance of judgment and purpose in 
the logical conflict between the constitutional prin- 
ciples in favour of freedom and the disposition of 
the aristocratic to use force with the weaken mem- 



263 DEMOCRACY 

bers of the race in commercial dealings with them. 
For eighteen hundred years, in so far as it could free 
itself from the dominion of imperialism which was 
the survival of the Greco-Roman polity of might 
against right, of power against weakness, the whole 
machinery of civilisation was directed to protect the 
rights and interests, not only of the individual, but 
of the inferior classes. Society represented and was 
pervaded by a divine-like mercy toward the unfortu- 
nate, even though it was dictated by the prudential 
motive of personal salvation. While the primary 
virtue of antiquity was courage, that of later times 
was benevolence. But this beautiful idyllic dream 
of Christianity was ruthlessly shattered by the con- 
quests of scepticism and physical science. First 
came Copernican astronomy, then l^ewtonian gravi- 
tation, and lastly Darwinian evolution. The first 
of these conceptions removed the last vestiges of that 
belief, originally Greek and partly Christian, which 
had spiritualised the whole celestial system: the 
second extended natural and mechanical causes into 
the structure and formation of a universe made 
physical by Copernicus ; and the last left us with the 
struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, 
the sole right of the strong, for our ethical norm in 
so far as it was reflected in the course of the physical 
universe, l^ature, which had been the poet's type 
of paradisaic beauty and happiness, was turned into 
the shambles of omnipotence. The golden age 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 263 

wliicli had been A^ariously placed beliind and before 
the human race vanished into the limbo of fancy and 
mythology, while the awful spectacle of evolution 
gave no lustre to the speculations of either history 
or hope. It is this conception which has done so 
much destructive work against the moral ideal of 
Christianity and substituted the right of the strong 
for the ideas of equality and fraternity, until there 
is little respect for the principles which had de- 
veloped and sustained a policy of both justice and 
benevolence toward the weaker classes. This is 
evinced by a large number of facts, connected, some 
of them at least, with other and co-operative influ- 
ences at the same time. For instance, the reaction- 
ary policy of the Republican party in its indifference 
to the constitutional rights of the negro, the mad 
progress of ^imperialism'' in which inferior races are 
to be exploited for the benefit of the commercial 
classes, the growth of lynch law, and such action as 
that of the present Governor of Illinois in his direct 
infraction of the constitution of the United States 
without protest or interference from an indifferent 
and pusillanimous public — all these and a thousand 
other facts show what havoc has been made of the 
old ethical ideal by the fundamental conception of 
evolution, which has not received any general cor- 
rection by the famous concession of Mr. Huxley in 
his Romanes lecture. What modification of it the 
future may have in store it is not necessary to con- 



264 DEMOCRACY 

sider here, as we have only to remark at least its 
temporary opposition to the moral ideal of the dem- 
ocratic past. 

I^ow if the doctrine of evolution is to hand ns over 
to institutions that are to embody the rights of the 
strong against the weak, the supremacy of the 
'' higher " over the '' lower "classes, we must have 
some method of making " higher " mean moral as 
well as strong. We do not discover this influence 
in the ignorant and vicious classes who seem to be 
the predominant factors in the exercise of the suf- 
frage and in stimulating the spirit of imperialism. 
They prefer gambling dens, brothels, saloons, horse- 
racing and prize fighting to pure politics, and are 
ever ready to cultivate a martial spirit when the 
politician manufactures some foreign complications 
for his subterranean purposes. This class cannot be 
entrusted with the balance of power in any imperial 
policy. If we are to have that system we must con- 
trive a method of joining social instincts and inter- 
ests to power. Otherwise we shall be governed by 
ITeros and Caligulas. 

In fixing upon a qualification for the franchise it 
is always necessary to choose a perfectly simple cri- 
terion, capable of application or determination b^ 
the subject of the right and not by a foreign power, 
one which philosophy would call an objective test. 
The intellectual and moral qualification is the one 
constantly spoken of as the best by all who cannot 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 265 

persuade themselves to accept a property qualifica- 
tion, and this is unquestionably true, as already re- 
marked. But what is the evidence of its posses- 
sion? ^Ro one will trust a court to decide the mat- 
ter, while the economic test can be made quite au- 
tomatic, and as I have shown the economic criterion 
is a moral one, or the symbol of it. But whether 
the qualification be intellectual and moral, or eco- 
nomic, it must fulfil three conditions in order to be 
successful as a qualification for the suffrage: (1) It 
must be general enough to support the beneficiaries 
of political power with sufficient physical force to 
sustain the law. (2) It must be a primary condition 
for survival in the struggle for existence. (3) It 
should be an external fact patent to all and equiva- 
lent to the services which society renders the indi- 
vidual. The economic qualification fulfils all three 
of these conditions, while the intellectual and moral 
test without it violates either the second or the 
third, or both conditions, and in addition limits in- 
dividual liberty to a greater extent in the acquisition 
of the right by leaving it in the hands of a court. 
Moreover, the economic test is the easiest applied, 
is sufficiently elastic to approximate universal suf- 
frage, if desirable, which I think it is not, and can 
be made to reach the material conditions of society 
which are the first demands to be satisfied in the 
support of population before any other ideals are 
possible. It is the index of the one virtue ; namely, 



266 DEMOCRACT 

prudence, which, though it does not always insure 
the cultivation of higher ideals than wealth, never- 
theless is the necessary condition of their possibility 
and of the opportunity to pursue them. This gives 
it the highest value as a political instrument, and 
when it promises at the same time to secure the in- 
telligence which is commensiu'ate with the demands 
of good government, we ought not to be frightened 
at the politician's cry that it is dangerous to limit 
the suffrage. He has his reasons for this fear. With 
his peculiar notions of what is practical in politics, 
which is to let civilisation go to the dogs while the 
proletariat learns to behave itself, he can never rise 
to the dignity or honesty of educating the masses to 
a method that is best adapted to their interests, but 
knows only how to lick the dust off their feet while 
he secures the power to rob them. The sooner that 
we ]eam that the so-called ^^ practical " politician is 
either a fool or a knave, or both, the better for us, 
and when we have learned it we shall place some con- 
fidence in the scientific truth about politics and 
cease to fawn upon our masters for the sake of sav- 
ing a small remnant of civilisation from wreck and 
ruin. The privileges of government are very dubi- 
ous when sycophants are the kings and the favour of 
mobs is the title to power. 

Before indicating what I assume to be the ad- 
vantages of the scheme as a whole, as outlined above 
with its differentiated franchise, I must anticipate a 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 267 

question which many political students will ask with 
a view to insinuating that I have not considered and 
provided against the worst evil in modern political 
life. The question is this: A^Tiat means have you 
to suggest for nullifying or destroying the power 
and influence of the '^ boss '' and ^^ machine? " I 
admit frankly and without reserve the extreme im- 
portance of this question, especially as it relates 
to the one objective point which occupies almost the 
whole attention of political students. 

In answering this question I have only to say that 
I have had this very evil in view when proposing 
the comprehensive system that I have outlined. 
But I did not assume that the end was to be di- 
rectly attained, or that the theory of government 
involved nothing but a discussion of " bosses." I 
had also a constructive purpose in view that went to 
the foundations of every form of successful polity. 
Once obtain a method for good government that will 
put the balance of power in the intelligent and moral 
classes, and there will be neither excuse nor op- 
portunity for the existence of " bosses " and ^^ ma- 
chines.'' There are just two of the provisions of 
the proposed modifications of our constitution that 
wdll tell directly against " boss " government. They 
are: (1) The Court of Impeachment and Removal, 
which applies responsibility to public officials in a 
way that makes ^^ boss " and " machine " control 
of them impossible. (2) The limitation of the 



268 DEMOCRACY 

f rancliise for tlie election of the Upper Houses tliat 
sliall have control of all appropriations and expendi- 
tures and public improvements, the one source of 
the '^ bosses' " power and ambition. These are 
strong checks against them. 

I cannot go into any elaborate study of machine 
politics, but I may look at the surface of them 
briefly and examine a few of the general causes for 
their existence. The defence of the ^' machine " 
and its " boss/' whether he shall be called by so 
disreputable a name or not depending upon his 
conduct and character, is that some such compact 
organisation is necessary in our present political con- 
ditions in order to secure efficiency in the manage- 
ment of elections and the various duties connected 
with them. This is true. But it does not represent 
the real motive for its organisation. It is not the 
compactness of the machine and its organisation, nor 
the imperious nature of its conduct and power that 
gives the system its bad name and associations. ]^o 
one would object to it in the interests of justice and 
good government. It is the insolent disregard of 
public welfare, the deliberate exclusion of intelli- 
gent and honest men from office, the refusal to rea- 
son about public policy, the shameless corruption 
of its leaders, its organised methods of deception, 
bribery, and black-mail with public jobbery and 
frauds upon the tax-payers, that make machine poli- 
tics so despicable in the estimation of the public 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 269 

conscience. This authority in the right hands 
would be a blessing. Hence the need of organisa- 
tion is neither an explanation nor an apology for 
" bosses " and ^' machines." They arise from con- 
ditions that have a long and complex history, and 
that involve both the general supremacy of the eco- 
nomic ideal in modern life and the special social de- 
velopment that this ideal has received in this coun- 
try. Nowhere in the world have there been such 
golden opportunities for the pursuit of wealth as in 
this continent. The enterprising of the old world 
emigrated hither and having cut loose from the so- 
cial, intellectual, aesthetic, and moral ideals of Eu- 
rope, had but one object to attain and one ambition 
to satisfy. This was the accumulation of wealth, or 
the satisfaction of the economic ideal. On the other 
hand, the absorption of one class in this pursuit, so 
that it will take no part in politics, and the possession 
of the franchise by the proletariat who have votes 
to sell at some price, enabled the shrewd politician 
to come between and to use the poor with their eco- 
nomic aspiration to plunder the rich. Hence it is 
the opportunity and desire for public pelf, directly 
or indirectly, and for gratifying personal ambition 
without reference to public service, that are the 
most potent influences in the formation and cohesive- 
ness of the '^ machine." The slightest real interest 
in the public would either create diiferences of opin- 
ion regarding the policy best adapted to this end, 



270 DEMOCRACY 

or in unifying the agency, when differences do not 
exist, for a good purpose and no outcry would be 
raised against it. But the single purpose that ani- 
mates the average politician is the same that inspires 
the beggar or the thief. Either he has failed for 
want of ability of an honest kind in legitimate meth- 
ods of business and in competition with his fellows, 
and seeks a public salary with freedom to indulge 
his natural indolence, or he uses his ingenuity and 
abilities to secure the irresponsible power to plunder 
the public with impunity. 

These being the causes that produce " bosses " 
and ^^ machines,'' it ought to be apparent how they 
will be affected by the comprehensive scheme that 
I have proposed. But I shall summarise the forces 
that should act as deterrents of machine politics. 
(1) The adoption of civil service reform; or per- 
manent official tenure in the subordinate service, 
subject to good behavior, which will limit the power 
of spoils to corrupt public life. (2) The extension 
of the executive's appointing power which will make 
him more independent of the " machine " in the di- 
rection of his policy, while it makes him more sensi- 
tive to public opinion and his responsibilities. (3) 
The subjection of the executive, legislative, and all 
administrative officers to the Court of Impeachment 
and Removal and its absolute powers of discipline 
and purgation. (4) The influence of the Court of 
Confirmation in limiting the appointing power of 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 271 

the executive. (5) The removal of the control by 
universal suffrage over public appropriations and 
improvements, so that property interests will not be 
at the mercy of those who are disposed to prey upon 
them without a return of equivalent services. 

These conditions would exercise a very powerful 
influence against machine politics, and if we wished 
to strengthen them we might entertain the propo- 
sition to subject campaign committees and candi-. 
dates for office to the Court of Impeachment. But 
1 hardly think this necessary with the restraints 
already indicated, especially if a public accounting 
of all campaign expenses, individual and collective, 
be required. There is, however, another feature 
of the existing system which I have not noticed and 
which occupies the attention of political students al- 
most as much as any other weakness in it. This is 
the primary election. It is in the primary that our 
government is really determined. It is here that 
the '' boss '' and the " machine " get in their work; 
it fixes the candidates which the " boss '' expects to 
use for his purposes. The public can work up no 
interest in the primaries, because it assumes with- 
out the slightest intelligence regarding the real 
genius of our institutions that the policy of authori- 
ties is determined by the regular elections, when 
in fact both the men and the policy are determined 
by the underground methods of the primary, large 
numbers of the citizens taking no part in them be- 



273 DEMOCRACY 

cause they have not been made to feel its impor- 
tance as they do the constitutional, or compulsory 
method of the law. Consequently, those who make 
their living by politics control public office at its 
foundations by putting the voter between the devil 
and the deep sea in the regular elections. Hitherto 
I have said nothing of this system, and have pro- 
posed no means for correcting it. Most persons 
would say that it is here that the reform must be- 
gin. But I should contend that the system which 
I have proposed, in destroying the chief resources 
of the '^ boss's " expectations and power, must 
take away his interest in the primaries. If he 
cannot make his henchmen responsible to him- 
self when in office, and if he cannot use universal 
suffrage as capital for purchasing the power to prey 
upon property, his vocation is gone. But as uni- 
versal suffrage is still to remain for the selection 
of the Lower Houses and the legislatures, I would 
suggest the following regulation of the primary 
election system. This is to conduct the primaries 
precisely as the regular elections are conducted 
under the so-called Australian system. The main 
practical difficulty with the present system is the 
fact that a man has to declare his party affiliations 
before he can enroll for the primary and to promise 
to support the ticket nominated. It is often against 
his business interests to make these preferences 
known in this way. Hence only those who have 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 273 

notldiig to lose and those who make politics a 
business are willing to accept publicity in their 
party aflS.liations. But the plan of putting the pri- 
maries under the law and conducting them in the 
same way that the regular elections are managed, 
if the ballots ivithin the party lines are counted 
against each other, and not against hallots hy other 
parties, the following conditions could easily be ful- 
filled: (1) The use of the same registry of the 
voters as is used in the regular elections. (2) The 
omission of all declarations of party preferences and 
promises to support a particular party. (3) The 
casting of a single ballot, so that the choice is def- 
initely for one and against all other candidates for 
nomination. (4) The secrecy of the ballot. (5) 
That the candidate nominated by any party shall 
represent a certain percentage of all the votes cast 
by that party. 

I do not decide in these provisions whether the 
nominations thus made shall be of the candidates for 
office, or of the members of the conventions that 
shall make the nominations. I am willing to leave 
the decision of this question to others, though I think 
I would prefer that the members of the convention 
should be elected in this way. The main point is 
to secure more respectable methods for the prima- 
ries, and a way out of the difficulty encountered in 
the reluctance of voters to declare publicly their 
party affiliations and to pledge themselves to sup- 



274 DEMOCRACY 

port this party's nominee whoever he may be. 
There are other and corollary questions to be con- 
sidered in the perfection of this method, but they 
are subsidiary and unimportant in comparison with 
the main problem. 

The last provision in the system I have proposed 
has to be considered. It is the appointment instead 
of the election of all judiciary incumbents. Both 
theory and experience are in favour of this policy, 
and I shall not undertake to argue it at any great 
length. If there is any general scepticism on this 
point, I have only one fact to mention, and it is the 
superiority of all courts in which the judges are 
appointed as compared with those in which they 
are elected by popular vote. Long tenure is also 
an important factor in this result. But of this again. 
The main issue at present is the method of securing 
judges fit to do the work required of them, and ex- 
perience has shown that appointments to the judi- 
ciary by the executive have uniformly been better 
than the popular election of them, this judgment 
perhaps being modified somewhat by the influence 
of long tenure in cases of elective appointment. 
But other things being equal judicial appointments 
are superior to their election. The reason for this is 
clear. If elected by popular vote the position is 
put at the mercy of men who are not qualified to 
decide upon fitness for judicial duties, but at most 
only of personal qualities which have no necessary 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 2'7b 

connection with the ability and readiness to dis- 
pense justice. On the contrary, those quahties are 
more likely to exclude the historical characteristics 
that attach in the public's estimation to a judge. 
Judicial positions require a wholly different talent 
from that of the electioneering politician; and if 
they require anything different at all these qualities 
will be the very opposite to those in the bidder for 
votes. The politician must be a hail-fellow-well- 
met sort of a man, suave, courteous even to people 
he despises, and capable of promising everything to 
every man he sees. The judge between man and 
man must possess the characteristics which have 
made the world describe justice as cold and impar- 
tial. These qualities do not fit a man for conciliat- 
ing the passions and prejudices of the populace, and 
the man who has them, with the sense of honour 
and conscientiousness that belongs to them, is not 
likely to meet with favour in comparison with the 
sharp campaigner who can tell funny stories and in- 
dulge in familiarities of all kinds with his constitu- 
ency, while he secretly despises them and expects 
to mulct them when he can. ^or can the argument 
that my system permits the election of the executive 
by the popular vote apply to the judiciary, because 
the two offices are wholly distinct in their nature. 
Judges have to interpret the law without regard to 
the interests of either side to a controversy, and to 
consider the complicated problems of evidence. 



276 DEMOCRACY 

which requires a scientific order of mind as well as 
freedom from passion and interest: the executive 
requires tact and sympathy with all persons with 
whom he deals in the administration of the law. 
Popular personality has a real value in the exercise 
of this function, as it disposes less to tyrannical ad- 
ministration. But I do not require abstract argu- 
ment to make the case clear. The Supreme Court 
of the United States is a conclusive illustration of 
my contention. Moreover in conversation with one 
of the chief authorities on constitutional law in this 
country I was told by him that my proposition is one 
of the first and most important reforms that the im- 
mediate future should consider. He had noticed 
that the courts had deteriorated with the degenera- 
tion from the former policy of appointment of 
judges that had prevailed in some states to their 
election by popular vote. 

In regard to tenure it is quite as important as ex- 
ecutive appointment that the judicial tenure of 
ofiice should be long in order to secure the men best 
qualified for its duties. Men of ability and with 
high ideals will not engage in any vocation that has 
the precariousness of a political career in the present 
system: nor will they do it in any order of things 
that necessitates uncertainty and anything like shif t- 
lessness. This is a truism in trade, in medicine, in 
law, in teaching, or in any other profession. Hence 
men who have made a success in the legal profession 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 2Ti 

are not going to sacrifice their practice and clientage 
for the sake of two or three years of judicial honours 
and loAv pay to be left afterward without any re- 
sources except the chance to build up a new practice, 
especially when the office has to be obtained by 
methods that are a prostitution of honour, dignity, 
and the qualities which are necessary to the dispen- 
sation of justice. Consequently, only nondescripts 
can be secured to-day for the minor judicial places. 
To improve the courts, therefore, the policy in some 
states during recent years, ^ew York State for in- 
stance, has been to fix a long tenure for the most 
important judicial positions like the Supreme Court. 
The consequence has been that it secures better men 
than under the old system. But in addition to long 
tenure we should have their appointment instead of 
their election, and all our courts might have the 
character that justice has given them in England 
and the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court in this country. 

There is also a modification of our methods of 
amending constitution desirable, if we are to leave 
universal suffrage intact. But as the system pro- 
posed makes this less imperative no great impor- 
tance will be attached to the problem, except to 
show where the defects of our present system are in 
this respect. A constitution is supposed to define 
the powers and rights of the various departments of 
government, the executive, legislative, and judicial, 



378 DEMOCRACY 

with their limitations. ISTow it is essentially absurd 
to leave, as our present method does, the duty to 
suggest and prepare amendments and changes of 
this fundamental law. With a tendency to obtain 
and use all the powers that they can secure, it can- 
not be expected that such bodies will be much in- 
terested in the imposition of limits upon its powers. 
It is in its very nature absurd to leave the suggestion 
and organisation of constitutional reforms and 
changes to the initiative of the executive and leg- 
islative branches of government. They are the 
parties to be governed by such instruments. A 
special body of men should be provided for this pur- 
pose independent of the directly governing agen- 
cies. This could be done without any political com- 
plications and without any expense to the state. 
But with the thorough responsibility of public of- 
ficials I imagine that there would be little reason to 
be tampering with the fundamental law as at pres- 
ent. The constant demand which we see on the part 
of citizens for constitutional amendments is only 
a further proof that our institutions are a failure, 
and that we have no adequate means for making 
public men responsible, or respectful of the service 
of the community. Establish their responsibility 
and we should need constitutional tampering as lit- 
tle as in England. 

Such would be my reply to Mr. Lecky: not by 
denying the justice of his complaints against the 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 279 

work of democracy, nor by defending its present 
form as the final stage of evolution/ but by admit- 
ting its many faitees and proposing the means of 
differentiating and integrating its functions, so that 
we may obtain the strength and conservatism of 
monarchy without the irresponsibility of its power, 
and the wider distribution of justice and liberty in 
democracy without its anarchy. Monarchy, or a re- 
turn to mediaeval types of government, is possessed 
of two ineradicable evils: (1) There is the per- 
manent tenure of executive power with little or no 
responsibility to either the people or any other con- 
stitutional check. This permanence of tenure with- 
out responsibility tends to aristocratic tastes and 
habits, nepotism in appointments, and indifference 
to human rights and justice. Some of these evils 
are the characteristics of the incumbents of political 
power in any form of government, but are more 
easily corrected in democracy than in monarchy, 
because, as in the scheme outlined above, per- 
manence of tenure does not belong to appointing or 
executive power, in fact, to no one at all except on 
condition that the interests of the public are main- 
tained by it. Even permanence of tenure is offered 
only to administrative subordinates (with responsi- 
bility to the Court of Impeachment), to the Su- 
preme Court, and the Court of Impeachment, all 
of which are non-executive offices and without 
powers of appointment. That it is the permanence 



280 DEMOCRACY 

of tenure with exemption from responsibility tliat 
creates the main evils of government is shown posi- 
tively by the career of the present emperor of Ger- 
many, by the history of Russia, and in our own 
country by the irresponsibility of the " boss," and 
negatively in England by the crown's relinquish- 
ment of many of its functions, especially of its chief 
executive duties. (2) There is in hereditary mon- 
archy, with its usual family life, connections, pri- 
vate habits, and social limitations generally, a 
tendency to the physical, intellectual, and moral 
degeneration of types that are to be the legatees of 
political power. Not that this tendency cannot be 
overcome, nor that recuperative influences are not at 
work to prevent the worst consequences : for family 
ambitions, personal interests in social honours and 
attentions, and a wholesome fear of revolution 
operate to check the worst form of degeneration in 
so far as dynastic questions are concerned. But the 
traditions of blood, the preservation of aristocratic 
dignity, and the antagonism to democracy require 
a vigilant exclusion of anything like an infusion of 
democratic blood and tastes into its veins. The worst 
effect of this is the moral one, in that both the ex- 
emption from responsibility and the withdrawal 
from common life, with its social commerce, create 
an intense selfishness and an utter inability to ap- 
preciate the demands of justice. Consequently, 
monarchy prevents us at all times from having the 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 281 

intelligence and moral character, born of the strug- 
gle for existence and social ideals of the middle 
classes, that are necessary to meet large responsibili- 
ties, and democracy is only an attempt to secure 
these qualities and to evade the evils of despotic 
government, though, as in our own case, it may eas- 
ily be nothing more than rushing from the frying- 
pan into the fire, as any retention of irresponsibility 
in governing powers must occasion. 

But in forbidding permanence of tenure for ex- 
ecutive functionaries in order to escape the evils of 
monarchy, we require either to have a satisfactory 
method of electing men to such places who can be 
trusted with the irresponsible powers that such po- 
sitions demand, or to deprive them of these powers 
and put them into the hands of the legislatures, or 
to make the executive responsible, lea\dng it with 
its large powers to direct the government. With 
the proper arrangements this last can be done. 
Monarchy is right in its conception of the power 
which it confers upon the central function of govern- 
ment, as is shown by its efficiency wherever pos- 
sessed, a fact also proved by the efficiency, if not 
the virtues, of machine politics, and it has only been 
a misfortune that this power had not been earlier 
separated from irresponsibility and permanence of 
executive tenure. But in abandoning monarchy 
and an irresponsible executive to hand their power 
over to the organised mob of our legislatures, the 



363 DEMOCRACY 

subterranean methods of legislative committees, the 
" scratch-me-and-I'll-scratch-you " policy of repre- 
sentatives with its refusal to serve the public except 
on the condition that personal interests are first fully 
subserved, the bribery, black-mail, and lobbying of 
legislators, the petty rivalries of politicians, machine 
politics, and the anarchic mode of selecting our of- 
ficers, are the penalty we pay for our unwillingness 
to simplify government by a better imitation of the 
development which has gone on in the system of 
industrial organisation, where integration and differ- 
entiation have occurred automatically and in re- 
sponse to the needs and interests of economic pro- 
duction and distribution. The whole process of nat- 
ural development inclines to put the larger powers 
in the hands of single agents, the check in the eco- 
nomic world being competition as well as honesty 
where the interests are complicated. Competition 
is an inhibitive process on the abuses of centralised 
power, whether in government or private enterprise, 
and if no political machinery can be obtained either 
to supply some form of competition within the social 
organism, or its alternative, honesty and public spirit, 
these being its only substitutes where competition 
and responsibility cannot be secured, the jealousy of 
strong executive powers will keep us in the direction 
of anarchy, because of that solidarity in the socio- 
economic system which makes irresponsible power 
so dangerous, and we shall have to put up with ir- 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 283 

responsible "" bosses " and the increasing number of 
imperia in imjjerio characterising the organisation 
of economic forces under the favour of some form of 
protective, one had better say piratical, legislation. 
If centralisation and efficiency are cause and effect 
in economics they are the same in politics, and the 
existence of them in one will end naturally and in- 
evitably in the other, owing to the enormous eco- 
nomic interests that are involved in the very con- 
stitution of the social organism, and unless we can 
adjust our political institutions, the executive and 
legislative powers, to some adequate method of re- 
sponsibility, as they must be in order to correct 
present evils, we shall have to choose between So- 
cialism and anarchy: for the irresponsible tyranny 
of machine politics and of economic monopolies 
under their protection must end in one or the other 
of them. We have just three alternatives to Social- 
ism: (1) We may organise all the interests of the 
economic world so as to set off one of them against 
the other. Whether this be possible or not I do not 
care or require to decide. It is simply one con- 
ception of the problem. (2) We may insist upon 
universal competition and the suppression of mo- 
nopolies by the principles and policy of free trade. 
It is not necessary to speculate upon the methods 
for accomplishing this result. (3) We may shape 
the powers of government with a view to larger 
executive functions and more perfect responsibility, 



284 DEMOCRACY 

SO that we may either prevent the political and eco- 
nomic evils which give so much trouble or be pre- 
j)ared by the ability to secure better officials for the 
natural development which social and economic ten- 
dencies are supposed to necessitate. The system 
which I have proposed is at least an attempt to sup- 
ply what is required by the last alternative, and 
while it does not exclude absolutely the assumption 
of government functions on a larger scale than at 
present, it may make Socialism either unnecessary 
or incapable of doing injury. But if men cannot 
get justice and freedom from the corruption of the 
present system without more powerful government, 
they will accept Socialism as an attempt to secure 
their ends. Mr. Spencer, after years of hope 
that this would not be the direction of development, 
has at last admitted in despair that it seems inevi- 
table. "We must have the political machinery either 
to conduct that system rightly, or to prevent its oc- 
currence. 

I have no a priori objections to Socialism as an 
abstract system of government. In fact it is theo- 
retically ideal, but practical only if you have a suf- 
ficient number of ideal men to guide its operations 
rightly and to prevent mistahes and injustice. 
But we certainly either do not possess tbese requi- 
sites for any kind of Socialism, voluntary or involun- 
tary, or we have no means of making unideal men 
responsible in the exercise of the enormous powers 



PM ACTIO AL REMEDIES 285 

required by such a polity. Until one or tlie other 
of these conditions is fulfilled we must regard So- 
cialism as a system which disguises the methods of 
despotism under the cloak of humanity, and puts 
its powers in the hands of the " boss " and the mob."^' 

*As an illustration of the kind of officers we get for 
municipal government, and that democratic Socialism 
would give us, I may be permitted to quote from the 
International Journal of Ethics a passage by the man- 
ager of Hull House, Chicago, describing the career of 
one of the city's aldermen. 

" The alderman of the Nineteenth Ward owns several 
saloons, one downtown, within easy access of the City 
Hall, where he can catch the more important of his 
friends. Here again he has seized upon an old tradition 
and primitive custom — the good-fellowship which has 
long been expressed when men drink together. The 
saloons offer a common meeting ground, with stimulants 
to free the wits and tongues of the men who meet there. 

" Last Christmas, our alderman distributed six tons 
of turkeys, and four or more tons of ducks and geese; 
but each luckless biped was handed out either by him- 
self or one of his friends with a ' Merry Christmas.' 
Inevitably some families got three or four apiece, but 
what of that? He had none of the nagging rules of the 
charitable societies, nor was he ready to declare that, 
because a man wanted two turkeys for Christmas, he 
was a scoundrel who should never be allowed to eat 
turkey again. 

" There is an old story which the writer has many 
times heard, to the effect that a respectable candidate 
once tried to run against this popular alderman of ours, 
and was somewhat embarrassed by receiving an offer 
of help from the president of a large temperance society. 
He knew it would make him unpopular to be thus be- 
friended, but he did not quite dare to refuse so moral 



286 DEMOCRACY 

Monarcliy was under some responsibility in tlie 
love of its emoluments wliich could remain perma- 
nent on good behavior and respect for justice. But 
democracy, in its present state of development, has 
no restraints, as it does not fear itself and has no 

a backing-. The president and several of the members 
made a vigorous campaign, speaking in his behalf al- 
most every night at the various meetings, and impres- 
sively asserting that, if the reform candidate were 
elected, he vs^ould soon have all the saloons of the v^ard 
closed at ten o'clock at night. The candidate ventured 
to protest once or twice that he had not thought of 
going to that extreme, but this protest so shocked the 
temperance orators that he at last gave it up. Such 
a campaign naturally made him very unpopular, and 
he lost heavily. On the day of the election he was 
surprised to see the president of the temperance society 
at the polls, openly working for his rival. He was quite 
nettled enough by that time to challenge him fiercely, 
only to receive the spirited reply, ' I hope you weren't 
fool enough to think that I made those temperance 
speeches to help you along. I made them for the other 
man.' Of what use to protest? The president was 
quite willing to retire, both from the society and from 
temperance, for he had received an otfice in the City Hall. 
" The alderman's wisdom was again displayed in pro- 
curing from downtown the sum of three thousand dol- 
lars wherewith to uniform and equip a boys' temper- 
ance brigade which had been formed in the ward a few 
months before his campaign. The question does, of 
course, occur to many minds. Where does the money 
come from with which to dramatise so successfully? 
The more primitive people accept the truthful state- 
ment of its sources without any shock to their moral 
sense. To their simple minds he gets it ' from the 
rich,' and so long as he again gives it out to the poor, 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 287 

emoluments to defend except its passions and vices. 
If Socialism, then, is going to be the future type 
of government, with its control over industries and 
every function of civilisation, why not either pre- 
vent it, if dangerous, or make it harmless, if nec- 
essary, by that adjustment of integration and dif- 
ferentiation of political functions which will secure 
responsibility, intelligence, and honesty on the one 
hand, and a diminished influence for the mob on the 
other. The differentiated franchise, the increased 
powers of the executive, and the enormous influence 
of the Court of Impeachment are attempts to meet 
these demands, and I must leave both their theoreti- 

as a true Eobin Hood, with open hand, they have no 
objections to offer. Their ethics are quite honestly 
those of the merry-making- foresters. The next less 
primitive people of the vicinage are quite willing to 
admit that he leads the ' gang" ' in the city council, and 
sells out city franchises; that he makes deals with 
the franchise-seeking companies; that he guarantees 
to steer dubious measures through the council, for 
which he demands liberal pay; that he is, in short, 
a successful boodler. But when there is intellect enough 
to get this point of viev^, there is also enough to make 
the contention that this is universally done; that all 
the aldermen do it more or less successfully, but that 
the alderman of the Nineteenth Ward is unique in being 
so generous; that such a state of affairs is to be de- 
plored, of course, but that is the way business is done, 
and we are fortunate when a kind-hearted man who is 
close to the people g-ets a large share of the boodle. 
It is again the justification of stealing from the rich 
to give to the poor." 



288 DEMOCRACY 

cal and their practical value to the judgment of 
political students. 

If I am asked how I expect to get so large a 
scheme adopted, I can only reply that this is not 
my problem. 1 am simply engaged in the task of 
every political student who offers a conceivable 
remedy for some existing evil. He presents his 
theory of government and the machinery for run- 
ning it, and leaves its adoption or rejection to so- 
ciety. I am not engaged in showing how men can 
be induced or compelled to accept any proposition 
for political salvation. My task is to propose a 
policy, not to beg votes. I have prescribed the 
medicine, and leave it to the patient to be taken or 
not as he pleases. The system may not recommend 
itself to those who fear to tell the truth to the masses. 
But if the intelligent classes became convinced that 
such a system as I have suggested is adequate to the 
purpose for which it is intended they might find 
the means to secure its adoption. If it be what is 
really needed it is absurd to say that we cannot 
get it. We never get anything except by hard 
work, especially in a democracy. The old adage, 
" Where there is a will there is a way," is as 
good in politics as in morals. Intelligent men 
ought to have as much courage to act vigorously 
in behalf of any approved scheme for good gov- 
ernment as the mob has for its objects. The only 
criticism that can weigh is that the system is 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 289 

worthless. If it is not strong enough to bear 
analysis and not good enough to accomplish its ob- 
ject, and if universal suffrage with its prospective 
appendages, the referendum and the initiative, and 
the universal election of all officials be the best re- 
sult of experience, I should not care to be found 
against the proper tendency of evolution. But if 
the study of the political problem shows that some 
such institutions, involving the integration and dif- 
ferentiation of functions, as I have outhned them, 
are necessary and effective, the difficulties of the 
'' practical '' politicians, who know only to wheedle, 
flatter and deceive their constituents, will have to 
be overcome and their place supplied by men who 
have the courage either to educate the masses into 
the naked truth or to organise a revolution. If the 
system be the right one, and if nothing stands in 
the way of its adoption except the cowardice of the 
politicians and the headlong determination of the 
people to rush with the current over the precipice 
into anarchy, I for one do not care to rescue men 
from the consequences of their folly and madness. 
On the contrary, I should watch them plunge over 
into the gulf with a most malicious and vindictive 
pleasure. Once grant that civilisation can be saved 
by the reforms suggested, and intelligent men ought 
to discover a way to initiate them. They may not 
succeed by mere reasoning about the matter. If 
the politicians reasoned about government there 



390 DEMOCRACY 

would be some hope. But theirs is a policy of '^ ad- 
dition, division, and silence/' of caucus, demagogy, 
" pull," and defiance, of carrying on an absolute 
despotism under the forms of law; while the lovers 
of order and civilisation are trying a policy of 
"' sweet reasonableness '' on an army of brigands. 
" Bosses " and politicians do not reason : they act, 
and their opponents will have to adopt a similar 
policy. But the real problem for this work is 
whether such a scheme as I have proposed has any 
merits at all in the line of the evolution to which 
I appeal, and not whether it is practical after its 
theoretical value has been admitted. The true can 
always be made practical when it has been j)roved 
to be the truth. 

I confess that my own doubts regard just this 
question, whether the system correctly conceives the 
proper tendencies of evolution. For, on the one 
hand, owing to the solidarity of social and economic 
interests established by our civilisation, the power 
of wealth has enormously increased in spite of dem- 
ocratic desires to restrain it, while it has cultivated 
many of the anti-social vices incident to intellectual 
and class pride, and some incursions upon the best 
results of the family, both of which, if true, might 
serve as a basis for doubt about the propriety 
of applying an economic qualification to the fran- 
chise and devolving more power upon the aris- 
tocratic classes of society. The intellectual classes 



r 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 291 

are often no better morally than the proletariat. 
Their ideals, which involve the pursuit of phil- 
osophy, of literature, of art, and various refined lux- 
uries, while they live on salaries or judicious in- 
vestments that make active co-operation in the 
world's work and the struggle for existence unnec- 
essary, are too often purchased at the expense of the 
family and are often as selfish as the avaricious aims 
of the plutocracy, while they are mixed with an aris- 
tocratic pride and vanity that a healthy civilisation 
cannot tolerate in the management of its political 
aifairs. On the other hand, the fact that the best 
social instincts are supplied by those who keep up 
population and who require protection against the 
abuses of political power that have been identified, 
in the past at least, with economic interests and 
class pride is a consideration in favour of a system 
that guarantees this portion of the community a 
chance in the struggle for existence. An aristoc- 
racy of intellect like an aristocracy of wealth often 
proves infertile as well as negligent of healthy 
physical and social life, while the disfranchised 
classes supply population and social instincts. 
Hence there is something to say for the retention 
of political power in the hands of the people who 
furnish the social as opposed to the individualistic 
elements of life. This principle I fully admit. But 
I should claim that the conditions which it represents 
are not found in either the plutocracy or the prole- 



392 DEMOCHAGY 

tariat. There is a limit to the social contributions of 
the proletariat, on the ground that it supplies popula- 
tion, and this is where it merges into the pauper 
and criminal classes. The proper supply of social 
instincts requires more than ability to furnish popu- 
lation. It includes the intelligence and ability to 
support it, moral willingness and economic capacity 
to meet responsibility, qualities which too many of 
the proletariat show no disposition to cultivate. On 
the other hand, there is also a limit to the individual- 
ism of the intellectual aristocracy, and this is where 
the economic interests have compromised with the 
family. It is the great middle class with its combi- 
nation of economic and social interests that creates 
the hope of civilisation and good government. Con- 
sequently, the method of limiting the franchise 
which has been proposed is perfectly adjustable to 
these conditions, and will put the balance of power 
in that class which keeps the economic and social 
instincts in proper proportion. The complexity of 
the scheme does not seem an objection, because the 
problem is complex, and a simple solution of it im- 
possible. The remedy must be commensurate with 
the difficulties to be removed. The principle of the 
remedy is simple enough, and it is only its applica- 
tion to several reforms at once that gives it either the 
appearance or the reality of complexity; especially 
to those who are accustomed to seeing only one thing 
done at a time. - 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 293 

But I shall concede a point to critics whom I may 
anticipate. I have worked out the system to com- 
pleteness for the sake of recognising how much has 
to be done. I am aware that so large a scheme cannot 
be adopted at once without the offer of one of those 
emergencies that follow an abrupt determination to 
make radical changes in a constitution. Gradua- 
tion, continuity, and cautious experiment in limited 
changes are the best policy that does not involve vio- 
lence against the prejudices and passions of the time. 
Hence either as an entering wedge to the general 
adoption of such a system, or as a reform which does 
as little violence as possible to the feelings of the age, 
though looking in the direction I suggest and afford- 
ing an opportunity for useful experiment, the fol- 
lowing measures might be adopted: (1) The uni- 
versal adoption of civil service reform. (2) The 
appointment of legislative commissions with powers 
of investigation and report. (3) The establishment 
of a Court of Impeachment and Removal in munici- 
palities with an increase in the mayor's powers of ap- 
pointment. (4) The limitation of the franchise for 
the election of municipal officers. Put in this form 
the system will appear less formidable to theoretical 
critics and practical statesmen, and provision will 
be made for experience and development. If two 
or three of the measures proposed satisfy the con- 
ditions of the general problem and prove the value 
of more to complete its solution, they will be de- 



294 DEMOCRACY 

manded witli sufficient energy to secure their adop- 
tion. But to indicate the magnitude and complex- 
ity of the problem to be solved, the varied condi- 
tions under which action has to be taken, and the 
many radical reforms necessary to correct our ten- 
dency to anarchy, a whole scheme of government 
had to be presented for consideration, even at the 
risk of suspicion for its impracticability. 

But whatever be thought of it as a practical 
scheme, it reflects a widespread feeling among the in- 
tellectual classes that our political institutions are not 
fulfilling the promises of their founders, and that 
something must be done to save the best conquests 
of civilisation. Having watched and nurtured laws 
and institutions that were intended to protect the 
rights of the individual against their sacrifice to 
some state Moloch on the one hand, and to political 
mercenaries on the other, they do not view democ- 
racy setting in thunder clouds without some fears 
for the future. They wish to retain, if not demo- 
cratic forms of government, certainly democratic 
objects; namely, freedom and justice, and when 
they look at the menacing approach of political anar- 
chy from experience with universal suffrage, they 
must be pardoned for their concern and condemned 
if they do not propose a way out of it. The present 
situation has been described over and over again. 
Briefly, it is constant encroachments by the legis- 
lature upon the executive, legislation under irre- 



PRACTICAL REMEDIES 295 

sponsible ^^ bosses " for personal ends, black-mail- 
ing of corporations by politicians, and of society by 
corporations to recoup the plunder of the politician, 
or to accumulate ill-gotten gain, both of them very 
good imitations of the Spanish policy in the colonies 
which is terminating in the ruin of an empire; 
favours shown to special forms of business and in- 
dustry, unjust taxation, the irresponsible conduct 
of our legislatures whose deliberations are the signal 
for alarm and confusion in the commercial world, 
and mass-meetings every week to frighten politi- 
cians into submission, libel, bribery, and lying in 
campaign work, government by perjurers, pugilists, 
and pimps, and political leadership by men who 
know no arts but those of Alcibiades and Catiline — 
all these and a hundred other facts like them create 
a profound and justifiable suspicion of institutions 
that confer the supreme power upon those who are 
equally unfit to govern themselves and others. The 
concern is all the more impressive and justifiable 
when we look at the present blind progress toward 
imperialism and colonial expansion without the 
slightest constitutional equipment for carrying 
out such a policy. If anything would establish the 
absolute unfitness of Congress to undertake this 
business, it is the ignorance, demagogy and fatuous 
inconsistencies which that body displayed in its 
haste to bring about the present war with Spain. 
Only a little piece of good fortune exists that can 



296 DEMOCRACY 

save Congress from Tiniversal reprobation. It can 
take an ex post facto shelter from tlie judgment 
upon its own iniquity by referring to the corruption 
and inhumanity of Spanish colonial policy. Such 
a body cannot safely enter upon empire with uni- 
versal suffrage for capital and " bosses " for rulers. 
But this solicitude for civilisation and its inheri- 
tance is not a craving for arbitrary government. It 
is merely a warning fear that society cannot be 
saved by peaceful and constitutional methods. The 
situation is one that calls for action. If we parley 
we are lost. We have to choose, with the growing 
density of population and complexity of socio-eco- 
nomic interests, between government by intelligence 
and government by the mob under mercenary politi- 
cians. With tendencies running rapidly toward the 
latter, though nominally in constitutional forms, 
but really excluding every moral qualification for 
good government, intelligent men have no time to 
waste in merely barking at them. They have at 
least to propose a possible remedy for trial as the 
only alternative to violent revolution, which, though 
it be a century distant, can only bring the man on 
horseback for a law-maker. 



INDEX 



Alcibiades, 22, 294 
Alexander, 97 
Animism, 91 
Aristocracy, 39, 43 
Aristotle, 3; work of, 39- 

41, 95 
Atomism, 92 

Bluntschli, 50 

Bodin, 75, 76 

Bosses, political, 32, 84, 

125, 265-272 
Bryce, Mr., 13-15 
Burke, 1, 188 

Caesar, 97 

Castelar, 11 

Catiline, 294 

Charlemagne, 97 

Checks and balances, 82, 

87, 112, 120, 163 
Christianity, 25, 59, 61 
Church and state, 63-69 
Civil service reform, 146- 

167 
Cleveland, President, 146 
Commission, Interstate 

Commerce, 112, 175 



Commissions, 174-181 
Confirmation, Court of, 

183-185, 192, 225 
Court of Confirmation, 

183-185, 192, 225 
Court of Impeachment and 

Eemoval, 141, 176, 180, 

183, 185-211, 225, 266, 292 
Court, Supreme, 119, 136, 

165, 180, 194-196 

Democracy, 1; economic 
and other changes af- 
fecting, 3 ; DeTocqueville 
on, 4-9; in Greece and 
Eome, 10; compared 
with monarchy, 12, 30, 
101; present conditions 
under bosses, 31-32 ; 
modern, 40; nature and 
objects of, 43; logical 
tendency of, 123 

Democritus, 100 

De Tocqueville, 4; attitude 
on democracy, 4-9, 136 

Differentiation of func- 
tion, integration and, 
103-109, 116 



29T 



298 



INDEX 



Economic ideal, 24, 28-29, 
99 

Empire, Holy Eoman, 19, 
28 

England, 56, 82 

Eng-lish Parliament, 81-82, 
114, 189; system of rep- 
resentation, 142, 168-171 

Epicurus, 100 

Erie Canal, 15 

Evolution, law of, 103-109, 
116; ethics of, 261-263 

Franchise, the, 211-265; 
manner of applying, 219, 
233; property qualifica- 
tion for, 238; criteria of 
a limited, 264 
French Kepublicanism, 11 
French Eevolution, 1 

Gladstone, Mr., 169 
Godkin, Mr., 114, 139 
Government, right to par- 
ticipate in, 20-21 
Greece, 10 

Harcourt, Sir William, 169 

Hobbes' doctrine of sover- 
eignty, 55, 75-80, 118, 
119, 186; theory of the 
state, 72-75 

Holy Koman Empire, 19, 
28 

Houses, Lower, 179, 180, 
219; Upper, 230 

Ideals, economic and ethi- 
cal, 24, 28-29 



Ideas and political ma- 
chinery, 22-24, 38, 71 

Immortality of the soul, 
relation of, to democ- 
racy, 25, 27; influence of, 
on the value of the indi- 
vidual, 61, 98 

Impeachment and Remov- 
al, Court of, 141, 176, 180, 
183, 185-211 

Imperialism, 25; in Greece, 
48, 50; Greco-Eoman, 57 

Individual liberty, 28, 30 

Individualism, 27, 59 

Inhibition, 119, 137 

Initiative, referendum and, 
122-137 

Integration and differen- 
tiation of function, 103- 
109, 116 

Intelligence and charac- 
ter, relation of, to gov- 
ernment, 24, 129, 138, 151, 
166 

Judiciary, 142, 273-276 

Lecky, Mr., 1, 4, 12, 32, 277; 

quotes Mr. Bryce, 13-15; 

nature of his work, 15-18 
Lower Houses, 179, 180, 219 

Macaulay, 3 

Machiavelli, 74 

Machine politics, 32, ^65; 

correction of, 265-273 
Maine, Sir Henry, 2, 18 
Masses, the, 19-22 



INDEX 



299 



Materialism of ancient civ- 
ilisation, 26 

Middle Ages, 19-20 

Military power, 187, 197- 
200 

Mommsen, 205 

Monarchy, 12, 30, 87, 101, 
278-280, 285 

Monism, 92 

Morley, John, 169 

Napoleon, 97 

Organism, nature of social, 

109-112 

Paganism, 62 
Parliament, 81-82, 114, 189 
Philosophy and politics, 

38, 45, 89-104 
Plato's Eepublic, 47, 95 
Political " bosses," 32, 84, 

125 
Political machinery and 

ideas, 22-24 
Political rights, 20-21, 150, 

212, 253-259 
Pollock, Sir Frederick, 75, 

77, 79 
Polytheism, 94, 95 
Power and responsibility. Pome, 10, 25 

24, 40, 54, 73, 83; reaction 

against Hobbes' doc- Socialism, 30-31, 259, 282- 

trine, 84-88; in office, 153, 287 

154 Sovereignty, 49-59; origin 

Primary election reform, of conception in military 

272 civilisation, 52, 58-59; 



Property and its relation 
to civilisation, 242-251 

Property qualitication for 
the suffrage, 238 

Protestant Reformation, 
28 

Quantity and quality of 
rulers, 42-44 

Referendum and initiative, 
122-137 

Reform of the primaries, 
272 

Reformation, Protestant, 
28 

Removal, Court of Im- 
peachment and, 141, 176, 
180, 183, 185-211 

Representation, English 
system of, 142, 168-171 

Responsibility, power and, 
24, 40, 54, 73, 160; reac- 
tion against Hobbes' 
doctrine, 84-88, 117-118; 
" bosses " and, 125; in of- 
fice, 153, 154, 162 

Roman Empire, 148 

Roman Empire, Holy, 19, 
28 



300 INDEX 

nature of conception, 75- Tribunes of the Commons, 

80; English Parliament 205-208, note 

and, 81-82; limitation of, 

86 Upper Houses, 179, 180, 

Spencer, Mr., 101, 283 219, 230, 266 
Supreme Court, 119, 136, 

165, 180, 194-196, 275 Wines, Mr. F. H., 250 

Thnrman, Judge, 170 Xerxes, 97 



JAN Id »»99 



